Homer Simpson Ponders Politics: Popular Culture as Political Theory by Foy, Joseph J. & Dale, Timothy M.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
American Popular Culture American Studies 
4-23-2013 
Homer Simpson Ponders Politics: Popular Culture as Political 
Theory 
Joseph J. Foy 
University of Wisconsin, Waukesha 
Timothy M. Dale 
University of Wisconsin, La Crosse 
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Thanks to the University of Kentucky Libraries and the University Press of Kentucky, this book is 
freely available to current faculty, students, and staff at the University of Kentucky. 
Find other University of Kentucky Books at uknowledge.uky.edu/upk. For more information, 
please contact UKnowledge at uknowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Foy, Joseph J. and Dale, Timothy M., "Homer Simpson Ponders Politics: Popular Culture as Political 
Theory" (2013). American Popular Culture. 14. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_american_popular_culture/14 

Homer Simpson Ponders Politics

Homer SimpSon 
ponderS politicS
Popular Culture as 
Political Theory
Edited by 
Joseph J. Foy and 
TimoThy m. Dale
Foreword by 
margareT Weis
Copyright © 2013 by The University Press of Kentucky
Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth,
serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, 
Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown 
College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead 
State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, 
Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville,
and Western Kentucky University.
All rights reserved.
Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky
663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008
www.kentuckypress.com
17 16 15 14 13  5 4 3 2 1
Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN: 978-0-8131-4147-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN: 978-0-8131-4150-3 (epub)
ISBN: 978-0-8131-4151-0 (pdf)
This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the 
American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library 
Materials.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
Member of the Association of
American University Presses
This book is dedicated to our parents.

Contents
Foreword by Margaret Weis ix
Introduction: Popular Culture as Political Theory: Plato, Aristotle, and 
Homer 1
Joseph J. Foy
Part 1. Classical Insights and Civic Virtue
 1. A Tale of Two Republics: Plato, Palpatine, and Politics 13
   Dean A. Kowalski
 2. Aristotle’s Politics and the Virtues of Springfield: Community,  
   Education, and Friendship in The Simpsons 29
   Timothy M. Dale
 3. “Keep Your Friends Close but Your Enemies Closer”: Machiavelli and  
   Michael Corleone 45
   Eric T. Kasper
Part 2. The State, the Individual, and Political Morality
 4. Social Contract: Rebellion and Dissent aboard Serenity 63
   Susanne E. Foster and James B. South
 5. Dwight Schrute and Servile Ambition: Tacitus and Rousseau on the  
   Lackey Politics of The Office 75
   Matthew D. Mendham
 6. Who Watches the Watchmen? Kant, Mill, and Political Morality in the 
   Shadow of Manhattan 97
   S. Evan Kreider
Part 3. The Limitations and Possibilities of Political Life
 7. Avatar, Marx, and the Alienation of Labor 115
   Mark C. E. Peterson
 8. Nietzschean Narratives of Hero and Herd in Walt Disney / Pixar’s The  
   Incredibles 131
   C. Heike Schotten
 9. Muggles, Magic, and Misfits: Michel Foucault at Harry Potter’s  
   Hogwarts 147
   Jamie Warner
10. Feminism, Sexism, and the Small Screen: Television’s Complicated  
   Relationship with Women 163
   Denise Du Vernay
Part 4: The Promises and Problems of Liberal Democracy
11. From John Wayne to John McClane: The Hollywood Action Hero and  
   the Critique of the Liberal State 183
   Carl Bergetz
12. J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit, or, There and Back Again: Recovering a  
   Platonic-Aristotelian Politics of Friendship in Liberal  
   Democracy 203
   Mary M. Keys
13. “Just Give Them the Internet”: Social Media and the Promise of  
   Liberal Democracy 233
   Joseph J. Foy
Acknowledgments 251
List of Contributors 253
Index 257
ix
Fore word
In describing what it means to be an author, Gary Paulsen once told me 
something I always remember: “We are the guy in the tribe who puts on 
the wolfskin and dances around the fire.”
That ancient storyteller was an entertainer. He made the members of 
his tribe forget that they were shivering with cold or wondering where they 
might find the next meal. But he was doing more than entertaining. Through 
his tales, the storyteller was passing on tribal traditions, maintaining an oral 
history of his people, and instilling values that would enable them to survive.
He used the thrilling story of an exciting hunt to show the members of 
the tribe working together to bring down game. His description of a warrior’s 
heroic death that ended up saving his people taught the value of self-sacrifice. 
The storyteller learned how to embellish the story in ways that stirred the 
emotions of those hearing it, so that they would remember it. If Homer had 
never told his tale, how many of us today would know about the fall of Troy?
As storytellers, we want our readers to enjoy our work, but we also want 
them to think about it. In fantasy fiction, the presence of different races such 
as elves and humans and dwarves gives the author the perfect opportunity to 
talk about racial discrimination. Not only is racial tension a good storytelling 
element; reading about the hurt and anguish and indignation suffered by 
an elf who is thrown out of the humans-only tavern can encourage readers 
to think about race relations in their own lives.
Since many adventurers often frequent taverns, my coauthor, Tracy 
Hickman, and I decided to make one of our characters an alcoholic. We did 
research on the subject and attempted to make our portrayal as accurate as 
possible. In writing about his struggles and the problems the other characters 
encounter trying to deal with him, we hoped to reach those readers who 
might find themselves in the same situation. We also wanted to encourage 
other readers to give serious thought to the issue.
Not only do human prejudices and fears, flaws and failings make for good 
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storytelling; they serve to ground the fantastic in what the reader knows to 
be real, helping the reader suspend disbelief. One reason the Harry Potter 
novels are so successful is that they are about children in school. Never mind 
that in this school the children fly on broomsticks. The idea of being a kid 
in a classroom, having to deal with classmates and teachers, is something 
to which we all can relate.
Readers of books and those who write them will find much to think 
about in this interesting and entertaining book. I feel very privileged to have 
been invited to write the foreword.
And now, if you’ll excuse me, I have to go find my wolfskin. It’s time 
to tell a story.
Margaret Weis
1introduction
PoPular Culture as 
PolitiCal theory
Plato, Aristotle, and Homer
Joseph J. Foy
When people told themselves their past with stories, explained their present 
with stories, foretold their future with stories; the best place by the fire 
was kept for the storyteller.
—The Storyteller (opening sequence)
In 1987 Jim Henson, most famous, of course, for his Muppets, created and 
produced the first installment of The Storyteller. Combining live acting and 
puppetry, Henson used this award-winning television series to recreate myth 
narratives from around the world and, in the process, remind audiences 
of all ages of the importance and power of the stories a society chooses to 
tell. In each episode, the Storyteller (in the first season played by John Hurt 
and in the second season by Michael Gambon) magically brought to life 
tales of German, Russian, Celtic, Norwegian, and Greek traditions, each 
one offering humanistic insights into questions of power, ethics, religious 
belief, tradition, social hierarchy, the individual, and the “other.” These tales, 
which had been told throughout time and across cultures, served as a means 
for dealing with the big questions that have long plagued communities of 
people: questions about truth, justice, freedom, equality, and ethics. And 
underneath the stories lay expressions of cultural values and frameworks 
for understanding the world and our place within it.
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American mythologist Joseph Campbell (1904–1987) describes myths 
like those presented in The Storyteller as “living inspiration of whatever else 
may have appeared out of the activities of the human body and mind,” argu-
ing that “religions, philosophies, arts, the social forms . . . boil up from the 
basic, magic ring of myth.”1 Campbell and other mythologists and folklorists, 
who ultimately address the common themes and symbols found through a 
cross-cultural comparison, use the popular stories shared within societies 
to reveal deeper insights into the messages they convey about the common 
philosophies contained in those societies.
It will likely come as no surprise to students of political theory, then, 
that myths—shared through stories, music, poetry, art, and sermon—have 
always been a way to communicate the principles and ideals of a society, as 
well as to frame and present insights regarding liberty, property, justice, rights, 
power, and community. Philosophers dating back to Confucius (551–479 
BCE) praised poetic works like those contained in the Chinese Book of Songs 
(many of which were also, or later became, popular songs), noting that such 
poems are invaluable to moral education. Italian philosopher Machiavelli 
(1469–1527) turned to dramatization to present a philosophical allegory about 
virtue ethics and community: his play La Mandragola. More recently, Ayn 
Rand (1905–1982), a screenwriter-playwright turned novelist and philoso-
pher, influenced countless conservative, libertarian, and Objectivist thinkers 
with her popular fiction novels The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, and 
democratic socialist thinker and writer George Orwell (1903–1950) penned 
compelling critiques of Stalinism and the totalitarian state in 1984 and Animal 
Farm. These narratives, poems, and dramatizations, just like the shared myths 
passed down through time, express the dominant values, ideals, and beliefs 
that define political culture and pose allegorical thought-experiments that can 
guide our reasoning when approaching problems both personal and public.
Popular Culture and the Modern Mythos
But where are our modern myths? Has civilization advanced beyond the 
need for stories and song to transfer cultural values and political philoso-
phies across wide audiences of people? Do we still use dramatization and 
art to create a common cultural experience? Along with revolutions in 
democracy, education, production, and capitalization, modernity ushered 
in challenges to traditional social arrangements. With mass production 
and mass communication, technologies began to emerge that transformed 
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the ways human beings interacted with one another. In the distant past, 
tribal associations and feudalistic arrangements tied people’s identity to 
what was immediately present in their lives; then the ability to move more 
freely, communicate more openly, and engage in society more horizontally 
presented the conditions for modern nationalistic identities and eventually 
introduced pressures of globalization that began pushing against long-held 
cultural institutions. No longer was there a spot by a common fire where 
everyone gathered to listen as the storyteller told myth narratives or the 
balladeer sang songs to make sense of the world. Instead, people sought out 
entertainment in movie theaters and from radio and television programs; 
now they have Internet and other technologies as well. And yet, what is 
more and more apparent is that while technologies have changed and our 
methods of telling stories are different, we still share in fictional works as a 
means of framing the world around us and shaping a common culture. The 
acrid smoke of the campfire has been replaced by the whitish-blue glow of 
the film projector, but the organization of the world and the conveyance of 
values and beliefs through stories have endured.
For instance, Campbell describes how the same heroic myths that were 
shared for ages across cultures and traditions emerged in popular films like 
Star Wars.2 He suggests that the Star Wars saga is “not a simple morality play” 
but a myth that reveals social truths about humanity, our place within social 
and political systems, and “the powers of life as they are either fulfilled or 
broken and suppressed through the action of man.”3 Describing the parallel 
journeys of Anakin Skywalker / Darth Vader and his son Luke, Campbell ar-
ticulates how this film series weaves a tale that struggles with the same social 
and political and humanitarian questions told in classical myths, religious 
allegories, and narrative literature throughout the ages. Star Wars, Campbell 
notes, represents “not a specific historical situation . . . [but] an operation of 
principles.”4 He argues that a similar transference of these messages occurs 
in other venues of popular culture, from the smallest nursery fairy tale to 
“the latest incarnation of Oedipus, [and] the continued romance of Beauty 
and the Beast, [which] stand this afternoon on Forty Second Street and Fifth 
Avenue, waiting for the traffic light to change.”5
The Praisers of Homer
These stories that we share through mass media and common values that 
are shaped through consumer culture direct and shape our attitudes and 
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perspectives related to our position as citizens within the state and as part of 
the world. Yet, many people are openly hostile to the idea of using popular 
culture as a vehicle for engaging in discussions about politics and political 
theory. Their criticisms range from the lack of sophistication and depth of 
popular culture itself to the ubiquitous nature of popular-culture books that 
are overrunning the shelves at local booksellers and working their way into 
the halls of academia. Popular culture is dismissed as at best a distraction 
and at worst a threat to the reasoned discourse and civic responsibilities 
necessary in contemporary democratic societies.6
Such a critique of popular culture’s role in shaping attitudes and behaviors 
is not new. Plato (427–347 BCE) presented similar sentiments in several of 
his dialogues. For instance, in a conversation with Glaucon in book 10 of 
The Republic, Socrates denounces the role that art and poetry—the popular 
culture of Greek society at the time—play in shaping perceptions of truth 
and human affairs. Calling out the “praisers of Homer,” Socrates contends 
that if we “accept the honeyed Muse, in song or poetry, pleasure and pain will 
be the twin kings in [our] city in place of established custom and the thing 
which has always been generally accepted as best—reason.”7 Put simply, art-
istry and poetics are intended to appeal to an arousal of passions and not of 
reason, and therefore they can pull individuals away from a rational pursuit 
of truth and into the realm of making decisions based on irrational, emo-
tional urges. Socrates also contends within this and other dialogues that such 
artistry amounts to mere imitation (mimesis) of human affairs, and a poor 
rendering at that.8 Human reason, which is complex and discursive, cannot 
be captured adequately by the artist who attempts to imitate and convey it 
through an unsophisticated mimicry. Likewise, since there is an ideal form 
of truth in the universe, according to Platonic thought, imitation cannot do it 
justice. Artists and poets present a false representation of the form; it cannot 
be packaged so crudely. The point was that the art produced by the poets of 
that age was misleading and potentially damaging to the politics of the just 
state because it distracted people from the truth and gave them a false sense 
of reality. So fearful of the disruptive and destructive power of popular culture 
is Plato (often seen as allowing his views to be presented through Socrates 
in The Republic) that he says such artisans ought to be either controlled to 
the benefit of the just state—wrapped up in his conception of the “noble lie” 
used to maintain order in society—or banished entirely.
And what would Plato contend given the ubiquitous nature of popular 
culture today? There is little doubt that he would condemn the nearly three 
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hours each day—roughly 12 percent of the year—that Americans spend 
watching television (about half of the time that adults age fifteen and over 
in the United States devote to leisure) and the over $10.5 billion received at 
the box office in the United States in 2009 and again in 2010.9 In particular, 
Plato would be critical of the diversity of popular culture available that is 
uncontrolled in terms of message. Films like The Hangover and its sequel 
(both of them among the one hundred top-grossing films of all time) glo-
rify what he would almost certainly deem as the less noble aspects of hu-
man nature and behavior. Certainly, if Plato was skeptical of the intellects 
of his age who admired Homer the poet, “who has educated Greece,” and 
declared that he was “worth studying both for our general education and 
for the management of human affairs,”10 one can only imagine the scorn he 
would have for scholars who claim that Homer the Simpson is educating 
America and ought to be studied for insights into the social order and the 
human condition.
Aristotle (384–322 BCE), a student of Plato’s, shared his teacher’s as-
sumptions that the artistry of popular culture amounts to imitation of an 
ideal form and that it possesses powerful rhetorical possibilities. However, 
unlike Plato, Aristotle embraced the arousal of passion through emotional 
appeal (pathos) as an important tool in the communication arsenal.11 In 
fact, in his Rhetoric, Aristotle suggests that, among some audiences, it is 
difficult (if even possible) to produce conviction with mere facts and logic. 
Rhetoric, including the rhetorical power of persuasion through emotional 
appeals as presented through artistic media, serves as a method of persua-
sion in particular contexts where presentation of logic alone fails to inspire. 
Popular culture forms such as stories, dramatic works, poems, music, and 
visual artistry can, therefore, be a means of communicating and persuading 
and can work to engage and inform audiences in ways that logic and the 
presentation of fact simply cannot. Moreover, as Aristotle suggests, these 
forms go beyond mere presentation for the sake of entertainment or pacifi-
cation: they are ways to communicate meaning. The creative talents behind 
contemporary popular culture are also conveying ideas and perspectives 
through the medium of entertainment.
Popular Culture and the Many Promises of Political Thinking
Of course, what is important to remember is that Plato never suggests that 
popular culture is unimportant or that it does not play a highly influential 
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role in shaping personal identity and communicating cultural values. On 
the contrary, if popular culture were ineffective in these ways, its purveyors 
would not be regarded as a threat. It is only because popular culture narra-
tives are so powerful in conveying messages that resonate with audiences 
long after the credits roll or the song ends that they are so “dangerous.” After 
all, Plato himself presents his philosophical works in dramatic dialogue akin 
to the script of a play, and his mentor Socrates tells allegorical stories like 
“Allegory of the Cave” and “Ring of Gyges” to explore questions about truth, 
morality, legalism, justice, and power. Plato also advocated the presenta-
tion of a “Noble Lie,” a myth about the nature of the soul and its force in 
determining a person’s place in society, to persuade people to accept their 
station and not disrupt what he considered the just ordering of the state.
The presumption of Plato is that there is only a singular form of the 
properly ordered state and that the only popular culture we ought to al-
low is that which perpetuates that vision. However, the history of politi-
cal thought introduces a battery of prominent thinkers, each of whom 
contributes insights into notions of justice, equality, virtue, the properly 
ordered society, and the good life. This political theory canon surfaces 
in our popular culture narratives and is a part of our common, cultural 
conversation. We may not directly invoke Thomas Hobbes, but we wrestle 
with his assumptions about the state of nature and the power of the state 
when we read of the troubles of Katniss Everdeen and Peeta Mellark in 
Suzanne Collins’s The Hunger Games. Whether or not we read Friedrich 
Nietzsche, we are presented with his arguments through the words of 
Voldemort, who tells Harry Potter at the end of The Sorcerer’s Stone that 
“there is no good and evil, only power and those too weak to seek it.” And 
as the chapters in this book illustrate, we watch Platonic philosophy in 
Star Wars, Aristotelian theories of community and virtue in The Simpsons, 
Machiavellian approaches to power in The Godfather, and contemporary 
Marxism in full 3D-effect in Avatar.
In part 1 of the book, authors use staples of American popular culture 
to examine classic treatments of civic virtue and the just society. In the first 
chapter, Dean A. Kowalski draws parallels between George Lucas’s Star Wars 
universe and Platonic political thinking, and in chapter 2 Timothy M. Dale 
offers an Aristotelian counter to Plato’s conception as presented through the 
community of Springfield in The Simpsons. Eric T. Kasper concludes this 
part with a look at Francis Ford Coppola’s Godfather trilogy as a presenta-
tion of Machiavellian thought and reflections on power. Collectively, these 
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chapters establish a foundation for considering the proper organization of 
society, as well as the role of the virtuous leader and the power of the state.
Part 2 explores the foundations and origins of the state, which help to 
provide insights about the purpose the state serves (or ought to serve) in 
establishing a framework for society. Susanne E. Foster and James B. South 
use Joss Whedon’s space-western series Firefly and the companion film 
Serenity to highlight the importance of social-contract principles guiding 
perspectives on rational legalism and limitations on state authority. This is 
followed by Matthew D. Mendham’s analysis of the popular sitcom The Of-
fice; in it he finds insight into the writings of another social-contract thinker, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and of the famed Roman historian Marcus Cornelius 
Tacitus, who explore the pathologies and underlying theories of leadership 
within a republican system. In chapter 6, S. Evan Kreider examines Alan 
Moore’s graphic novel Watchmen and contrasts the Kantian universalism of 
the character Rorschach with the utilitarian views of Ozymandias.
Part 3 confronts the limitations and possibilities of political life and the 
ways in which these challenges are presented in popular culture narratives. 
Mark C. E. Peterson shows how James Cameron’s Avatar, the highest-grossing 
movie of all time, illustrates Marxist notions of alienation that one experi-
ences in the materialist bonds of capitalist society. C. Heike Schotten decon-
structs the Nietzschean critiques of modern thinking in the Disney/Pixar 
film The Incredibles, and Jamie Warner looks at the Foucauldian themes of 
power and discipline in J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter books. Denise Du Vernay 
concludes part 3 with an analysis of popular culture and the identity mes-
saging that comes through many prominent forms of entertainment media.
Part 4 offers a look into the problems and promises of liberal democracy. 
In chapter 11, Carl Bergetz explains how the action-movie genre exposes 
the conservative political theory that constructs the iconic action hero in 
American cinema, glorifying illiberal themes and posing challenges to 
underlying assumptions made by democratic orders. In chapter 12, Mary 
M. Keys explores J. R. R. Tolkien’s classic fairy stories and epic novel The 
Hobbit and finds commentary on virtue and Tocquevillian perspectives on 
liberal democracy. Finally, Joseph J. Foy examines the political and cultural 
transformation being ushered in by new media and social networking, which 
replace the singular storyteller with the voices of the many. Foy argues that 
elite control of discourse is disappearing as more and more people tell their 
own narratives—their own stories—in fulfillment of the democratic promise 
of liberal societies.
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Ultimately, how we think about questions of rights, justice, equality, 
freedom, power, the state, and a host of other questions long debated in the 
field of political theory is just as profoundly shaped at the box office as in the 
classroom. How we conceive of ourselves in relation to the political system or 
feel and deliberate about the authority and legitimacy of institutions, actors, 
and outcomes in government is influenced and directed as much by the char-
acters and complications of our television shows or the lyrics to our favorite 
songs as by traditional media or town hall debate. As political thinkers, we 
cannot dismiss the importance of philosophical messaging in popular culture. 
As citizens, we cannot presume that the storytellers of our age are not helping 
us to explain our past, understand our present, and foretell our future.
This volume is a testament to the notion that those conversations are 
happening within our popular culture, where the political theory canon is 
alive and well in our movies, our television shows, our music, our novels, 
and our media; in the myth narratives of modern America.12 And so our 
story begins “a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away,” where we turn for 
entertainment and, at the same time, learn more about our politics, our 
world, and ourselves.
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1
a tale oF two rePubliCs
Plato, Palpatine, and Politics
Dean A. Kowalski
One doesn’t often hear the names Plato and George Lucas uttered in the 
same sentence. We could muse, I suppose, that if the former solidified 
the intellectual importance of the ancient Greeks, the other solidified the 
cultural importance of modern geeks. But deeper connections exist, if one 
looks. Consider that both have authored politically charged tomes that have 
become classics in their respective fields. And each of these classics has quite 
a bit to say about the intricacies of, well, a republic.
It is admittedly unlikely that George Lucas had Plato’s Republic open 
on his desk when he began penning the Star Wars saga. Nevertheless, the 
parallels are rather striking. By learning more about Plato’s Republic, we 
achieve a novel and effective perspective for better grasping how Palpatine 
so efficiently transformed the Galactic Republic into the Galactic Empire, 
installing himself as emperor. Yet the Galactic Republic provides an interest-
ing medium for better appreciating some of Plato’s ideals, especially those 
pertaining to the locus of political power. So making connections between 
Plato’s Republic and Lucas’s Galactic Republic facilitates deeper insights 
into each.
Society and the State
By the “state,” political philosophers mean (roughly) a unified but structured 
society. Thus discussions of the ideal state invariably involve how, optimally, 
society should be structured. Who should preserve its well-being and direct 
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its future, thereby possessing political power? How should the holders of 
political power be selected? How extensive should their power be? Should 
there be limits to that power, and if so, what should be done if the limits 
are violated? For that matter, should the state be structured to politically 
empower anyone at all?
These questions are difficult and therefore lend credence to the enterprise 
of political philosophy. But they have something else in common. Because 
each question explores aspects of how society should be ideally structured, 
but society is made up of individuals, they cannot be answered apart from 
a more basic question: what is best or optimal for the individuals making 
up the society? This is why the term state is often used interchangeably with 
commonwealth: what is in everyone’s best interests—the common good—in 
terms of structuring society?
Thus discussions of the ideal state also invariably involve assumptions 
about human nature. This was also true in Plato’s day. In the Republic, Plato 
uses his brother Glaucon as the mouthpiece for the commonly held view that 
human beings are driven by their desires for personal gain and satisfaction. 
Glaucon bolstered this contention with a story about Gyges, a shepherd who 
finds a magical gold ring. When the ring face is turned one way, its wearer 
becomes invisible. Gyges immediately utilizes the ring to fulfill all of his 
desires, including becoming king. Glaucon fears that any person would 
act this way. If there were no negative consequences for our indiscretions, 
why care about anything or anyone besides yourself? But, of course, magic 
rings are imaginary; consequences for moral and legal infractions are real. 
Moreover, being subjected to the whims of politically powerful individuals 
constantly seeking their selfish ends, especially if there is no way for you 
to obtain recompense or restitution, is not desirable. (Imagine living as a 
slave on Tatooine under Hutt rule.) Therefore, each of us implicitly strikes a 
bargain by agreeing to follow the laws of the state. Although it’s sometimes 
about as much fun as kissing a Wookie, following state-sanctioned mandates 
keeps us civil, for the common good. This social arrangement is the best we 
can realistically hope for.
Plato spends a great deal of time and effort in the Republic arguing that 
the view Glaucon espouses is false. He agrees that most of us are driven by 
our baser, animalistic drives and that we often act on these desires. However, 
it isn’t necessary that we do. There is more to human nature than merely its 
beastly (rancor) side. Furthermore, under the proper circumstances, human-
ity can make important strides toward perfection. Human nature is perfected 
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when the multiple facets of humankind act optimally, thereby achieving a 
sort of harmony among them. The ideal state should be structured so as to 
mirror, and reinforce, the ideal form of humanity. Plato’s goal, as a social 
and political philosopher, is to explain just what that structure is and what 
circumstances must obtain to achieve it.
For Plato, everything within the ideal state functions optimally. Justice 
prevails when the citizens and the various factions of society all work har-
moniously with one another. With no disputes or squabbles, everyone in the 
state is properly provided for and everyone is happy, which obviously is the 
common good. Plato believes that such an ideal state is synonymous with 
the just state. But when some citizens or factions act contrary to the way they 
should function, the state becomes disordered; injustice ensues and citizens 
of the state become unhappy. Therefore, Plato holds that there is a conceptual 
link between justice and happiness as they pertain to the commonwealth. 
A perfectly just state is perfectly happy. So, because everyone clearly wishes 
to be perfectly happy, the denizens of a commonwealth have a good reason 
to work toward the goal of living in a perfectly just state.
The Republic Goes Galactic
Plato’s architecture for a perfectly ordered state consists of three presupposi-
tions. The first presupposition advises a division of labor. Some individuals 
seem better equipped for some jobs than for others. This is common sense. 
For instance, some people excel at running a business, such as Watto the 
junk dealer. Others possess the dexterity needed for piloting a podracer, 
such as the Dug Sebulba. But Watto cannot pilot a podracer, and Sebulba 
shows little aptitude for managing a business or bookkeeping. These fictional 
examples remind us of the reality that none of us is completely self-sufficient. 
Rather than forcing us to do everything for ourselves, why not encourage 
each to develop his or her own aptitudes? A division of labor is better for 
the state and its citizens.
Plato’s second presupposition is that each citizen falls within one of 
three societal groups based on the person’s natural aptitudes and abilities. 
Just as we might say a young Bith is a born jazz horn player, Plato extends 
this intuition into classifying kinds of people as “profit-loving” (producers), 
“victory-loving” (guardians), or “philosophical” (rulers).1 The first faction is 
the most populous; it is made up of farmers, craftsmen, physicians, bankers, 
and merchants, among others. This class of citizens includes those who most 
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efficiently provide the day-to-day goods, services, and sustenance for the 
commonwealth; they accomplish these activities most efficiently because 
they naturally excel at them.
Lucas’s far-away and long-ago galaxy is replete with this group of 
denizens. There are moisture farmers on Tatooine, those in the Agricul-
tural Corps (on Bandomeer and elsewhere), Corellian spice-runners, diner 
owners such as Dex on Coruscant, and Geonosian droid-makers. But there 
are also larger consortiums, for example, the Intergalactic Banking Clan, 
the Techno Union, and the Trade Federation. Furthermore, Lucas concurs 
with Plato that individuals pursuing these professions are (often) naturally 
suited to them. Neimoidians, for example, seem particularly adept to be 
part of, if not to lead, the Trade Federation; they are driven by greed and 
profit seemingly as a result of their very (insectlike) rearing. Note also how 
the Trade Federation secures the essential financial lifeblood of the galaxy 
by transporting goods and services to the Outer Rim, keeping planets like 
Naboo connected to the Core.
Plato’s second societal faction, guardians, would today take in police 
officers, firefighters, members of the National Guard, and the military. 
This class of citizens is marked by their innate tendencies to be courageous 
and strong and to have a sense of adventure; they most efficiently provide 
protection for the commonwealth, defending it both from within (police, 
firefighters, the National Guard) and without (the army and the navy), be-
cause they naturally excel at the necessary activities.
The primary example of the guardian class in Lucas’s Star Wars saga 
is none other than the Jedi. Given the prominent role of the Jedi, this may 
surprise some readers. But recall that the life of a Jedi is one of service to 
the Senate and to the Galactic Republic generally. The Jedi are peacekeepers, 
looking to always maintain balance in the Force. On rare occasions they act 
like the National Guard to quell some squabble or dispute, as when Qui-Gon 
Jinn and Obi-Wan Kenobi were sent to defuse the Trade Federation block-
ade of Naboo or Obi-Wan and Anakin were assigned to ensure the safety 
of Senator Amidala during her stay on Coruscant. The Galactic Republic 
lacked a standing military—at least until the clone soldiers were mobilized 
to defend against the threat of the Separatists and their droid armies. Thus, 
the Galactic Republic also has groups responsible for quashing internal and 
external threats to its safety.
Plato’s third faction intriguingly arises out of the second. Initially, 
children with natural aptitudes for guardianship receive the same training. 
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But soon enough, a subgroup with particularly noteworthy intellectual 
gifts is identified. Those individuals receive very specialized academic and 
administrative training to become the governmental rulers and the societal 
leaders. Plato believed that this group would be rather small in number and 
that their training would last many decades. The exact political organization 
of this class is left rather unclear, but Plato advocated that they live in a sort 
of communal arrangement. They were to lack private property and not be 
concerned with wealth (416d–417b). The idea is to reinforce that they are 
to lead for the common good and not out of personal interest. In any event, 
this is the smallest class, made up of the most intelligent, rational, and self-
controlled people—those best naturally suited to make difficult economic, 
social, and foreign policy decisions on behalf of the commonwealth.
Lucas’s Galactic Republic also has political leaders of various sorts. But 
much unlike Plato, Lucas created political leaders that are something of a 
mixed bag. There is Supreme Chancellor Valorum, who serves as the chief 
of state residing in the capital city-planet of Coruscant. He seems to be an 
honorable man but is not a terribly effective leader. The Senate, also housed 
on Coruscant, comprises numerous representatives from all the star systems 
within the galaxy, not all of whom are forthright and well-respected. The 
Senate also includes delegates representing various special-interest groups, 
for example, Senator Lott Dod of the Trade Federation. The various star 
systems, in turn, benefit from their own local political structures. For ex-
ample, Naboo elects a monarch serving for a limited term to safeguard the 
interests of its system.
The importance of Plato’s first two presuppositions is now clearer. 
Each societal faction provides an essential feature of the well-ordered state: 
the producers provide all the necessities of life, including health care and 
financial services; the guardians protect the city from within and without; 
and the rulers provide governmental leadership. On this division-of-labor 
model, the state is well ordered, operating optimally, when each faction as 
a whole works at what it does best.
Plato’s Ideal State
Plato’s third presupposition addresses the issue of how a state achieves and 
maintains perfection. Just as each citizen has one basic kind of latent but 
distinctive ability she is best suited for, Plato believes that each of the factions 
has a latent but distinctive characteristic it is most suited to exemplify. Yet, 
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even as a Bith who is a “born horn player” must still hone his innate abili-
ties to reach his full potential as a virtuoso Mos Eisely cantina player, each 
faction must strive to fully realize the characteristic it is fittest to achieve.
For the producers, the distinctive characteristic is moderation, or what 
Plato called “temperance.” This societal faction should not produce too many 
or too few goods and services, lest the commonwealth become indulgent or 
impoverished. It seems unlikely that a starving army could properly defend 
the state against hostile invaders. It seems equally unlikely that the govern-
ment could properly run the commonwealth without financial stability. Fur-
thermore, this faction must not selfishly hoard its commodities or services, 
even though it is solely responsible for their production. Thus, the producers 
must understand, or at least accept, the need to share their produce with 
the other two factions for the overall good of the state, without resentment 
or delusions of grandeur regarding their role in the commonwealth. If the 
producers do not realize their proper role in society, they fail to exemplify 
their distinctive characteristic. Plato would say that they thereby become 
intemperate, and intemperance leads to social strife. An intemperate state 
is not well ordered and justice cannot prevail.
For the guardians, the distinctive characteristic is courage of convic-
tion. This faction is to bravely defend the commonwealth from all threats 
to its well-being; the guardians should act as the loyal agents of the rulers, 
enforcing or enacting policy decisions. Plato relies on colorful analogies 
from the animal kingdom to convey the multifaceted role of the guardians; 
he writes, “Now will a horse, a dog, or any other animal be courageous if it 
is not spirited? Or haven’t you noticed just how invincible and unbeatable 
spirit is, so that its presence makes the whole soul [self or person] fearless and 
unconquerable in any situation” (375b)? The guardians must also be strong, 
sharp-eyed, and loyal. Plato continues, “But surely they must be gentle to 
their own people and harsh to their enemies. Otherwise, they will not wait 
around for others to destroy them, but will do it themselves first” (375c).
Yet it cannot be overlooked that the guardians are quite intelligent. 
They must quickly recognize friend and foe and also understand how policy 
decisions may aid the former and protect against the latter.2 Thus, for the 
guardians, being courageous is also being loyal to the state, and being loyal 
to the state requires correct convictions about when the state is in need of 
defense. When the commonwealth suffers from cowardice, disloyalty, or 
improper conviction in situations calling for bravery or loyalty, it is not well 
ordered and thus cannot be a just state.
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For the rulers—those particularly talented and capable guardians—the 
distinctive characteristic is wisdom. The rulers must have knowledge of vari-
ous topics. In addition to training in mathematics and harmonics, they must 
understand economic, educational, philosophical, and political policies of 
all sorts. Moreover, they must possess the sound judgment to discern how 
their knowledge ought to be enacted. They must know what sorts of public 
policies to enjoin and have a keen, intuitive sense for when changes in policy 
are needed. They must know what laws to enact and how severe the penal-
ties should be if the laws are broken.3 They must know when exceptions to 
laws should be made or when old laws should be replaced. They must know 
when a situation calls for a peace treaty or a declaration of war. And they 
must know when and how the guardians (the “national guard”) should be 
summoned for domestic tragedies or natural disasters.
Plato tended to use the analogy of a ship captain to illustrate the role of 
a ruler in his ideal society. He writes, “A true captain must pay attention to 
the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to 
his craft, if he truly is to be a ruler of a ship” (488d). Plato clearly thought 
that rulers must not merely possess factual or encyclopedia-type knowledge. 
They must also be truly wise—fully aware of how their various pieces of 
knowledge fit together—to get the “big picture” for the benefit of everyone 
in the commonwealth, to make it take the proper course. A ship piloted by 
an unwise commander winds up like the Executor’s Admiral Ozzel—in tur-
moil with the life choked out of it. (Cue Admiral Piett.) Analogously, a state 
run by ignorant, imprudent, or shortsighted rulers suffers from continual 
political unrest. It will not function properly, and it cannot be just.
A perfectly just state, then, is one in which temperance, courage, loyalty, 
and wisdom prevail. When each distinctive characteristic is exemplified, the 
commonwealth enjoys perfect balance and harmony among its factions. 
Although the rulers and the guardians are unproductive regarding the daily 
necessities of life, the former provide sound leadership and the latter provide 
defense. Although the producers are not involved in governance or defense, 
they provide the sorts of goods and services without which the state could 
not survive. Thus, when the three societal factions work together to form a 
cohesive unit, justice obtains and the common good is secured.4 Contem-
porary Plato scholar Julia Annas eloquently sums up the benefits of Plato’s 
view: “Plato thinks that the point of a state is to make its members part of 
a political and cultural unity that brings out the best in everyone, because 
everyone will be guaranteed the place that best fits his or her talents.”5
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Orchestrating Disharmony
Very little, thematically speaking, is perfect in Lucas’s Galactic Republic. 
Yet things go horribly wrong once Palpatine succeeds Valorum as Supreme 
Chancellor. The Galactic Empire he institutes certainly seems unjust. But 
Plato would say that the injustice results from the irreparable disharmony 
Palpatine caused.
Plato would explain the success of Palpatine’s political coup as the result 
of the Sith Lord’s diverting the various Galactic Republic factions from their 
respective distinctive aptitudes. Palpatine transforms the Trade Federation 
into a political and military entity. He leaves the Jedi no choice but to become 
generals and field marshals—wagers of war rather than peacekeepers. He 
effortlessly turns the clone soldiers against their generals. He hastens the 
downward spiral of a crumbling Senate. The Clone Wars have the senators 
tied up in knots; they become obsessed with petty self-interested squabbles, 
all but forgetting the best interests of the Galactic Republic. These combined 
effects were obviously disastrous. As the Galactic Republic swiftly unraveled 
in Palpatine’s insidious hands, Plato would have rhetorically asked: “Is there 
any greater evil . . . for a city [state] than that which tears it apart and makes 
it many rather than one?” (462a).
In the years leading up to The Phantom Menace, the Trade Federation 
struggles to defend itself from pirates and terrorists in the Outer Rim.6 It 
requests additional judicial protection, but the Galactic Republic lacks the 
resources to provide it; furthermore, some of the raids occur in neutral 
space. Consequently, Lott Dod formally petitions the Senate for permission 
to strengthen the Trade Federation’s defensive capabilities by upgrading its 
droid armies. Palpatine subtly influences Valorum to grant the request, but 
only if the Trade Federation accepts a new commerce tax on the currently 
free trade routes in the Outer Rim. This makes the Trade Federation a politi-
cal player, embroiling it in various senatorial maneuverings.
Concurrently, Darth Sidious secretly works with Neimoidians in the 
Trade Federation Directorate, especially Viceroy Nute Gunray. Sidious, 
also financing Outer Rim terrorists, arranges for the assassinations of non-
Neimoidians serving in the Directorate. This action solidifies Gunray’s hold 
over the Trade Federation. It also leaves Neimoidian avarice completely 
unchecked. In an obvious act of intemperance, the Trade Federation 
upgrades its armies, but it protests the commerce tax by blockading and 
eventually invading Naboo—with its impressive new droid armies. The 
A Tale of Two Republics 21
invasion signals the start of the Separatist movement and peril for the 
Galactic Republic.
The Separatist movement is emboldened under the charismatic leader-
ship of former Jedi Master Count Dooku. Numerous star systems swiftly 
align themselves with Dooku, allowing him to sign treaties with various 
producer-class consortiums. The Jedi take note. Mace Windu, a senior 
member of the Jedi Council, somberly reminds Chancellor Palpatine: “You 
must realize there aren’t enough Jedi to protect the Republic. We are keep-
ers of the peace, not soldiers.”7 The Military Creation Act is partly a result 
of that advice. Some, such as (now) Senator Amidala, vehemently oppose 
it, and their voices are strong. Why threaten the Separatists with violence 
when you seek peace?
Concurrently, Obi-Wan serendipitously discovers an army of two hun-
dred thousand cloned soldiers on Kamino, who were authorized ten years 
ago by Jedi Master Sifo-Dyas, acting under Palpatine’s subtle influence. With 
civil war looming, the Senate responds by voting the Supreme Chancellor 
emergency powers to mobilize the clone army in the hope of putting down 
the Separatist stronghold on Geonosis. But the clones were genetically de-
signed to take orders and not give them.8 The Jedi become generals. They 
are soon spread all over the galaxy on disparate military missions. Focused 
on war, the Jedi’s connection to the Force is altered; they are no longer 
singularly dedicated to maintaining its balance. Darth Sidious eventually 
initiates Order 66 to trigger genetically hidden psychology within the clones. 
As a result, the clone soldiers instantaneously mutiny against their generals; 
almost all the Jedi are assassinated by their formerly loyal troops. The clones 
now unquestioningly serve the Emperor.
Palpatine exerts far less effort at successfully imploding an already cor-
rupt Senate. By the time of Revenge of the Sith, he has managed to manipu-
late various senators motivated by greed or self-aggrandizement, including 
Senator Orn Free Taa of Ryloth and the Vice Chairman of the Senate, Mas 
Amedda. Indeed, the Galactic Senate has become little more than a tool for 
widening the gulf between the privileged and the disenfranchised. This divi-
sion is reflected in the structure of Coruscant itself. Most of its denizens eke 
out meager lives in the dank lower levels, while the senators live far above 
in the posh upper levels. Furthermore, Palpatine exploits this arrangement 
to oust Valorum. Various self-interested senators hide behind the rule of 
law and public decorum to derail Valorum’s efforts, thereby making him 
appear ineffective. When he cannot prevent the invasion of Naboo, Amidala 
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sounds the vote of “no confidence.” Becoming Supreme Chancellor, aided 
with some timely emergency powers, Palpatine has all he needs to bring all 
of his Sith-borne plans to fruition.
Plato Surveys the Galactic Republic
Plato’s commentary on Palpatine’s clandestine maneuverings might begin 
mundanely with the guardian and ruler classes. Plato was clear that the 
guardians had to be rather intelligent in order to properly protect the state. 
The vast majority of the guardian class—the clone soldiers—were genetically 
designed to be Palpatine’s trump card against the Jedi. They were ultimately 
puppets, a tool that he could implement by almost literally flipping a switch. 
Plato was also clear that the rulers should be the intellectually elite of society, 
instilled with valuing the common good in all their decisions. This might 
describe solitary figures like Bail Organa or Padmé Amidala, but they rep-
resent a small minority of the Galactic senators. In fact, the various political 
leaders of the Galactic Republic hark back to the greedy sailors in Plato’s 
ship-captain analogy, those who quarrel “with one another about steering 
the ship, each of them thinking that he should be captain even though he’s 
never learned the art of navigation. . . . They’re always crowding around the 
shipowner, begging him and doing everything possible to get him to turn 
the rudder over to them. And sometimes, if they don’t succeed in persuad-
ing him, they execute the ones who do succeed or throw them overboard” 
(488c). This scenario is eerily reminiscent of the individual senators piloting 
their own “repulsorlift” balconies, trying to get the Chancellor’s attention in 
order to change the course of the Republic.
Plato would also probably question the size of the Galactic Republic. If 
the state is too small, it cannot be self-sufficient. If the state is too large—say, 
the size of a galaxy that can be traversed only with the help of hyperspace 
lanes—the prospects of discord are great. Moreover, note how the Senate 
Building itself, containing 1,012 detachable balconies, represents the Galactic 
Republic’s mammoth size and overwhelming diversity. With so many dif-
ferent voices all clamoring to be heard, it is unlikely that any sort of unity 
could be maintained. Thus Plato advises that the rulers be fully cognizant 
of the size of the state (polis); it may continue to grow, but not past a cer-
tain point, at least not if it is to remain unified (423b). Plato was seemingly 
most concerned about the state becoming divided into two, especially with 
respect to economic status. As the state grows, presumably some but not 
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all will grow wealthy. A conflict of interests will result, leading to much 
political unrest and ultimately upheaval. Palpatine exploited the Galactic 
Republic’s lack of unity, especially the avarice of those who wished to retain 
and enhance their wealth at the expense of others, such as those on Naboo, 
who had little financial recourse.
But Plato’s most strident criticism of the Galactic Republic would no 
doubt be its commitment to democracy. Plato’s negative view of democracy 
may insult our current sensibilities. Nevertheless, he begins his critique with 
a series of rhetorical questions: “First of all, aren’t they free? And isn’t the city 
full of freedom and freedom of speech? And doesn’t everyone have license 
to do what he wants? . . . And where people have this license, it’s clear that 
each of them will arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him” 
(557b). Contemporary readers may not feel the force of Plato’s questions, 
but Plato worries that there is too much personal freedom in a democracy. 
On the one hand, such liberty is indicative of a plurality of values, which 
leads to disunity. Disunity can only lead to civil strife. Rather than doing 
what they are most naturally suited for, given their natural talents, citizens do 
whatever they want, including nothing at all. Society quickly breaks down. 
On the other hand, Plato believes that unity is ultimately preserved through 
his meritocracy: only those who are best suited to govern should lead. And 
lead they must, since the state requires wise guidance to keep it functioning 
optimally. But in a democracy, those that are most suited to govern need not 
govern. Furthermore, a democratic citizenry may come to adore and follow 
a leader who merely “tells them that he wishes the majority well” (558c). This 
situation can only invite various “sailors” to clamor for the “rudder” even 
though they have no aptitude for “navigation”; and society faces shipwreck.
Through an account that eerily echoes Palpatine’s political ascendancy, 
Plato argues that “democracy’s insatiable desire for what it defines as the 
good also destroys it: freedom” (562b). By prizing freedom to the extreme, 
citizens become so wary of losing it that they will empower any flatterer who 
seems willing to preserve it for them. This protector of the people—“their 
special champion”—is publicly revered and politically empowered (565c). 
Soon, their special champion requests “that the people give him a bodyguard 
to keep their defender safe” (566b). (Bring in the clones—say, aren’t you a 
little short for a storm trooper?) The people’s champion continues to charm 
the citizenry and publicly denounce absolute power. But soon he “stirs up 
a war so that the people will continue to feel the need of a leader” (566e). 
(Cue the “temporary” emergency powers.) Eventually, he will have to do 
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away with “anyone who is courageous, high-minded, intelligent, or rich” in 
order to keep political power. (Let’s see: Wookies besieged in trees, Mace 
windowed, Yoda swamped, Gunray’s Mustafar morbidity.) “The champion” 
will continue to purge the best citizens from the commonwealth, thereby 
becoming its destroyer. And the Supreme Chancellor becomes Emperor.9
In short, Plato warns that we must guard against what we seemingly want 
most and instead be vigilant about what is actually best for us. Sometimes a 
democracy isn’t best. How would the family unit function as a democracy? 
Analogously, our true interests are best served when political and social 
unity is preserved by each of us performing those duties we are most fit 
to accomplish, with the wisest of us offering guidance to those who need 
it. Only then does the state function optimally; only then is the state truly 
healthy. If we don’t follow what is best, we may find ourselves echoing Vader: 
“Yes, my master.”
Jedi Philosopher-Kings and Balance
Plato is sometimes criticized because his account of the ideal state is too 
unrealistic to be put into practice. The significance of this criticism is debated 
among scholars. Some argue that Plato’s Republic offers an ideal that we 
should strive to emulate; even if it forever remains unobtainable, working 
toward it will reap great political and social benefits. Others flatly argue that 
a theory that cannot be put into practice is next to useless.
Without presuming to resolve this debate, we can observe a novel con-
nection to it via the Star Wars saga. The Jedi are trained in ways very similar 
to the training of Plato’s rulers. The unique talents of each are identified in 
early childhood. The respective “younglings” are taken from their homes 
to undergo highly specialized physical, intellectual, and ethical training, 
away from the temptations of mainstream society. If all goes well with a 
padawan’s apprenticeship, the padawan eventually becomes a member of 
the Jedi Council. If all goes well with a guardian’s training, the guardian 
eventually becomes a “philosopher-king.”
Plato believes that the ascendancy of the philosopher-king is crucial to 
an ideal state and, indeed, human flourishing; he writes: “Until philosophers 
rule as kings or those who are now called kings genuinely and adequately 
philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide 
. . . cities [states] will have no rest from evils . . . nor, I think, will the hu-
man race. And until that happens, the constitution [commonwealth] we’ve 
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been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible” 
(473d–e). However, Lucas’s Jedi—even the likes of Yoda and Obi-Wan—in-
variably shun political power.10 It seems that such power is too tempting; 
it leads one to the dark side. In this way, Lucas seemingly sides with Plato’s 
detractors that even the best of us—no matter how well trained or intel-
lectually gifted—is corruptible.11
Plato believed that his philosopher-kings, once they had attained genu-
ine knowledge and virtue, would never swerve from their role as benevolent 
monarchs. They would always do what is right and good, taking everyone’s 
best interests into account. But Lucas seems to believe that no one—not 
even the Jedi—is that resolute. If Plato’s detractors are correct about this, 
then Plato’s system seems particularly troubled, because it cannot operate 
without philosopher-kings guiding the state. Moreover, Lucas’s decision 
to have the Jedi answer to the Senate, always serving to maintain balance 
in the Force, makes more sense. As the Jedi strive to keep far from the 
shadow of darkness without being blinded by the light, they and the Force 
remain balanced.
The operatic Star Wars saga is many things. It is a story about good and 
evil, folly and redemption. But perhaps among its various messages is the 
benefit of a society with a system of political checks and balances. Perhaps 
there is room for rule of law, assuming that it doesn’t become a social and 
political straightjacket. Even though the Galactic Republic became overly 
encumbered in its plurality of voices and values, this doesn’t necessarily mean 
that the ultraunity of Plato’s Republic is the only alternative. Moreover, the 
downfall of the Galactic Republic doesn’t obviously serve as an indictment 
of democracy in all of its forms. Yet Plato has a point, in that any political 
leader should strive to become learned, wise, and virtuous. Thus, as political 
padawans, we should “mind what we have learned”; we must keep balance 
as we continue to explore and refine our path toward political excellence. 
Save us it can.12
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26 Dean A. Kowalski
it seems pretty clear that Plato would scoff at the suggestion that his “guardians” should 
be called “rulers”; see 463b–c.)
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377–78 and 414b–415a.
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are functioning properly and harmoniously. The kidneys must clean the blood at the rate 
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is most beneficial for the animal, the harmonious arrangement of the various factions of 
society is most beneficial for the state. That which is optimally best for the state equates 
with its perfect health. When the state is perfectly healthy, perfect happiness reigns 
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trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 10–11.
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of Deception (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001).
7. Patricia Wade, Star Wars: Attack of the Clones (New York: Scholastic Books, 
2002), 13.
8. Obi-Wan is informed by a Kaminoan cloner that the clones are “totally obedi-
ent, taking every order without question. We modified their genetic structure to make 
them less independent than the original host.” Ibid., 90.
9. This is not to say Plato believed that democracy necessarily devolves into 
tyranny or despotism in exactly this way for exactly these reasons. Plato’s views on the 
transitions between various forms of government are actually rather convoluted. See 
Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic, 294–305.
10. It’s true that in the larger Stars Wars universe of the Old Republic, the Jedi seem-
ingly accepted more political power. Some even became Supreme Chancellor. However, 
this practice was not without its social and political difficulties, and it was eventually 
discontinued. See Ryder Windham, Star Wars Jedi vs. Sith: The Essential Guide to the 
Force (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), 56–57.
11. Plato’s famed student Aristotle was among Plato’s detractors on this point. See, 
for example, Aristotle, Politics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. 
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 3.15. He offers a detailed criticism 
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of the Republic at 2.1–5. Interestingly, Plato also eventually came to have doubts about 
the prospects of anyone becoming the sort of philosopher-king his meritocracy required. 
He revisited these issues in the Laws, one of the last books he wrote.
12. My sincere thanks go to Nicholas Bruce for sharing with me his vast knowledge 
of the Star Wars saga, offering insights well beyond his years. I have no doubt that he will 
one day take his own philosophical padawan; on that day, balance will be truly brought 
back to the Force once and for all.
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aristotle’s PolitiCs and the 
virtues oF sPringField
Community, Education, and Friendship in The Simpsons
Timothy M. Dale
The title sequence for The Simpsons television series has become a cultural 
icon. White clouds move in a bright blue sky, and the unmistakable yellow 
lettering emerges from behind the clouds as a chorus sings the name of the 
family after which the show is named. The scene then moves down from 
the sky to overlook the town, including the nuclear plant, the city hall, and 
the Springfield tire fire, before arriving at the school (where Bart is writing 
sentences of punishment on the chalkboard). The city of Springfield is fea-
tured prominently as the setting for the show. By the time the title sequence 
is complete and the members of the Simpson family have raced from their 
various places in the town to meet on their couch in front of the television 
set, we have surveyed much of Springfield and have been introduced to most 
of the characters living in the town. This focus on the town at the beginning 
of every episode of The Simpsons is a reminder that this longest-running 
television show is about more than just the family at its center. It is also a 
story about a city and the community of people who inhabit it.
The Greek philosopher Aristotle would describe episodes of The Simp-
sons as stories about a “constitution of people,” held together by mutual 
values, common experiences, and shared friendships. Aristotle might also 
see the community of Springfield as exemplifying many of his observations 
about political communities and the virtues and practices that keep them 
bonded together. The community of Springfield is certainly flawed, but 
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Aristotle famously recommends that our political theories must begin with 
a practical account of those who live within a society and include an inves-
tigation into why political regimes succeed or fail. Approaching the city of 
Springfield the way Aristotle would, we find that the city is successful because 
it is held together by common goals and shared values. The adventures of 
its citizens exhibit Aristotle’s insights about the nature of political regimes, 
the value of education, and the integral role of friendship for keeping a city 
intact and cultivating virtuous citizens.
A Political Theory of Springfield
If we approach The Simpsons asking about its politics, on first glance we 
would likely observe its most overt political messages. Politicians are in-
competent and corrupt, media are sensationalistic and lazy, citizens are 
easily persuadable, and many people are eager to manipulate others for 
their own gain. At this surface level, The Simpsons frequently offers poignant 
and effective political and social satire, reflecting in the town the absurdity 
and injustice its writers find in the world.1 Several episodes involve political 
campaigns and other explicit references to the American political system, 
and these episodes usually include a critique of the corruptibility of elected 
officials and the unsophisticated gullibility of citizens. Through the overt 
messaging of its narrative, political commentary in The Simpsons often 
takes direct aim at our conventional politics; it contains many insightful, 
forthright, and mocking portrayals. These satirical depictions of society and 
politics are linked to a deeper concern about the purpose of community 
and the nature of relationships within it. Because of this, we have to dig 
below the surface of the parody of politics to find the political theory at 
the heart of the series.
Underneath the familiar irreverence of The Simpsons toward political 
and social life, the show contains an innate understanding of the goodness 
of human nature. Through the action of any given episode, the characters 
learn that they can depend on one another, and the family and the city find 
order through the redemption that is in place at the end of every episode. 
In this way, almost every episode of The Simpsons is a story about disorder. 
The narrative action is usually driven by a character or characters who find 
themselves out of their normal place in the family or in the town, and the 
resolution involves bringing the family or the town back into order. The 
political theory of The Simpsons is about applying the basic goodness of 
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human beings in an effort to stabilize the ethical, political, and economic 
order of the Simpson family and the city of Springfield.
The Simpsons thus contains a political philosophy parallel to that of 
Aristotle, who also maintained that the primary purposes of politics are to 
cultivate virtue and maintain order in a society.2 For Aristotle there is not 
one consistent answer to the question about which kind of authority struc-
ture is best for accomplishing these tasks, however. This is because different 
societies and different people require different political regimes. Some people 
might be particularly good at ruling themselves, for example, and therefore 
a regime that allows them to participate in government is preferable. An-
other society may contain people who desire honor and recognition from 
others, so that society’s best government would bestow honors for good 
behavior. Aristotle’s recognition of differences among people leads him to 
recommend that governments be judged by what is the “best possible,” as 
opposed to the “best overall.”
For Aristotle, despite the existence of several acceptable forms of 
government, patterns across different regime types can be identified. He 
explains that governments can rule in the interest of the common good, or 
they can rule in the interest of themselves (those in power). These regimes 
can be further divided according to how many people rule in accordance 
with their ruling principle (one, few, or many). The best regimes rule in the 
common interest no matter how many people are in charge, and the regimes 
are identified as monarchies, aristocracies, and constitutional polities. 
Aristotle believes that any regime that rules in the interest of the common 
good is acceptable. The problem is that regimes tend toward their deficient 
forms. No matter who has authority, over time authority will be used by 
those who have it to pursue self-interest. A political regime is unhealthy, 
according to Aristotle, when the good of one or a few is held higher than 
the good of society.
Turning to look at the politics of Springfield with Aristotle in mind, we 
find that The Simpsons contains a similar account of the fate of well-meaning 
political endeavors. In the episode “They Saved Lisa’s Brain,”3 Lisa’s frustra-
tion with the stupidity of the town’s citizens leads her to join a group of 
Mensa members. After being bullied out of a rightful gazebo reservation, 
the Mensa group goes to confront the Mayor about the town’s stupider 
residents controlling the political system. The Mayor, who misunderstands 
the Mensa members when they storm into his office and declare “The jig is 
up, Quimby!” leaps out the window to escape what he thinks are corruption 
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charges. Lisa and the members of Mensa soon discover that the town charter 
declares that in the absence of a mayor, a “council of learned citizens” will 
rule. When they, the smartest members of the town, take over, Lisa describes 
their goal as to “use the power of good ideas to change things for the bet-
ter”—which includes eliminating green stoplights (everyone moves faster 
for yellow) and renaming the jury the “Justice Squadron,” which meets at 
the “Municipal Fortress of Vengeance” (to make it sound more appealing). 
The group soon begins to fight among themselves, however, as each mem-
ber wants to pursue his or her own pet project. When presented at a town 
meeting, the group’s ideas, including a shadow-puppet theater and Comic 
Book Guy’s seven-year breeding plan (based on the Vulcan society in Star 
Trek), cause a violent backlash. Fortunately, Stephen Hawking appears to 
rescue Lisa from the violence. He shames the naive approach of the “council 
of geniuses,” saying, “I wanted to see your utopia, but now I see it is more 
of a Fruitopia.”
In this episode the town learns Aristotle’s lesson about the tendency of 
even well-meaning regimes to devolve into self-interest and conflict. The 
common good cannot be trusted to a single person or group of people for 
very long. The solution to this problem, according to Aristotle, is to create 
a “mixed regime” wherein several groups of people contribute to decision 
making. Aristotle compares this mixed regime to a feast, where the number 
of people and the different contributions they bring add to the stability of the 
government.4 The aim of the mixed regime is to sustain a political order that 
will help its citizens live the best possible life. For Aristotle, the best possible 
government is one that effectively combines the pursuit of excellence with 
the behavior of which people are capable.
One of the requirements of stable and effective political structures ob-
served by Aristotle is that people fulfill particular roles within that structure 
according to their natures.5 Disorder emerges when people or societies at-
tempt to do things that are outside their natural tendencies or capabilities. 
The city of Springfield operates according to this Aristotelian principle. 
All of the characters in The Simpsons have particular roles to perform in 
the town, and Springfield falls into disorder when characters step outside 
of their naturally defined roles. When Homer runs for political office in 
“Trash of the Titans,” for example, he wins election as sanitation commis-
sioner but fails at the job. Homer is so terrible, and his policies cause so 
many problems, that the city of Springfield has to literally move (all of the 
buildings and people) to a different location. The disorder introduced by 
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Homer’s election is corrected when he is removed from office and the town 
is returned (relocated) to its original position.
Homer’s moving out of his normal position within the social order is 
a common source of disorder, but other characters’ changing roles cause 
disorder as well. In “Bart vs. Lisa vs. the Third Grade,”6 conflict is created 
when Bart and Lisa move into the same class. Not only is the sibling rela-
tionship disrupted, but the disruption makes it all the way to the governor, 
whose flag contest is ruined by the competition between Bart and Lisa. The 
situation is resolved when Principal Skinner moves the two back to their 
respective classrooms at the end of the episode.
The principal, Seymour Skinner, is involved in his own role dislocation 
when, in “The Principal and the Pauper,”7 he is discovered not to be the 
real Seymour Skinner. In a case of stolen identity, the character Seymour 
is actually Armin Tamzarian, an imposter who stole the identity of a war 
hero. When the real Skinner appears after decades as a prisoner of war, 
Tamzarian leaves town in disgrace and the real Skinner takes over as prin-
cipal. The town hates the new principal, however, and the episode ends with 
the town banishing the real Skinner by tying him to a chair on a train. A 
judge then declares that the old Skinner will have his old job and that no 
one may mention the name Tamzarian again “under penalty of torture.”8 
In episodes like this, the town experiences disorder and discomfort when 
a character or characters are removed from their natural place. Order can 
be restored only when everyone finds her or his native place within the 
structure of the town.
Thus, the political theory at the heart of The Simpsons prefers order 
over disorder and maintains the goodness of its characters according to the 
roles that they play in the broader community. What makes a worthy social 
order for the people of Springfield is close to Aristotle’s description of a good 
constitution that promotes the common interest and creates a community 
in which the whole is greater than the parts.9
Education and the Virtuous City
One of the primary political problems for Aristotle, as for the citizens of 
Springfield, is that members of a community do not always recognize or 
understand what is in the common interest. A key concern for a political 
regime is therefore to educate people toward virtuous behavior.10 The school 
serves as a central location in much of the action of The Simpsons, and it is 
34 Timothy M. Dale
here that Bart and Lisa learn many of their lessons about civic responsibility 
and how to behave toward others.
It is at school, for example, that Lisa learns to treat the social outcast 
Ralph Wiggum with respect after breaking his heart in the episode “I Love 
Lisa.”11 Bart also learns many moral lessons at school. In the noteworthy 
episode “Bart Gets a ‘Z,’ ” he plays a prank on his teacher by spiking her drink 
and causing her to lose her job.12 When she learns that Bart is the one who 
was responsible for her lost job, she declares that Bart is the only child she 
has ever met who was “bad on the inside.” Stricken with guilt, Bart decides to 
confess to the principal and accept his punishment with the hope of getting 
his teacher her job back. In these episodes school is where grade-obsessed 
Lisa and hopeless hoodlum Bart learn lessons about compassion and are 
revealed to have much more complex natures than the superficial way their 
characters first appear.13
The children of Springfield are not the only ones who receive an educa-
tion under its regime. Adult citizens, too, find many learning experiences, 
sometimes at the hand of Lisa and other times by a design of tradition. 
In “Lisa the Iconoclast”14 Lisa discovers that the town founder and hero, 
Jebediah Springfield, was actually a pirate who was the enemy of George 
Washington. While attempting to report the truth about the town’s his-
tory, Lisa realizes that the memory of Jebediah and the lesson his memo-
rial teaches the town (“A noble spirit embiggens the smallest man”) are 
more important than the truth. Here Lisa learns the lesson that Aristotle 
promotes as key to the success of a community: the purpose of stories and 
community celebrations is to make people strive to be better. In accord 
with Aristotle’s (and Lisa’s) view, the people of Springfield need to rely on 
tradition to help them practice virtue, and it is through tradition, includ-
ing the founding story of the town, that citizens learn values like courage, 
nobility, and generosity.
Aristotle would go further with the people of Springfield to emphasize 
that moral character comes about through habituation and exercise. People 
do not learn virtue through reasoning or deliberation, but through the actual 
practice of virtues. The practice of virtues, according to Aristotle, teaches 
people that virtue lies in the avoidance of extremes. The virtue of truth-
telling, for example, is the “mean” between the extremes of brash honesty 
and deceit.15 In the case of Jebediah Springfield, Lisa makes the virtuous 
decision to not disclose the true identity of the town’s hero. The truth in this 
case is that the town is made better by the myth of Jebediah. In the case of 
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all moral actions, there is a middle ground, and practice with these actions 
is what makes us virtuous.
Friendship and the Virtuous Citizen
The existence of friendship within a society is just as important as institu-
tions and traditions of education for the practice of virtuous behavior and 
the development of excellent citizens. For Aristotle, the shared objectives 
inherently pursued in a friendship are essential for the development of other 
virtues and indispensable for the formation of community. Friendship as-
sists in the process of finding the “mean between extremes” (the basis for 
all virtues) because a friendship requires partnership and compromise. 
Friendship is also the foundation of community because it is the basis on 
which people collaborate for common purposes.16 Ultimately, friendship 
helps to make people and communities good because people want to treat 
friends well, and the practice of doing good things for friends habituates us 
in virtuous behavior that will extend outside of the friendship.
Aristotle also believes that friendship within a society contributes to 
political stability. Friends are more likely to be patient with each other, and 
the understanding that exists within a friendship makes it easier to develop 
compromises. Friendship is even useful when it comes to common defense—
friends are more likely to want to defend each other, and they can better 
coordinate activities pursued for the common interest. Correspondingly, 
Aristotle observes that friendship is often held in even higher regard than 
justice, because the bonds of friendship cause people to act in good ways 
toward each other without external guidelines or rules.17 Well-developed 
friendships are the glue that holds society together.
We find the kind of friendship admired by Aristotle prevalent in the 
city of Springfield. Almost every significant character in The Simpsons has a 
significant friendship with another. Within these friendships the characters 
complement each other’s personality, and in many cases the friends help each 
other learn things about themselves. Friendships in Springfield also often 
help the friends make good decisions; it is frequently the advice or actions 
of a friend that bring a “disordered” person back into the normal order.
Homer Simpson has several such friendships with other characters, 
but none perhaps are more significant than his friendships with Barney 
Gumble, the barfly; Ned Flanders, the evangelical Christian neighbor; and 
Marge, Homer’s wife. On the surface, and in most episodes, Barney is the 
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supportive drunk at the other end of the bar, Ned Flanders is the constant 
source of annoyance who lives next door, and Marge is the patient mate who 
is always there for support and charitable words of encouragement. When 
these friendships are featured in episodes, however, we are given a deeper 
look into the friendships, their meaningfulness, and how they help Homer 
realize and exercise virtue.
In the episode “Mr. Plow,”18 Homer decides to buy a snowplow and 
becomes a hero in the city for the plowing service he provides to pay for 
his new form of transportation. Barney asks for Homer’s advice about how 
he can become successful, too, and the advice he receives leads Barney 
to form a rival snowplow business that is more effective than Homer’s. 
Barney’s success leads to Homer losing all of his customers (and the key 
to the city, which is taken from him and given to Barney). When Homer 
decides to plot revenge against Barney, he sends him to a dangerous place 
to plow, and Barney becomes trapped by an avalanche caused by one 
of his burps. After seeing his trapped friend, Homer regrets his actions 
and rescues Barney. The two friends decide to work together as plowing 
partners, and Homer declares, “When two best friends work together not 
even God himself can stop them!” God sees this as a dare and causes all 
the snow to melt, forcing Homer out of business and returning the town 
to normal. Although Homer is susceptible to rivalries with his friends, he 
also maintains a deep commitment to their well-being, and he learns in 
episodes like “Mr. Plow” that the bonds of friendship are meaningful and 
important for his happiness.
Homer’s friendship with Ned Flanders is more complex. Superficially, 
Homer views Flanders as his arch-nemesis, mostly because he is jealous 
of the perfect life that Flanders seems to lead. Feeding Homer’s apparent 
hatred is the cheerfulness with which Flanders approaches all interactions 
with Homer. In “Homer Loves Flanders,”19 however, these roles reverse. 
Flanders wins tickets to a football game that Homer desperately wants to 
attend and invites Homer to go with him. Homer has a great time at the game 
and decides that Flanders is his best friend. Homer’s overbearing grateful-
ness annoys Flanders, causing Flanders to declare that he is beginning to 
hate Homer. Homer’s pursuit of Flanders’s company drives Flanders to the 
edge and ultimately prompts him to yell at Homer in the middle of church. 
The shocked congregation embarrasses Flanders, but Homer comes to his 
defense and convinces everyone that Flanders deserves another chance. 
Even though the relationship quickly returns to normal (Homer is back to 
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“hating” Flanders the next week), in this episode Homer’s virtue is cultivated 
and displayed through his friendship with Flanders.
The most significant relationship that Homer has is with his wife, 
Marge. Throughout The Simpsons series, Marge demonstrates an enduring 
and unconditional devotion to her husband, and he frequently expresses 
his gratitude for her fidelity and compassion.20 Marge is especially useful to 
Homer as the understanding friend who encourages him after his plans go 
awry. Homer attempts to be just as supportive for Marge, but this support 
occasionally backfires. In one such episode, “The Twisted World of Marge 
Simpson,” several levels of their friendship are demonstrated.21 Here, Marge 
is thrown out of an investment group, the Springfield Investorettes, for refus-
ing to take high risks. Homer encourages Marge to start her own business, 
and she starts a pretzel business that is less than successful. In support of 
Marge, Homer makes a deal with the Mob to make Marge’s business profit-
able, but the plan backfires when mobster Fat Tony demands 100 percent 
of the profits. When the Simpsons refuse to pay the Mob, they are rescued 
by the Investorettes, accompanied by Japanese organized crime. Homer’s 
devotion to Marge is demonstrated in this episode, along with Marge’s ability 
to forgive. The honesty of Homer’s confession allows them to work together 
as a couple toward a solution and brings them closer together.
Aristotle recognizes the partnership of marriage as a significant “insti-
tution of friendship” that advances civility, decency, and a common social 
life.22 Homer’s relationship with Marge keeps him grounded in reality and 
usually prevents him from engaging in completely antisocial behavior. But 
even Marge is occasionally capable of selfish and disorderly behavior. Nev-
ertheless, it is through their relationship that one always manages to recover 
and redeem the other.
Friendship and the Divided Soul
Another characteristic of the friendship between Marge and Homer, and 
other partnerships we find in The Simpsons, is that one person in the relation-
ship typically represents the “rational” approach while the other is driven 
by appetites and desires. This dualism is a direct reflection of Aristotle’s 
depiction of the soul as being divided into two parts, the rational and the 
nonrational.23 For Aristotle, these parts of the soul are both essential to its 
functions, but the rational must be developed out of the nonrational. He 
sees the nonrational as a natural immaturity of the soul and believes that 
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through education the rational emerges. The rational part, then, should 
rule the irrational, both in the individual and in the well-ordered society.
Other key partnerships of other characters correspond to the same 
relational split between rationality and irrationality that we find in Marge 
and Homer’s relationship. Lisa and Bart also illustrate the pairing of ra-
tionality and appetite, as does the relationship between Waylon Smithers 
and Montgomery Burns.24 In each of these cases, one of the characters in 
the relationship is the voice of reason for the other, whereas the character 
embodying appetite is often the source of adventure, but also disorder. The 
tension between these different character types usually creates friction be-
tween the characters, but it is also the force of attraction that keeps them 
bound to each other. In part this attraction allows one of the pair to live 
vicariously through the other. The attraction also exists because the non-
rational character recognizes that he or she needs the reasoning character 
to resolve problems and reestablish order. In these cases, the characters of 
Marge, Lisa, and Smithers, insofar as they are coupled with their correspond-
ing partner, are reliably able to rein in the disorder that the appetites of the 
others tend to bring about.
Following the Aristotelian model, embedded in The Simpsons’ depiction 
of these pairs is a critique of the gendered way in which Aristotle conceives 
of rationality and irrationality. For Aristotle, a male is more naturally fit-
ted to rule than a female because the rationality of men is naturally more 
developed than that of females and because men naturally have the ability 
to command more authority than women.25 For the relationships in The 
Simpsons, the opposite is true. In each case the female (or feminine) side of 
the pair is the one most grounded in reason, and it is the male who is a slave 
to his appetites. Homer is susceptible to being tempted by any desire that is 
immediately apparent to him, and Marge provides the balance and influence 
of reason.26 Bart’s appetite for making mischief gets him into frequent trouble, 
and although Lisa is often frustrated by her older brother, she takes pride 
in her ability to offer advice to get him out of that trouble. The millionaire 
Burns is most inclined to pursue his appetite for money, but Smithers offers 
a voice of reason, tempering Burns’s greed with a concern for the long-term 
stability of his business and an attentive view toward public relations.
For the key characters in these relationships, the balance between reason 
and appetite is essential for preserving order, both within the friendship and 
in the city of Springfield. It is not possible, or desirable, to eliminate the ap-
petites, since the “trouble” caused by their pursuit provides many opportuni-
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ties for the town and delivers much of the richness it enjoys. It is essential, 
however, for reason to keep the appetites under control, since the disorder 
that exists without the force of reason would break the relationships and the 
city apart. From an Aristotelian perspective, the paired relationships in The 
Simpsons serve as a metaphor for the soul, for which desires are followed 
but in which reason is respected.
Furthermore, from Aristotle’s point of view, the different parts of the soul 
each have something crucial to offer. Aristotle argues that it is foolish simply 
to consider generalities when describing the good soul,27 since the virtues 
are better enumerated to account for the many contexts and situations that 
require different kinds of actions and different forms and applications of 
virtue. Thus, in Aristotle’s account, the moderating force of reason provided 
by Marge, Lisa, and Smithers is important for the pursuit of virtue, just as 
there is an important place in the soul and in the city, given particular pur-
poses and circumstances, for the appetites of Homer, Bart, and Mr. Burns.
The Well-Ordered Springfield
Through The Simpsons’ mix of characters and the adventures that occur in 
the program, in every episode the town of Springfield moves from disor-
der back to order. The overt messaging in The Simpsons that seems cynical 
about conventional politics and social relationships is intelligible only on 
a foundation of a political theory that aims at something better. Even in 
the episodes about the fundamental dysfunction of citizens and politics, 
the system ultimately works, and The Simpsons usually offers a defense of 
the effectiveness of conventional political structures.28 Within its order the 
community of Springfield is stable because all of the different characters, 
and their relationships with each other, hold it together. Each person has a 
specific role and place for which she or he is well suited. Moreover, the city 
of Springfield is stable at its core because the family, namely the Simpsons, 
is its cornerstone. Different members of the family are good at different 
things, allowing the family to pursue a common interest with the strengths 
of each member added to the pursuit.
As a family in which all members participate in its management, and a 
family that includes a diversity of virtues among its members, in the final 
analysis the Simpson family serves in part as a critique of Aristotle. In his 
Politics Aristotle notoriously defends the subordination of women and chil-
dren within his conception of “nature.”29 Contrary to Aristotle’s depiction, 
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the Simpson family offers a strong case that a relationship of justice within a 
family is more parallel to the just organization of the political order. In The 
Simpsons we find a family that is a community of people whose different 
natures promote the overall well-being of the family. Homer occasionally 
asserts himself as the “head of the household,” but the virtuousness of his 
decisions is usually questionable and needs to be tempered through interven-
tions by other members of the family. The Simpsons suggests that the same 
logic Aristotle applies to the mixed regime in the political community can 
also apply to that of the family. Using Aristotle’s statement about the ideal 
constitution, we see that it pertains to the Simpson family as much as it does 
to the political order: the best life for a city (and for human beings) should 
be judged “neither by a virtue that is beyond the reach of ordinary people, 
nor by a kind of education that requires natural gifts and resources that 
depend on luck, nor by the ideal constitution, but by a life that most people 
can share and a constitution in which most city-states can participate.”30
The crucial question to ask from the perspective of Aristotle’s ethics and 
politics remains: is Springfield happy? For Aristotle happiness is life’s high-
est possibility and is the condition that means a purpose has been fulfilled. 
The goal of an individual life, and the goal of a city, is to be good at what it 
is supposed to do and to practice the virtues that will achieve this kind of 
happiness. While it is true that Homer (and other citizens in Springfield) 
represents a hedonistic view of happiness, episodes do not conclude with 
this view being rewarded. The source of disorder through the action of each 
episode is the pursuit of appetites and characters moving outside of their 
proper place within the social order. Happiness in Springfield returns at the 
end of every episode because people are placed back into the natural order 
of the town, given the exercise of different virtues by the characters who 
intervene through the course of the story.
In this way, The Simpsons holds an Aristotelian mirror to our ethical, 
social, and political lives and presents us with reflections of ourselves and 
our social and political order. Political theory presented in a performance 
as entertaining, profound, and relevant as The Simpsons should cause us to 
reflect on the following questions: What is the proper authority structure 
for the kind of people we find ourselves to be? Are our values and purposes 
reflected in our political order? What are the sources of disorder in our 
society, and how do we recover from them? How do we promote virtue, 
both in personal relationships and through political and social structures?
Answering these questions requires an investigation into who we are, 
Aristotle’s Politics and the Virtues of Springfield 41
what we value, and how we want to live our lives. Aristotle and The Simpsons 
recommend that we be honest and realistic as we consider these questions, 
and Aristotle pushes us to actively pursue the best possible life for ourselves 
and our society. Motivated by the pursuit of excellence, we should engage 
in political theory striving for a life that is better, in the context of what is 
possible for us to achieve.
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42 Timothy M. Dale
11. Season 4, episode 15.
12. Season 21, episode 2.
13. The voice of reason and conscience, in more episodes than any other character, 
is Lisa, who provides frequent moral lessons to members of her family and others in 
Springfield. With her saxophone by her side, Lisa is also closely associated with music. 
This is a significant point for an Aristotelian interpretation of The Simpsons, since educa-
tion in music is important for promoting virtue, according to Aristotle. Politics 1340a.
14. Season 7, episode 15.
15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1999), 1103a15–20, 1104a20–25, 1107a35–40, 1108a20–25.
16. Ibid., 1167a25. Aristotle uses the term “concord” here to refer to the condition 
of friendship in which the citizens in a city “agree about what is advantageous, make 
the same decisions, and act on their common resolution.”
17. Ibid., 1155a23–25.
18. Season 4, episode 9.
19. Season 5, episode 16.
20. In “A Streetcar Named Marge” (season 4, episode 2), Homer outwardly wonders 
why Marge does not deserve someone better than him, and in “The Last Temptation of 
Homer” (season 5, episode 9), even when tempted by the “perfect woman” for him, Homer 
endearingly admits that he has already found Marge, who is the perfect woman for him.
21. Season 8, episode 11.
22. Aristotle, Politics 1280b35.
23. Aristotle comments: “As soul and body are two, so we observe that the soul also 
has two parts, the irrational part and the part possessing reason, and that the states which 
they experience are two in number, the one being desire and the other intelligence; and 
as the body is prior in its development to the soul, so the irrational part of the soul is 
prior to the rational. And this also is obvious, because passion and will, and also appe-
tite, exist in children even as soon as they are born, but it is the nature of reasoning and 
intelligence to arise in them as they grow older. Therefore in the first place it is necessary 
for the training of the body to precede that of the mind, and secondly for the training of 
the appetite to precede that of the intelligence; but the training of the appetite must be 
for the sake of the intellect, and that of the body for the sake of the soul.” Ibid., 1334b20.
24. In the episode “Blood Feud” (season 2, episode 22), Mr. Burns refers to Smithers 
as the “gentle ying to his [Burns’s] raging yang.”
25. Aristotle, Politics 1259b, 1260a13.
26. In “Secrets of a Successful Marriage” (season 5, episode 22), Homer completely 
collapses after Marge kicks him out for sharing personal stories about their marriage 
with his adult learning annex class.
27. Aristotle, Politics 1260a25.
28. In “Mr. Lisa Goes to Washington” (season 3, episode 2), for example, Lisa 
confronts the corruption of politics by writing an essay about it, but she loses the essay 
Aristotle’s Politics and the Virtues of Springfield 43
competition. The episode ultimately resolves Lisa’s disillusionment, however, because 
the corrupt representative is thrown in jail and the system is proven to work.
29. Aristotle, Politics 1259b.
30. Ibid., 1295a.

45
3
“KeeP your Friends Close 
but your enemies Closer”
Machiavelli and Michael Corleone
Eric T. Kasper
In Mario Puzo’s bestselling novel The Godfather, published in 1969, he told 
the story of a fictional mafia family in America. The book was famously made 
into a successful and award-winning film, The Godfather (1972), as well as 
a sequel-prequel, The Godfather Part II (1974), and a sequel, The Godfather 
Part III (1990). These movies relate the saga of the Corleone crime family, 
including the transition of power from one generation of the family to the 
next. The main character in all three films, Michael Corleone, quickly be-
comes the embodiment of the political philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli 
in The Prince. Although at first Corleone is repelled by the seamy underbelly 
of the “family business,” a series of violent events in The Godfather turn him 
from an idealist to a consequentialist who thirsts for political power. Indeed, 
examples of Machiavellian realism occur in many of Michael Corleone’s 
words and deeds throughout the Godfather film franchise.
Niccolò Machiavelli wrote The Prince nearly five hundred years ago to 
the Florentine ruler Lorenzo II de’ Medici, apparently to serve as a political 
how-to manual for the royal ruler. Machiavelli’s overarching goal in the work 
is the attainment of Italian unity, but the book can also teach the reader much 
about power politics. Machiavelli, considered by many political theorists to 
be the first modern political philosopher, emphasizes the notions that the 
ends justify the means and that one must be willing to use force if necessary 
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to achieve one’s political goals. In other words, Machiavelli tried to describe 
how politics really occurs, not how it should be. It is for this reason that 
Machiavelli is not only a proper noun today—the term Machiavellian is now 
a derisive and pejorative adjective that represents “the view that politics is 
amoral and that any means however unscrupulous can justifiably be used 
in achieving political power.” This chapter uses The Godfather’s Michael 
Corleone as a teaching tool to explain and explore the political philosophy 
of Machiavelli in The Prince.1
Michael Corleone and Niccolò Machiavelli
The character of Michael Corleone emerged out of the novel The Godfather 
in the late 1960s. In both the book and the film adaptations directed by 
Francis Ford Coppola, the character of Michael (played by Al Pacino in the 
film trilogy) at first seems like a poor choice for a Machiavellian prince. The 
youngest of the family’s sons, he chooses to attend college and later to serve 
in the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II, rather than be a part of the family 
business. On the surface his father, Vito Corleone (played at different ages by 
Marlon Brando and Robert De Niro) runs an olive oil importation business, 
but that is only a cover for criminal activities, including gambling, bribery, 
and extortion. This is something in which Michael’s brothers, Santino (James 
Caan), Tom (Robert Duvall), and Fredo (John Cazale), are willing to par-
ticipate. Yet, the young Michael initially rejects these activities, telling his 
girlfriend Kay Adams (Diane Keaton) in the mid-1940s in The Godfather, 
“That’s my family, Kay; it’s not me.” Michael’s desire apparently is to marry 
Kay, settle down, and make an honest living, eschewing the power politics 
and dishonest behavior of his father and brothers.
This rather inauspicious start for Michael is the exact opposite of Nic-
colò Machiavelli’s early career. To understand this difference, one needs to 
realize that while Michael Corleone grew up in a wealthy, powerful mafia 
family, Machiavelli was born in 1469 in Florence, in a disunited and weak 
Italy. Indeed, during Machiavelli’s youth and adulthood, Italy was not one 
country; it was divided into several city-states. The more united foreign 
powers at the time (such as France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire) 
had more influence in European affairs, and over the Italian people, in the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, because these nations possessed 
more people and more resources by being unified. This relative weakness 
of the Italian city-states, including his native Florentine Republic, was the 
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backdrop of Machiavelli’s political education. To better protect the interests 
of Italy, he wanted to acquire power in ways that young Michael did not 
during his privileged upbringing.2
At age twenty-nine in 1498, Machiavelli took the post of secretary to the 
second Chancery in the Florentine Republic. In this civil service position, 
he soon began receiving additional responsibilities, especially over foreign 
affairs. Machiavelli met with leaders of other countries and was sent on 
many diplomatic missions. It was during this period that he gained an astute 
understanding of politics and international affairs. All of this came to an 
abrupt halt, however, when the Medici family came to power in Florence in 
1512 and restored it to a monarchy. The Florentine Republic suddenly was 
no more. This turn of events also signaled the end of Machiavelli’s position 
of leadership and political power.3
In contrast, a series of shocking events in young Michael Corleone’s 
life ultimately propelled him to greater and greater power. When another 
mobster, Virgil “The Turk” Sollozzo of the Tattaglia crime family, makes an 
attempt on his father’s life, Michael starts taking matters into his own hands. 
Michael kills those responsible for shooting his father, and in this way he 
begins what becomes a meteoric rise to the top of the power structure in the 
mafia family. After both his first wife, Apollonia, and his brother Santino are 
killed by rival gangsters, Michael eventually becomes the “don,” or boss, of 
the Corleone crime family. For decades he continues to rule over the criminal 
empire that his father built, first in New York and then in Reno, Nevada. 
Along the way, Michael navigates through many political minefields and 
leads the family to much financial success via illegal activities and gambling 
pursuits. According to The Godfather Part III, by the time Michael goes into 
retirement in 1980, the Corleone family’s wealth is estimated to be in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.
As for Machiavelli, his career took a turn for the worse. When the 
Medicis took power, they thought him to be a conspirator against the royal 
family, and for this he was not only fired; for a brief time he was imprisoned 
and tortured. After two months he was released and banished to private 
life. Being unemployed in his early forties, Machiavelli attempted to cull 
favor with the new royal family by writing The Prince in 1513 as a political 
“how-to” manual for those who govern. Machiavelli dedicated the work to 
Lorenzo II de’ Medici, who later became the duke of Urbino, in an attempt to 
teach him the proper tactics that one could use to be successful in politics.4 
As Machiavelli notes in his dedicatory letter in The Prince, it is customary 
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for those who wish to gain favor with a monarch to bestow a precious gift 
upon him or her. However, since Machiavelli had no tangible possessions 
of note, he wrote The Prince for Lorenzo, to share with him his “knowledge 
of the deeds of great men,” which he had “acquired through a long experi-
ence of modern events and a constant study of the past” (3). The knowledge 
that Machiavelli espouses in The Prince is largely amoral. Machiavelli rarely 
indicated whether something was good or evil, instead advising the reader 
what would be effective.
Although Michael Corleone is fictional and Machiavelli was real, each 
one experienced power politics, one in the criminal underworld and the 
other on the international stage. The career of one culminated in a significant 
building of power, while the other had everything taken from him while 
still relatively young. Still, each of these men of Italian heritage lives on and 
has influence. In Michael Corleone’s case, he is, according to the American 
Film Institute, the eleventh-greatest villain in motion picture history, with 
The Godfather film ranked as the second-greatest movie in American his-
tory.5 Al Pacino’s performance and the story of The Godfather have been 
alluded to in many art forms since the early 1970s, and hundreds of televi-
sion programs and movies have referred to the film in the subsequent four 
decades.6 As for Machiavelli, his influence has gone far beyond his immedi-
ate intended audience of Lorenzo, as people around the world still read The 
Prince a half millennium later. According to one scholar, The Prince is the 
most famous book on politics ever written.7 Now let’s look more closely at 
Michael Corleone in The Godfather, to understand the themes espoused by 
Machiavelli in The Prince.
The Lion and the Fox
From the very beginning of his rise to power, Michael Corleone demon-
strates his understanding of a key analogy from The Prince, that of the lion 
and the fox. Machiavelli explains that a great leader will know how to fight 
both by law and by force and that using only one method is insufficient. 
The two can be characterized as fighting by the methods of humans and 
by the methods of beasts. Machiavelli then divides the methods of fighting 
like beasts into the methods of the lion and of the fox: “A prince being thus 
obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, 
for the lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend 
himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a 
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lion to frighten wolves. Those that wish to be only lions do not understand 
this” (64). Machiavelli’s point here is that a successful leader will exhibit both 
strength (the lion) and cunning (the fox) when appropriate. If one tries to 
strong-arm opponents when one is weak, one will lose; conversely, if one 
acts too craftily when one could attack with sufficient force, one is wasting 
resources. Thus, a great leader will be a beast in both the manner of the lion 
and that of the fox, depending on what is necessary.
Michael Corleone acts as the fox early on in The Godfather. When he 
visits his father in the hospital after an attack on Vito’s life, Michael finds that 
the guards being paid to protect his father have left. After moving his father 
to another room, Michael encounters Enzo, a baker and family friend who 
has brought flowers to Vito at the hospital. Michael asks Enzo to stand at the 
entrance to the hospital. It is night and they are both wearing overcoats, but 
neither one is armed. Michael, acting like the fox, tells Enzo to get rid of the 
flowers and says, “Put your hand in your pocket like you have a gun.” Michael 
does the same, and the two of them standing there are enough to scare away 
the hired killers, who continue driving past the hospital’s entrance, rather 
than confront persons whom they believe to be Don Vito’s armed guards.
Shortly thereafter, Michael demonstrates that he can also act like a 
Machiavellian lion (with a touch of the strategic fox). It becomes readily ap-
parent that Sollozzo has bribed a police captain, McCluskey, to try to make 
Vito Corleone more vulnerable at the hospital. When Michael confronts the 
officer about this, Captain McCluskey punches Michael in the face, breaking 
his jaw. A few days later, other members of the Corleone family arrange for 
Michael to meet with Sollozzo and McCluskey, under the pretenses that Mi-
chael will patch things up with the two men. Something much more sinister 
is being planned by Michael, however. A revolver is strategically planted in 
the restroom of the restaurant where they plan to meet. Michael, who is 
searched by Captain McCluskey when he is picked up, is excused from the 
table at the restaurant to use the restroom, and when he returns, he shoots 
and kills both men. In this case, unlike the one involving Enzo, Michael is 
powerful enough, via a handgun, to use force.
There is another instance of Michael as a fox in The Godfather Part II. 
Michael is subpoenaed to testify before a U.S. Senate committee that is inves-
tigating organized crime. During his testimony, Michael denies involvement 
in the mafia. However, the government has Frank Pentangeli, a caporegime 
(a high-ranking member or captain) in the Corleone family who took di-
rect criminal orders from Michael. Pentangeli is offered immunity for his 
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criminal acts if he will testify that Michael is the don of the family business; 
if this happens, Michael is sure to be indicted for perjury. Pentangeli is heavily 
guarded by FBI agents at an army base, so Michael cannot have him killed. 
However, playing the fox, Michael arranges for Pentangeli’s brother, who lives 
in Sicily, to appear at Pentangeli’s Senate committee testimony. This sends a 
clear message to Pentangeli—that he is breaking a code of silence if he testifies, 
which will bring both shame and misfortune on his family. Pentangeli refuses 
to implicate Michael in any criminal activities before the Senate committee. 
Later, Michael sends his brother, Tom, to inform Pentangeli that if he commits 
suicide, Pentangeli’s family will not be harmed. Shortly thereafter, Pentangeli 
slits his wrists. This is another demonstration that Michael could use cunning 
to accomplish his goals at a time when he did not have the power to carry out 
a hit on someone so well guarded as Frank Pentangeli.
Committing All of One’s Cruelties at Once
Another important Machiavellian skill that Michael Corleone exhibits is 
when to carry out one’s actions. Early in The Prince, Machiavelli explains 
how different types of principalities need to be ruled according to how 
a prince acquires them or based on the makeup of the territory and the 
people who live there. When describing the correct course of action for 
those who attain power by “villainy,” Machiavelli states that cruelty may 
be necessary “for the need of securing one’s self ” and ensuring that one 
is established as the leader, rather than for the sake of being cruel (34). 
As will be explored in more detail below, Machiavelli has in mind that 
cruelties should be committed only in the service of a greater good. He 
then clarifies by stating:
In taking a state the conqueror must arrange to commit all his cru-
elties at once, so as not to have to recur to them every day, and so 
as to be able, by not making fresh changes, to reassure people and 
win them over by benefiting them. Whoever acts otherwise, either 
through timidity or bad counsels, is always obliged to stand with a 
knife in hand, and can never depend on his subjects, because they, 
owing to continually fresh injuries, are unable to depend upon him. 
For injuries should be done all together, so that being less tasted, 
they will give less offense. Benefits should be granted little by little, 
so that they may be better enjoyed. (35)
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In other words, Machiavelli tells us that when a leader comes to power, 
especially if that leader comes to power by force, she or he should commit 
all necessary acts of cruelty at once, thereby wiping out potential enemies 
right away and winning the support of those who have not been harmed. 
Otherwise, the ruler risks being distrusted by followers, as they will never 
know whether they will be the next ones to be killed.
Michael Corleone follows this advice quite well in The Godfather. After 
his brother Santino died, Michael became the next logical choice to replace 
his father as the don. Although Vito Corleone was in semiretirement for 
some time in his later years, it was not until Vito died that Michael completely 
took over the family business. Shortly thereafter, Michael has a number of 
rival dons and traitors to the family killed, including caporegime Salvatore 
Tessio (played by Abe Vigoda) and his own brother-in-law, Carlo Rizzi. In 
all, Michael has at least seven potential enemies killed on the same day right 
after he takes over, in a move that Michael characterizes as follows: “Today, 
I settle all family business.” His statement also signaled to all remaining 
members of the Corleone crime family that they were trusted. Machiavelli 
would approve of this move as a very effective way for a leader like Michael 
to finalize his ascension to power.
Deception and the Need to “Keep Your Friends Close 
but Your Enemies Closer”
Michael Corleone deceives many people throughout the Godfather film 
trilogy. In a similar vein, throughout The Prince, Machiavelli stresses the 
importance of using deception to accomplish one’s goals in politics. This is 
because Machiavelli sees deception as a key tool to ensure that a leader is 
able to be successful. After describing some traditionally laudable qualities, 
Machiavelli states: “It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to have all of 
the above-mentioned [good] qualities, but it is very necessary to seem to 
have them. I would even be bold to say to possess them and always observe 
them is dangerous, but to appear to possess them is useful. Thus it is well to 
seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so; but you 
must have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you 
may be able to change to the opposite qualities” (65). Machiavelli’s point is 
that a great ruler must at least appear to be a “good” person to win the sup-
port of the people and to have them think that he or she is a moral person. 
However, always following these virtues can leave a leader vulnerable to an 
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unscrupulous enemy, so the leader must also be willing to act in less moral 
ways by being deceptive. Put another way, in the words of Machiavelli, one 
must “be able to do evil if constrained” (65).
Michael Corleone follows this advice, and he does so for reasons remark-
ably similar to Machiavelli’s. For instance, Michael interrogates his brother-
in-law Carlo for information about who tried to set him up by telling him, 
“Don’t be afraid, Carlo. Come on, do you think I’d make my sister a widow? 
I’m Godfather to your son.” In fact, after Carlo tells Michael what he needs 
to know, Michael has him killed mere minutes later.
Michael tries to deceive his enemies quite a bit in the three Godfather 
films. Michael’s signature line in this regard occurs in a scene early in The 
Godfather Part II. Michael visits Frank Pentangeli at a time when Pentangeli 
is still acting as a caporegime for Michael. Michael confides in Pentangeli that 
he knows Hyman Roth, an old business associate of his father, tried to kill 
him. Pentangeli then says, “Let’s hit ,em all. Let’s hit ,em all now, while we 
got the muscle.” Michael, in another example of Machiavellian fox behavior, 
reveals that he is playing this game at a much higher level. He replies, “My 
father taught me many things. . . . He taught me, keep your friends close 
but your enemies closer. Now, if Hyman Roth sees that I interceded in this 
thing, and the Rosato brothers failed him, he’s gonna think his relationship 
with me is still good. . . . That’s what I want him to think. I want him com-
pletely relaxed, and confident, in our friendship. Then I’ll be able to find out 
who the traitor in my family was.” In the film, Michael does not want to kill 
Roth (even though he clearly can) because he needs to keep Roth alive to 
find out which member of his family betrayed him. At the same time, that 
one line, “Keep your friends close but your enemies closer,” is the ultimate 
example of Machiavellian deception: Michael is making someone who is 
his enemy think that he considers him a close confidant. All the while, 
however, Michael is using Roth, whom he ultimately has killed at the end 
of The Godfather Part II.
Michael is also quite deceptive with his own wife, Kay, on whose behalf 
he always claims to be acting. For instance, in The Godfather, Michael’s sister 
Connie (played by Talia Shire) is distraught because she has figured out that 
Michael killed her husband, Carlo. Upon hearing Connie’s allegation, Kay 
asks Michael if it is true, and he denies it. In The Godfather Part II, Kay asks 
Michael when the family business will be legitimate, and Michael claims that 
he is trying to no longer be involved in criminal activities, even though he 
is really making no effort in that direction.
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Yet, all of this deception pales in comparison to Michael’s deception 
when it comes to religion. Throughout the films, he pretends to be a devoutly 
religious Catholic while he is also committing immoral acts. One of the more 
notable moments in this regard occurs in The Godfather when Michael agrees 
to be godfather to Connie and Carlo’s son. During the christening, the priest 
asks Michael a series of questions about his faith. Michael agrees that he 
believes in God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the Catholic Church. He 
also agrees that he renounces Satan, all of his works, and all of his pomps. 
But even as he is making these statements in the church, Michael’s hench-
men are murdering rival mafia dons and other people in cold blood. Michael 
continues this use of religious deception in The Godfather Part III when he 
receives papal honors for his charitable work. Kay, however, who by this 
time has divorced Michael, is not fooled. She tells him, “I didn’t come here 
to see you disguised by your church. I think that was a shameful ceremony.”
Returning to The Prince, deception with respect to one’s religion is 
something that Machiavelli emphasizes repeatedly. When describing the 
need to appear to be a moral person, Machiavelli advises: “A prince must 
take great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which is not . . . mercy, 
faith, integrity, humanity, and religion. And nothing is more necessary than 
to seem to have this last quality, for men in general judge more by the eyes 
than by the hands, for everyone can see, but very few have to feel” (65–66). 
For Machiavelli, a ruler must appear to be religious, as this puts others at ease 
that the leader is a good person, allowing her or him to continue engaging 
in illicit activities without raising suspicion. Clearly, this same sentiment 
was shared by the character of Michael Corleone.
Acting for the Greater Good: Why the Ends Justify the Means
Upon reading the preceding paragraphs, one might get the impression that 
both Michael Corleone and Machiavelli are cold, heartless thugs who merci-
lessly and sadistically advocate killing on a whim. According to their words, 
however, nothing could be further from the truth. Both men shun the use of 
deception and similar tactics simply for their own sakes. Instead, they agree 
that a great leader is one who acts for the greater good. For example, at one 
point in The Prince, when describing the barbarous cruelty and inhumanity 
of an ancient king, Agathocles the Sicilian, Machiavelli makes the following 
observation: “It cannot be called virtue to kill one’s fellow-citizens, betray 
one’s friends, be without faith, without pity, and without religion; by these 
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methods one may indeed gain power but not glory” (32). Thus, contrary to 
popular belief, it appears that Machiavelli did have something of a moral 
compass. Indeed, he thought that cruelty or atrocities committed for no 
greater reasons were reprehensible. Thus, great leaders will not act in this way.
What, then, is the ultimate goal for Machiavelli? He states in The Prince 
that “in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there is 
no appeal, the end justifies the means” (66). This is the most succinct state-
ment of Machiavellian philosophy, at least what he espouses in The Prince: 
that the end justifies the means. For Machiavelli, the great end is the good 
of the people, especially the good of the Italian people. As is clear from his 
statement regarding Agathocles, Machiavelli thought the overall good of the 
people was important. Indeed, toward the end of The Prince, he begs Lorenzo 
(his most direct intended audience) to work toward the good of the Italian 
people and the unification of Italy. In his last chapter, titled “Exhortation 
to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians,” Machiavelli implores Lorenzo: “This 
opportunity must not, therefore, be allowed to pass, so that Italy may at 
length find her liberator” (98). Clearly, this greater goal of the good of the 
people, more specifically for Machiavelli the good of the Italian people, was 
the end that justified the means described above. In pursuit of such goals, 
a leader should encourage the people to close ranks against outsiders. It is 
only by acting immorally that a leader can accomplish great things for the 
people. As the old saying goes, if you want to make an omelet, you have to 
break a few eggs.
The character Michael Corleone has a similar goal. He believes (or fools 
himself into believing) that he commits various crimes, including murders, 
for the good of his family. He sees his family as the ultimate entity that he 
must protect. For instance, in The Godfather, Michael travels to Las Vegas 
to meet with Moe Greene (played by Alex Rocco) in an attempt to buy out 
Greene’s share of a casino-hotel that the Corleone family partly owns. Greene 
proceeds to argue with Michael, refusing to sell his portion of the business, 
and Fredo comes to Greene’s defense. After Greene leaves, Michael turns to 
Fredo and says, “Fredo. You’re my older brother and I love you. But don’t ever 
take sides with anyone against the family again. Ever.” Michael believed that 
Fredo overstepped his bounds by siding with Greene, especially in public, 
which made Michael appear to be a weak leader and worked against the 
ultimate good of the family.
The emphasis on the importance of acting to protect his family exists 
for Michael throughout the Godfather trilogy. In The Godfather Part II, he 
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has a heart-to-heart talk with his mother shortly before her death, in which 
he worries about losing his family. He wonders if by being strong for his 
family, he might lose it. At this point, Michael is realizing that the acts of 
cruelty he has committed against others, acts that he thought needed to be 
done to protect the family, might not be understood by his family, particu-
larly his wife and children. Michael’s concern for his family extends to The 
Godfather Part III, where he shouts in an argument with Kay, “I spent my 
life protecting my son. I spent my life protecting my family! . . . I did what 
I could Kay, to protect all of you from the horrors of this world.”
Michael’s protection of his family members had its limits, though. If 
family members betray Michael, he no longer sees them as part of the fam-
ily. This was evident in his order to murder his brother-in-law Carlo after 
Carlo worked with a rival mafia family. He also distances himself from Fredo 
in The Godfather Part II after learning that Fredo conspired with the rival 
gangsters who tried to kill Michael. Michael’s statement to Fredo is telling: 
“Fredo, you’re nothing to me now. You’re not a brother, you’re not a friend. 
I don’t want to know you or what you do.” Fredo was no longer a member 
of the family in Michael’s eyes, and he was thus someone whom Michael no 
longer felt obligated to protect. Toward the end of the second Godfather film, 
Michael has Fredo killed. Since Fredo was no longer his brother, Michael 
could justify killing Fredo in the name of the greater good, the good of the 
Corleone family. This reasoning is remarkably similar to what Machiavelli 
prescribed.
The Difference between the Powerful and the People
Implicit in Machiavelli’s statement cited above (“in the actions of men, and 
especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the 
means”) is the notion that leaders should be held to different standards 
than average people. It is clear that Machiavelli intends the audience of The 
Prince to be leaders (recall the language from his dedicatory letter), and it 
is equally clear that he was not advocating that every person in society use 
the types of tactics he wrote of in The Prince.
Michael Corleone believed in this sentiment as well. In The Godfather, 
after Michael has returned to America from Sicily, he tells Kay that he 
would like to see her again. Kay questions Michael why he would work for 
his father in the family business, something a few years earlier he claimed 
he would never do:
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Michael. I’m working for my father now, Kay. He’s been sick, very sick.
Kay. But you’re not like him, Michael. I thought you weren’t going to 
become a man like your father. That’s what you told me.
Michael. My father’s no different than any other powerful man.
Kay. Hah.
Michael. Any man who’s responsible for other people—like a 
senator or a president.
Kay. You know how naïve you sound?
Michael. Why?
Kay. Senators and presidents don’t have men killed.
Michael. Oh, who’s being naïve, Kay?
In this passage, Michael demonstrates his Machiavellian belief not only 
that the ends justify the means, but also that this consequentialist action is 
something necessary for those in positions of power.
This belief of Michael’s, and his differentiation between himself as 
leader and the rest of his family, is confirmed in an exchange with Senator 
Pat Geary in The Godfather Part II. Geary, when meeting privately with 
Michael, tries to extort money from Michael in exchange for allowing the 
Corleone family to have a Nevada gaming license. When Michael asks why 
he would even consider paying more than the standard license fee, Geary 
responds, “Because I intend to squeeze you. I don’t like your kind of people. 
. . . The fact is that I despise your masquerade, the dishonest way you pose 
yourself. Yourself and your whole fucking family.” Michael’s response: 
“Senator, we’re both part of the same hypocrisy. But never think it applies 
to my family.” Michael’s statement is more evidence that he understands the 
need for himself, as well as politicians, to be deceptive and justify the means 
by the ends. However, he also wants to protect his family from the sordid 
nature of politics, and he does not think the same rules apply to them. This 
fits the general tone of The Prince, as there is no indication that Machiavelli 
thinks the rules he prescribes should apply to everyone in society. Rather, 
like Michael Corleone, Machiavelli is constantly referring to leaders when 
he states what the most effective means are to reach a noble end.
The Importance of Studying History
Throughout The Prince, Machiavelli emphasizes the importance of study-
ing history to become a successful leader. Recall from his dedicatory letter 
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that Machiavelli has “knowledge of the deeds of great men” because he has 
undertaken “a constant study of the past.” Machiavelli confirms this later in 
The Prince when he writes, “A prudent man should always follow in the path 
trodden by great men and imitate those who are most excellent” (19–20). 
Indeed, if one reads The Prince, one finds numerous historical examples, 
especially from ancient Rome and Greece, used as evidence to prove Ma-
chiavelli’s points.
Michael Corleone was also a student of history, something he alludes to 
throughout the Godfather films. For instance, at one point in The Godfather 
Part II, he says to his brother Tom, “If anything in this life is certain, if his-
tory has taught us anything, it’s that you can kill anyone.” In The Godfather 
Part III, Michael notes how studying history explains the violence of the 
mafia and its rise to power in Sicily. Throughout the three movies, Michael 
also tries to model his actions by those of his father, whom Michael sees as 
a great leader for the family.
Why It Is Better to Be Feared Than Loved . . .  
But Don’t Be Hated!
Of course, no complex fictional character could completely fulfill and 
perfectly espouse any political theory. Although Michael Corleone comes 
close to embodying the Machiavellian prince, he ultimately fails to follow 
Machiavelli’s advice in one respect. Machiavelli advises in The Prince that 
“one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to 
go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has 
to be wanting.” Machiavelli believes this is true because “love is held by a 
chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves 
their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never 
fails” (61). Thus, Machiavelli counsels leaders to be feared, rather than loved, 
because love can be fickle, whereas fear will never fade. As noted by political 
philosopher Leo Strauss, Machiavelli emphasizes fear over love because it 
promotes self-reliance for a leader: “Whether one is loved depends on oth-
ers, while being feared depends on oneself.”8 Machiavelli cautions, though, 
that “a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he does not 
gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred” (61). Indeed, being hated can cause 
those around a leader to rise up and rebel when they can no longer tolerate 
a leader’s oppressive behavior.
Throughout the Godfather film series, Michael lives the experience of 
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Machiavelli’s mantra that it is better to be feared than loved. Many men fear 
him and consistently do his bidding because of fear. Yet, Michael struggles to 
obtain lasting love from his family members, especially his wife, Kay. She was 
not one of his henchmen or a rival gangster, so Kay never feared Michael in 
the way many others did. From the opening of The Godfather, Kay is in love 
with Michael, and she maintains that love for many years, even as Michael 
becomes more and more Machiavellian. By the end of The Godfather Part II, 
however, her love has faded, and Kay confirms to Michael in an argument, 
“At this moment, I feel no love for you at all. I never thought that would 
happen, but it has.” This is one of the great tragedies of the Godfather trilogy. 
All of the terrible acts that Michael commits, which he claims for years he 
did on behalf of his family, ultimately cost him his family. Michael and Kay 
eventually divorce, and Michael’s relationship with his children is nothing 
like the relationship he and his siblings had with his father. Thus, Michael 
tragically proved Machiavelli’s warning that love is not as lasting as fear and 
that being hated often spells disaster for a leader.
Closing the Door on Machiavelli and Michael Corleone
There is no question that Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince has had an influ-
ence on the modern world. It has been alleged or verified that The Prince 
was read by, and had an influence on, many world leaders, including James 
Madison, Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln, Benito Mussolini, Joseph 
Stalin, Winston Churchill, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton.9 The influence of 
The Prince is so well-known and widespread that even the pop singer Lady 
Gaga has publicly advocated that President Barack Obama read it to better 
understand foreign relations.10
Regardless of one’s interpretation of the book, and whether or not one 
agrees with Machiavelli’s advice in it, there is no question that it remains an 
important work of political science today and that it has been relied upon 
by countless politicians and other leaders. Studying the character Michael 
Corleone in the Godfather trilogy can help one better understand Machia-
velli’s messages in The Prince. Both men believed that violence, cruelty, and 
deception were necessary to be successful in politics. Yet, to quote Michael 
from The Godfather, for each man such acts were not personal; rather, for 
them they were “strictly business.”
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Rebellion and Dissent aboard Serenity
Susanne E. Foster and James B. South
The major plot of Serenity, the companion movie to Joss Whedon’s TV series 
Firefly, pits the crew of the spaceship Serenity against their interplanetary 
government, the Alliance. River Tam (Summer Glau), a member of the crew 
who begins as a stowaway, was severely damaged while at an Alliance school 
for “gifted” individuals.1 By the time the movie opens, River’s brokenness 
and the Alliance’s persistent attempts to find her lead the captain and crew 
to believe she is a threat to their safety. While attempting to discover what 
happened to River and why the Alliance is so desperate to recover her, the 
crew learn that an Alliance experiment in controlling human aggression 
annihilated the population of the planet Miranda and created the Reavers, 
a group of hyperviolent individuals.
Mal. I know the secret now. The truth that burned up River Tam’s 
brain and set you after her. And the rest of the ’verse is gonna 
know it too. ,Cause they need to.
The Operative. You really believe that?
Mal. I do.
The Operative. You willing to die for that belief?
Mal. I am. Of course, that ain’t exactly Plan A.
In this scene, which occurs late in Serenity, we see Malcolm (“Mal”) Reyn-
olds (Nathan Fillion), the captain of the spaceship Serenity, expressing the 
reasons why he finds himself at odds with his interplanetary government, 
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the Alliance. Over the course of the series Firefly and its sequel movie 
Serenity, the Alliance has been shown to be systematically keeping secrets 
from its citizens and to have policies that lead the government to sacrifice 
members of the community in pursuit of some greater good. By contrast, 
the relationship that develops between Mal and the crew of Serenity is one 
in which each individual is kept informed of the plans, and reasons for the 
plans, of the group, and in which those plans are never predicated on sac-
rificing any member of the crew for the good of the others. One especially 
salient feature that emerges from the interactions of the crew members is 
that they demand compliance with the rules that keep everyone safe while 
not judging one another’s motives and actions as long as crew members stay 
within these boundaries.
At the beginning of the series, Mal and his crew are rebelling against their 
interplanetary government, attempting to avoid interaction with or depen-
dence upon the Alliance. But as the series progresses, the crew of Serenity 
moves from rebellion to dissent, working to hold the Alliance accountable 
for its decisions and to force it to change its policies and actions. The com-
plex story of the community that develops among the crew of Serenity and 
their changing relationship to their government can best be understood by 
exploring the meaning of the term consent within the framework of “social 
contract theory,”2 both in the classical sense, expounded by John Locke, and 
in the development of the view found in the writings of the contemporary 
philosopher Stanley Cavell, who points out succinctly that “the force of the 
idea of a social contract is to put the advantage of a society, as it stands, in 
question.”3
Rebellion and Marginalization
The series begins a few years after a civil war between the Alliance and a 
rebel group called the Resistance. A member of the Resistance, Mal was 
present at the Battle of Serenity Valley, where the Resistance was defeated. 
His decision to name his ship Serenity and his penchant for picking battles 
each year on the anniversary of that defeat demonstrate his deep anger and 
inability to let go of the war. As captain he gathers to himself other individu-
als who are marginalized by or rebelling against the Alliance government. 
His own continuing rebellion against the Alliance is further demonstrated 
by his decision to make a living for himself and his crew by engaging in 
illegal activities, thereby depriving himself and his crew of the protection 
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the Alliance could provide them and forcing them to hide from the threat 
of violence from the Alliance itself.
We contend that Mal’s relationship to the Alliance consists of an attempt 
to withdraw consent from the social contract. Locke claimed that citizens 
enter into a social contract in order to protect their property and the rights 
that flow from it. In entering into the contract, citizens consent to be gov-
erned, that is, they give up some autonomy and freedom in exchange for a 
social world in which they can flourish, while being cognizant of the kinds 
of behavior and practices that are now off-limits to them.4 Mal’s rebellion 
as captain of Serenity may well strike us as juvenile, a mere thumbing of his 
nose at the government that defeated the Resistance. After all, Mal is now 
living a life in which he barely scrapes by, often short of fuel and parts for 
his ship as well as food and provisions for his crew. Moreover, he continually 
puts his crew at risk while engaging in illegal activities. It is worth noting 
that, ironically, even to the degree that Mal is able to make do in his rebel-
lious activities, he is nonetheless parasitic upon the good functioning of the 
social contract. One can become an outsider only by leaving the inside intact. 
Furthermore, the community on board the ship presupposes the language 
and social customs of the wider community.5 In short, it seems that despite 
his attempts at rebellion, Mal is still a member of the Alliance community 
to the extent that he relies on the good functioning of the Alliance to make 
his own living possible.
Some social-contract theorists at this point invoke Locke’s term tacit con-
sent to describe how it is that consent has been given when “few people have 
actually consented to their governments so no, or almost no, governments 
are actually legitimate.”6 On this interpretation, Mal’s use of Alliance-backed 
currency and goods such as produce and Alliance-developed technol-
ogy might seem analogous to Locke’s example of the tourist who uses the 
roadways of another country and thereby agrees to abide by the laws of the 
state.7 The problem for the social-contract theorist who wants to make this 
move is that Locke’s use of the concept is restricted to aliens present within 
a state; he nowhere makes the claim that tacit consent provides for genuine 
membership in a political community. Indeed, as Cavell notes, even in the 
sections where Locke brings up the notion of tacit consent, “he reiterates 
his contention that membership in the polis requires express consent.”8 So, 
we are left with three questions: What is required before one can be said 
to have given express consent? What would be required to withdraw that 
consent? and What would legitimate the withdrawal?
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Cavell’s insight is that express consent is best understood in light of an 
adequate account of withdrawal of consent. In what follows, we will discuss 
in some detail the ways in which Mal and the other crew members seem to 
have withdrawn consent. But we will show, drawing on Locke’s work, that 
they do not manage to actually withdraw consent. The crew’s initial response 
to the Alliance does not rise above acting out in a juvenile and rebellious 
manner. Locke foresaw rebellious reactions such as Mal’s, but he argued 
that they were fruitless insofar as they would fail to effect social change: 
“The examples of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an 
unfortunate man, moves them [the mass of citizens] not.” And so, Locke 
concludes, “Nor let anyone say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often 
as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of 
the government.”9
Mal’s crew consists of those who find themselves actively harmed by 
their government, or marginalized, or simply forgotten—as can happen in 
any society. These crew members, then, represent concretely those whom 
Cavell describes as subject to “specific inequalities, and lacks of freedom, 
and absence of fraternity.”10 So, for example, Jayne Cobb (Adam Baldwin) 
starts out as a member of a group of bandits threatening Mal and the crew. 
When Mal points out to him that he will benefit financially if he switches 
sides, Jayne ends up fighting against his erstwhile companions on behalf 
of Mal (“Out of Gas”).11 Just as Jayne was a mercenary before, he is now 
clearly in a kind of mercenary relationship with Mal. It is always an open 
question whether someone will make him a better offer and give him a fi-
nancial reason to turn on Mal and his crew. So Mal’s agreement with Jayne 
is a strictly financial one.
Inara Serra (Morena Baccarin) holds the position of a Companion, a 
profession akin to a legalized form of “prostitution” that involves a set of 
cultured, intellectual, and social functions similar to the Japanese notion 
of a geisha. Prior to leasing a shuttle aboard the spaceship Serenity, Inara 
walked away from her position as a rising member of the Companion House 
Madrassa. Although being a member of this guild afforded her a considerable 
amount of power, respect, and political clout, not to mention luxuries in food 
and clothing, it also meant she was socially compromised and constrained 
in a number of ways. Although we are not told the explicit reasons she has 
for leaving that position to take up residence with Mal and his crew, whose 
actions clearly lack social respectability, it is clear that by taking a position 
upon Serenity she gained a degree of autonomy and distance from the direct 
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affiliation with her guild while still plying her trade as a Companion. Her 
initial agreement to become part of the Serenity crew is explicitly financial. 
She tells Mal that he cannot enter her shuttle and that her services will not 
be available to the crew. But during their initial negotiations, Mal calls her a 
“whore,” attempting to assert his moral superiority, and she responds that he 
does not get to call her that again—as a stipulation of their agreement—and 
thus makes it clear that in addition to financial gain, she requires a position 
in which she is not being judged morally (“Out of Gas”).
Kaylee Frye (Jewel Staite), in contrast, becomes a member of the crew 
because she has no good reason to stay on her home planet, which appears 
to be exceptionally poor and limited in resources and opportunities. Rather 
than being morally compromised in the way Inara is, Kaylee’s circumstance 
is marginalization through poverty. She refers to her life as boring, and her 
agreement with Mal is to use her exceptional skills as a mechanic to keep the 
ship in flying condition, in return for the adventure of being part of Mal’s 
crew (“Out of Gas”). She betters her circumstances by being able to indulge 
her sensuality: wearing pretty dresses, eating strawberries, and acting on 
an earthy sexuality. This suggests that while Kaylee is marginalized by her 
society, she is too naive actually to rebel.
Simon Tam (Sean Maher) and his sister River are from a well-positioned 
family on one of the more cosmopolitan planets in the Alliance. The family, 
in short, has the privilege of power and wealth. The parents have sent River 
to a school for gifted individuals, but it turns out that the school is really 
an Alliance program engaged in experimentation and exploitation of the 
students’ gifts in order to train them for later use as Alliance operatives. She 
manages to get a message to her brother asking for help. Simon, although 
already embarked on an impressive career as a doctor, poses as an Alliance 
official and infiltrates the facility where River is being kept. He is able to 
extract her, but he and his sister are now wanted by the Alliance because 
River, while at the school, was accidentally given access to top-level secrets. 
Her knowledge of the Alliance’s past misdeeds and Simon’s knowledge of 
what was going on at the school threaten the Alliance. This act of rescuing 
his sister costs Simon a lot. He is unable to function openly as a physician, 
and it is clear he is drawn to practicing medicine. For example, in a scene 
in which he smuggles River into a medical facility for a series of diagnostic 
tests on her brain, he risks being caught in order to save a patient from the 
incompetence of another doctor (“Ariel”). Simon and River, then, represent 
those individuals in a society who are subject to gross, but isolated, injustices.
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The initial moment of their joining the crew of Serenity is especially 
complex. Simon masquerades as an ordinary passenger and smuggles River 
on board in his luggage. When an Alliance operative follows him, his act 
puts the crew of Serenity in danger. Although the crew protects Simon and 
River from the Alliance, Simon now must negotiate an agreement with Mal 
to become part of the crew and not just a passenger. He offers his services 
as a doctor—services they will need because, in their dangerous and illegal 
work, they will be unable to obtain needed medical help openly for fear of 
exposure (“Serenity”). This negotiation has to be reaffirmed frequently since, 
as a result of the experiments performed on her, River’s behavior is erratic 
and often puts the crew in danger.
Building Community: Speaking in Mutuality
Our discussion of the individual crew members so far shows that the group 
on board the ship began as a mere collection of misfit individuals marginal-
ized or persecuted by the Alliance. They have assembled for diverse reasons. 
First, they want to achieve the advantage of their common protection. 
Second, each believes that as a member of this particular crew, he or she 
can more effectively meet his or her needs for various goods and services. 
Third, each will now have opportunities for meaningful action, free from 
the prior constraints imposed by the social structures supported by the Al-
liance. Over the course of the series, though, it turns out that through their 
diverse abilities and the leadership of Mal, they begin to form a community, 
one that becomes superior to the political community fostered by the Alli-
ance. The new community that develops on Serenity shows its superiority in 
four ways. Decisions are always made based on some common agreement; 
no one’s good is sacrificed for the group; in spite of the diversity of moral 
perspectives among the crew, each is assured of the respect of the rest of 
the community; and although Mal is in a leadership role on Serenity, his 
leadership is by common consent and not absolute. In contrast to Locke, 
who argues that a prince is in a state of nature in relation to his subjects 
because there is “no common, higher appeal” between them, we believe that 
Firefly exemplifies a different model, one in which disagreements between 
Mal and the crew cannot be settled by a higher appeal but nonetheless can 
be resolved by a common appeal.12
The first key element in the communal understanding of the crew is 
their willingness to tolerate and even respect differences in goals and con-
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ceptions of the good held by the other crew members. After all, everyone 
is well aware that Jayne’s sole motivation for being on Serenity is the hope 
of financial benefit. No one upbraids him for his motives, and the only 
limit Mal ever places on Jayne is that his pursuit of money cannot be at the 
expense of any member of the community. When, in one episode, Jayne 
sells out the Tams, Mal threatens to open an airlock, thus pulling Jayne 
out into space. Mal makes his point: “You turn on any of my crew, you 
turn on me. But since that’s a concept you can’t seem to wrap your head 
around, then you got no place here. You did it to me, Jayne, and that’s a 
fact” (“Ariel”).
Another example of this mutual toleration involves Mal and Inara’s 
substantially different standards of respectability. When Inara points out 
that, unlike Mal’s smuggling, her own career is legal, Mal responds that un-
like hers, his chosen profession is not morally questionable (“Out of Gas”). 
Nonetheless, the two respect each other and work together. When an Alliance 
official questions Inara’s willingness to associate with the crew of Serenity, 
Inara responds, “It’s a mutually beneficial business arrangement. I rent the 
shuttle from Captain Reynolds, which allows me to expand my client base. 
The Captain finds that having a companion on board opens certain doors 
that might otherwise be closed to him” (“Bushwhacked”). But it is clear that 
the relationship develops beyond a business arrangement predicated on mere 
mutual toleration. When a man Inara is accompanying to a party implies 
that Inara is a whore and his property, Mal rushes to her defense. Inara asks 
Mal about his behavior: “You have a strange sense of nobility, Captain. You’ll 
lay a man out for implying I’m a whore, but you keep calling me one to my 
face.” And Mal responds: ”I may not show respect for your job, but he didn’t 
respect you. That’s the difference, Inara. He doesn’t even see you” (“Shindig”). 
Another element in the crew’s mutual relationship is that decision making 
aboard the ship is always transparent and results from a discussion among 
them, as seen throughout the series. Even more significant, though, is that 
the community’s plans are restricted by the need to meet the goals of all the 
members. When Inara points out to the captain that he is seeking jobs in 
areas where she cannot get work, Mal, however grudgingly, takes on jobs 
in a more populated area (“Trash”).
An especially poignant example of the community’s commitment to the 
good of each of the members, and one in which the other crew members are 
forced to act contrary to the expressed desires of Mal, the captain of the ship, 
occurs in “Out of Gas.” When the ship’s engines are crippled, knocking out 
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life-support systems, Mal directs the others to take the shuttles away from 
the ship and send out distress signals. Reluctantly, they leave. He remains on 
board to avoid using life-support resources in either shuttle and hoping for 
a miracle. A passing ship spots Serenity, and Mal barters with its captain for 
the part he needs to repair the engines. Once on board, though, the pirates 
turn on Mal, planning to kill him and take Serenity as their own. Gunfire is 
exchanged, and Mal, though injured, acquires the part and forces the oth-
ers off the ship. Bleeding profusely, he attempts the repairs and as he passes 
out, he manages the repair. Disobeying his orders, the shuttles return and 
Simon is able to save Mal’s life. When Mal awakes, he challenges the others: 
“I call you back?” Zoë (Gina Torres), the ship’s first officer and fellow soldier 
from his Resistance days, states that she takes full responsibility. Simon adds, 
“The decision saved your life,” and Zoë remarks, “Won’t happen again, sir.” 
Mal’s response to Zoë’s “apology” is “Good,” but he continues by saying, 
“Thanks, I’m grateful.”
As “Out of Gas” shows, in contrast to a Lockean model, where there 
is no mutuality between prince and subject and the prince is “in a state of 
nature” with regard to his subjects because there is no higher authority by 
which to settle disputes, Mal’s leadership role depends on common consent, 
and meaningful dissent can occur between the crew and its leader. Cavell 
provides resources for understanding this sort of community through his 
discussion of the forms of life constitutive of community. In an important 
passage, Cavell writes:
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are ex-
pected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further 
contexts. Nothing ensures that this projection will take place (in 
particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books 
of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, 
the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our 
sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humor and of sig-
nificance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar 
to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance 
is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl 
of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and 
activity, sanity and community, rest on nothing more, but nothing 
less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult 
as it is (and because it is) terrifying.13
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So genuine community does not require a higher authority but relies instead 
on a set of shared agreements in language, thought, feelings, and interests. 
Understood in this way, we see that despite Mal’s early attempts at rebel-
lion, which required an appeal to a higher standard, Mal is embedded in a 
community that is simultaneously dependent on and aversive to the broader 
community exemplified by the Alliance. With no higher authority to which 
he can appeal, Mal instead has to abandon his rebellious attitude toward the 
Alliance and turn to a form of expression that exists within that community 
and does not make an appeal to some outside source: dissent. That dissent 
finds expression in the companion film, Serenity.
Dissent: “If you can’t do somethin’ smart . . . do somethin’ right.”
When the Firefly series was prematurely canceled, Joss Whedon, the show’s 
creator, was fortunate to get funding to make a movie that could serve to 
wrap things up. As part of the plot of the movie, the crew finds itself in 
a bar pursuing payment for a completed job. A subliminal message on a 
telescreen triggers River’s Alliance conditioning and she violently attacks 
everyone around her. Just before the attack, she whispers the word “Miranda.” 
Miranda turns out to be the name of a terraformed planet that the Alliance 
claimed had been rendered uninhabitable through some natural event. In 
order to find the cause of River’s violent behavior, in hopes of curing her, the 
crew sets out on a dangerous journey to discover what really happened on 
the planet. This time, not only must the crew dodge the Alliance, but they 
must pass through Reaver territory. Reavers are humans who have become 
vicious cannibals, supposedly driven mad by spending too much time in 
deep space, away from human communities (“Bushwhacked”).14
When Serenity arrives at Miranda, the crew discovers that there has 
been no natural catastrophe. Instead, the inhabitants are dead, but without 
apparent cause. Eventually they find a recording made by an Alliance sci-
entist revealing that the government released a chemical, called “The Pax,” 
onto the planet in hopes of making the population “better.” But rather than 
simply removing excess aggression, the chemical destroyed all motivation 
in virtually all the planet’s inhabitants. They simply stopped and thus died. 
A minute fraction of the population had the opposite reaction. Their aggres-
sive tendencies were tremendously magnified. The release of the chemical, 
it turns out, was the true origin of the Reavers.
The carelessness with which the Alliance acted on Miranda, and the 
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resulting slaughter, is consistent with its routine attitude toward its citizens. 
In seeking out River Tam, Alliance operatives exterminated anyone they 
believed to have talked to her, and in attempting to prevent the crew from 
releasing the information they have acquired about Miranda, the Alliance 
indiscriminately destroys any community that they believe might harbor 
Mal and his crew.
In the final part of the movie, we see Mal and his crew risk their own 
lives to try to get the news of what really happened at Miranda out to the 
public. Mal still desires to bring down the Alliance, but he does not simply 
run away, as in his earlier rebellion from it. Instead, he is trying to do some-
thing with revolutionary potential. He demonstrates his commitment to 
the community governed by the Alliance by showing how the government 
has become corrupt. Locke, in his account of social-contract theory, made 
it clear that he thought people would be willing to put up with significant 
harms from government simply because that course was easier than rebel-
lion. He claims that, “til the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs 
of the rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, 
the people . . . are not likely to stir.”15 But the actions of Mal and the crew in 
reaction to their discovery on Miranda are aimed at making the “ill designs 
of the rulers become visible.” To maim and exterminate human beings in an 
experiment to improve human nature certainly qualifies as an “ill design.” 
The crew’s development of a community that involves mutual respect and 
tolerance is a model of the social contract that now stands in stark contrast 
to the Alliance.
Cavell reminds us, “It is a very poorly kept secret that men and their 
societies are not perfect,” but we are always in community despite imperfec-
tions because we share language, customs, and the like. “To speak for oneself 
politically is to speak for the others with whom you consent to association, 
and it is to consent to be spoken for by them . . . as someone in mutuality 
speaks for you, i.e., speaks your mind.”16 As Mal expresses his newfound 
reasons for taking on the Alliance: “Someone has to speak for them.” At 
no point in the series are Mal and his crew able to break free of the larger 
community they struggle against. In addition to the goods and services 
for which they must barter, their own smaller community presupposes the 
language and customs of the interplanetary government. And at no point 
is Mal content with his stance toward the Alliance. The bigger question, 
then, is, How does one respond when one cannot assent to the words and 
actions of one’s community? Cavell writes, “Dissent is not the undoing of 
Social Contract 73
consent but a dispute about its content, a dispute within it over whether a 
present arrangement is faithful to it.”17 At the end of Serenity, we see Mal 
expressing that dissent: “You all got on this boat for different reasons, but 
you all come to the same place. So now I’m asking more of you than I have 
before. Maybe all. Sure as I know anything I know this, they will try again. 
Maybe on another world, maybe on this very ground swept clean. A year 
from now, ten, they’ll swing back to the belief that they can make people . . . 
better. And I do not hold to that. So no more running” (Serenity). And once 
he broadcasts the truth, regaining his voice within the community, dissent-
ing from the lies and actions of the Alliance, he lets go his rebellious anger 
and need to isolate himself. We see Mal and the crew of Serenity continuing 
their association, but now in a vastly different relationship to the Alliance.
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dwight sChrute and 
servile ambition
Tacitus and Rousseau on the Lackey Politics of The Office
Matthew D. Mendham
Much of the brilliance of the first few seasons of NBC’s comedy The Office 
was derived, quite simply, from pathology. Leading the maladjustment was 
Regional Manager Michael Scott, whose frequent missteps resulted from a 
highly insecure and narcissistic personality. This made him capable of every 
sort of adolescent nuisance and cowardly pandering. Yet without fail, he dis-
played a boundless capacity to deceive himself into believing his employees 
felt all the love and admiration for him that he so desperately needed. Further 
analysis of Michael we will leave to trained psychologists and turn to our 
main topic here: the more politically minded Dwight Schrute, particularly as 
he appears in the early seasons of the program.1 For him life is about power 
and authority, even heroism and weaponry. The leading salesman of Dunder 
Mifflin, he brings an unrivaled level of discipline and organization to his 
work. He also brings peculiar habits derived from his Amish heritage and 
his old-fashioned beet farm. Yet, while these traits make him quirky, there is 
another factor that makes him—amid many unsavory characters—the most 
despised person in the office. This is his basic approach to social interaction. 
In normally functioning societies, various influences, including affection, 
friendship, politeness, professionalism, and convictions about innate human 
dignity, have always been indispensable in making interactions tolerable. 
But with rare exceptions, Dwight does not concern himself whatsoever with 
any of these gentle buffers. Rather, he relates above all through the prism of 
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power, both in striving to attain power and in respecting those—and only 
those—who have it. Take, for instance, his monologue shortly after he was 
assumed to be inheriting the Regional Manager position from Michael: “How 
is the new boss? Tough. Do people respect him? They have to. Do they like 
him? Irrelevant. They do not. And I hate them back.”2 Dwight thus displays 
many of the faults that great political observers have noticed about a certain 
unprincipled kind of ambition, including a degrading submissiveness toward 
superiors and a harsh dismissiveness toward peers and inferiors. Or, to use 
a phrase that has become well known recently, Dwight’s typical approach 
to social interaction is “kissing up, kicking down.”
With the exception of a handful of well-adjusted characters, The Of-
fice can be seen as a sort of cage-match of personal and social pathology. 
Insofar as the show has been crafted with psychological insight and real-
ism, it stands to reason that the dysfunctions it puts on display would often 
parallel—albeit on a more frivolous level—forms of corruption that have 
been criticized by leading political theorists. To my knowledge, the best 
frameworks for understanding Schrute’s pathologies of power can be derived 
from Marcus Cornelius Tacitus (c. 55–117 CE) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712–1778). Tacitus is often viewed as the greatest of the ancient Roman 
historians; he starkly analyzed the brutality, paranoia, and decadence of 
imperial Rome, which followed the collapse of the republic. Rousseau is 
commonly recognized as one of the greatest political theorists, although 
he remains controversial for his radical republicanism and his scathing 
criticisms of the inequality, luxury, and oppression of Europe in the time 
of the Enlightenment. The task of this chapter is to show that the imperial 
palaces of the first-century Roman Empire, as well as the aristocratic courts 
of eighteenth-century France, reveal certain patterns of behavior that are 
clearly echoed in the office parks of twenty-first-century America.
Although in the next section I will introduce the crucial political teach-
ings of Tacitus and Rousseau and will interweave the observations of various 
political thinkers throughout our discussion, it may be useful to begin with 
some philosophical claims that particularly evoke Schrute. Most commonly, 
a person who is ambitious and preoccupied with power is a feisty, stubborn 
type—one who likes to give orders but chafes at following them and thus 
strives to minimize the frequency and degradingness of submission to oth-
ers. Rousseau often praised vigorous, republican societies exemplifying this 
sort of proud independence and love of liberty. He thus faulted the great 
majority of modern people for being willing to degrade themselves in or-
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der to gain the comforts and securities offered by the modern commercial 
and political system. Such people are “busy, restless, ambitious, detesting 
freedom in others and not wanting any for themselves, provided that they 
. . . dominate the will of others—they torment themselves their whole life 
long by doing what is loathsome to them; they omit nothing servile in order 
to command.”3 Rousseau mentions that this last phrase—to “omit nothing 
servile in order to command”—comes from Tacitus’s discussion of Otho. 
Otho was a Roman general who usurped the throne to become emperor 
and reigned four months before being overthrown himself. For Rousseau, 
this phrase shows that “Tacitus knew the human heart. . . . Few men have 
healthy enough hearts to be able to love liberty: All wish to command, 
and at that price none fear to obey. A little upstart gives himself a hundred 
masters in order to acquire ten valets.”4 It is somewhat counterintuitive and 
paradoxical that a person obsessed with power and domination would so 
eagerly embrace abasement and subordination. Tacitus and Rousseau were 
also surprised by the many people in their times who were desperate to taste 
great power and wealth and at that price eagerly endured the degradation 
of being treated like “lackeys”—servants of particularly low standing and 
respectability.5 This paradox might capture much of what is complex and 
intriguing about Dwight Schrute. His fawning, flattering service to Michael, 
alongside his rough treatment of his co-employees, is traceable to his ambi-
tion being so “servile”—that is, “slavish,” both in the degrading things he 
is willing to endure and in his narrowly selfish and calculating outlook.6
Dwide Schrude and the Origins of Servile Ambition
We know that Dwight craves power, and we know that he behaves in a “ser-
vile” (that is, slavish) manner toward his superiors. If anything, he may go 
beyond Rousseau’s observations, in that he often seems to positively delight 
in being servile, at least in relation to Michael. According to our political 
theorists, the rise and preponderance of this sort of character results from 
a corrupt social system. After outlining the political theories of ambition in 
Tacitus and Rousseau, I will suggest that the sources of ambition in Schrute 
seem to be of a more distinctive, personal nature.
For Tacitus, looking at his contemporaries and the recent past in com-
parison with the greatness of the earlier Romans, the explanation was fairly 
straightforward. For most of their history, the early Romans were politically 
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free—citizens of a republic, not subjects of a monarchy. They also had the 
firm and public-minded sort of character that was required to maintain that 
freedom and was reinforced by the exercise of that freedom. By contrast, 
under the absolute power of the emperors, strength and open disagreement 
in service of the common good gave way to cowardice and fawning in order 
to placate a single man. Under the early republican system, competitive drives 
such as ambition were restrained by an equal system of laws and expressed 
themselves in the pursuit of excellence in political speech, political service, 
and military victory. Under the imperial system, competitive drives could 
only encourage mediocrity, treachery, and dishonest flattery of the powerful.7
For Rousseau, the rise of destructive forms of ambition is more com-
plex, being closely linked with his overall political and historical theories. 
At one level, Rousseau seems close to Tacitus in finding certain healthy 
forms of ambition to flourish in virtuous republics and other, destructive 
forms of ambition to prevail in corrupt societies. However, at another 
level, Rousseau seems to suggest that society itself is the problem, since 
it was only with the rise of society that humans came to develop a range 
of highly destructive, competitive passions, including ambition as well as 
greed, envy, and contempt. Instead of having a natural and healthy self-
love (amour de soi) based simply on personal well-being, humans become 
consumed by a vain self-love (amour-propre) and are even willing to neglect 
or subvert their substantive well-being, so long as they can drag someone 
else down and thus increase their own comparative status in the eyes of 
society. Especially in his early Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau presents 
this as the universal tale of civilized humanity. The heroes in this account 
are not Spartan or Roman citizens but the “savages” of the most primitive 
times and conditions:
Savage man and civilized man differ so much in their inmost heart 
and inclinations that what constitutes the supreme happiness of the 
one would reduce the other to despair. The first breathes nothing 
but repose and freedom, and wants only to live and to remain idle, 
and even the Stoic’s ataraxia [tranquility] does not approximate his 
profound indifference to everything else. By contrast, the Citizen, 
forever active, sweats, scurries, constantly agonizes in search of ever 
more strenuous occupations. . . . This, indeed, is the genuine cause of 
all these differences: the Savage lives within himself; sociable man, 
always outside himself, is capable of living only in the opinion of 
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others and, so to speak, derives the sentiment of his own existence 
solely from their judgment.8
From this perspective, the opportunism and obsession with status that we 
find in Schrute is simply a clear picture of social and civilized humanity, 
from Sparta to Scranton.9
This being said, at least as Rousseau’s political thought came to be fully 
expressed, his main problem does not seem to be with society or civilization 
as such. In his practical models for politics, he does not think we can return to 
the simplicity and freedom of the savage, but he does wish to recreate some of 
their integrity at a more complex level. He believes that citizens of a few small 
communities, isolated from the corruptive charms of the modern world, might 
be able to satisfy their competitive passions not by struggling against their 
compatriots for wealth and status, but by striving with them for civic honor 
and glory. In this way they would find their greatness by identifying them-
selves with a free and virtuous state, in comparison with the slavish and base 
states all around them. Thus amour-propre is elevated and redirected through 
a deeply inculcated patriotism.10 The true citizen is unlike the savage in hav-
ing extensive amour-propre but like him in not having a kind of amour-propre 
that naturally leads to conflicts of interest with his neighbors. Another major 
problem Rousseau wished to avoid was common to virtually all societies—the 
abuse of political and legal authority, which forces people to submit themselves 
to the arbitrary wills of powerful individuals. A virtuous community can avoid 
this fate only if it universally and directly takes up the duties of governing it-
self, passing laws that apply uniformly to everyone, in service of the common 
good alone. In submitting to such laws, a citizen can thus “nevertheless only 
obey himself and remain as free as before.”11 Again, the true citizen is unlike 
the savage in needing to obey, but he is like the savage in remaining free of all 
dependence upon, or subjection to, any particular individuals and their wills.
We can see that Rousseau rejects not civilization so much as modern 
civilization, and modern civilization is found lacking in comparison with 
both the simple savage and the true republican citizen. He thought these 
destructive social passions such as greed and envy were reaching their most 
acute expressions in the sort of open, individualistic, commercial, and “en-
lightened” societies that were fairly new in his times but have continued to 
expand and reinforce themselves since then. Whereas many, including Rous-
seau’s predecessor Montesquieu, had viewed England’s commercial economy 
and balanced, representative government as the most free and admirable 
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model the world had to offer, Rousseau would have none of that. Since 
these new societies undermined economic independence and made people 
increasingly dependent on others, humans’ destructive social tendencies 
would reach their most calculating heights. Greed and inevitable conflicts 
of interest would stratify economic life, frivolous fashions would pass for 
cultural excellence, and a narrow elite would supplant every sort of direct 
political activity. Instead of honor found in public service and patriotism, we 
have “the passions of petty self-interest, concentrated together with egoism 
in all hearts by inept institutions in which genius never had any share.”12 
Thus Rousseau offered scathing criticism of any society driven by greed 
and comparative status, often entailing a great willingness of individuals to 
humiliate themselves in order to subordinate others. Whereas the earliest 
savage had neither knowledge nor opportunity for such ambition, and the 
true citizen seeks superiority through the community alone, the modern 
finds his identity only through the eyes of others. Even the most faithful 
and self-abasing ally secretly aspires to betray and surpass his superiors 
and would carry out such wishes if only given the assurance of success.13
While many would argue, with some justification, that modern liberal 
societies have proved more resilient and less monolithically corrupt than 
Rousseau anticipated, there is much in his portrayal that rings alarmingly 
true. And while Schrute seems to embody much of the fawning and cal-
culating ambition portrayed by Rousseau and Tacitus, his character does 
not completely fit these models as far as the causes of his servility are con-
cerned. For one thing, Schrute does not seem to be a result of domination 
by, or dependence upon, superiors, as Tacitus and Rousseau both found. 
The needy Michael is stunningly weak as a personality and a leader. Better-
adjusted characters, such as Jim Halpert and Ryan “the Temp” Howard, are 
more than capable of making the excuses necessary to distance themselves 
from Michael’s psychological vortex. Second, Dwight does not seem to fit 
Rousseau’s account of corruption by peers, whether through imitation or 
through competition. Dwight has nothing but contempt for their profes-
sional skills and feels no need to earn their confidence or approval in his 
quest for dominance. However, he does come closer to Rousseau’s analysis 
in desperately needing to feel superiority over his peers in his own mind and 
in needing to have that confirmed by the existing (albeit pathetic) leader.
Dwight’s servile ambition therefore seems to result more from internal 
and personal factors than from broader sociopolitical forces. The program 
does not attempt to fully explain Dwight’s origins—after all, how can such a 
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person really be explained? But we do find several important reminiscences 
of his upbringing in the Schrute household.14 These are often described by 
Dwight in a charmed, even wistful manner. For instance, “I remember every 
hot summer morning, dad driving us all over to Rocky Glenn’s swimming 
hole near Factoryville. We would splash away until 10 a.m., and then work 
the beet fields until well after midnight.”15 He also mentions love for his father 
in describing the origins of his name: “My father’s name was Dwight Schrute. 
My grandfather’s name was Dwight Schrute. His father’s name: Dwide 
Schrude. Amish.”16 Although Dwight does not seem to have been raised in 
a full-fledged Amish manner, there are Amish elements of his upbringing 
that, at least to most outsiders, might be judged negatively. In explaining his 
decision to shun Andy Bernard for three years (following the wall-punching 
incident), Dwight coolly observes: “I was shunned from the age of four until 
my sixth birthday . . . for not saving the excess oil from a can of tuna.”17 In all 
of Dwight’s recollections of his homespun upbringing, we find a great deal 
of the sorts of austerity that were common in scarcity-driven, traditional 
societies—a vigorous work ethic, shame about waste, and respect for elders. 
But such factors don’t seem to go far in explaining his rough treatment of 
his peers, his lust for power, or the peculiar neediness of his submission to 
Michael. Many people who have emerged from regimented upbringings and 
incompetent workplaces have maintained their senses of personal dignity 
and social respect. Although we may never know the reasons, we shall see 
that Dwight ended up going another way.
“To Intimidate My Subordinates”: Schrutian Authority
Before we discuss Dwight’s characteristically fawning services to Michael, we 
might turn, briefly, to those rare moments when authority has been vested in 
Dwight, allowing him to experience his deeper fantasies of power—at least 
partially. Here I will comment on his stern responses to social disorder in 
general, his many opportunities to exercise petty authority, and his fleet-
ing moments of supreme command as Regional Manager of the Scranton 
branch. Our philosophical guides will then help us understand the stark 
contrast between his treatment of superiors, on the one hand, and of peers 
and inferiors, on the other hand.
Schrute’s approach to any question of violent action—of fear, weaponry, 
survival skills, and heroism—is unmistakably boyish. Upon supposedly tak-
ing over the Scranton branch, he names Jack Bauer as his ideal choice for 
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his “number two”; in explaining true citizenship to Jim, he cites Han Solo. 
He is thrilled about the fireworks he received from his uncle. Nunchucks, 
throwing stars, spudguns, and blowguns are featured prominently in his 
at-work arsenal (not to mention several grown-up survival knives). He is 
always easy to convince about a major security threat, as when Jim sends 
him alleged top-secret correspondence from the CIA. It is this pattern of 
paranoia—of compulsively exaggerating levels of danger—that makes him 
systematically overreact to perceived threats or disorder. Thus, although 
he has various tendencies that are downright fascist, in the early seasons 
we are focusing upon, he remains an essentially comic figure and (mostly) 
harmless.18 Thus, also, even when his convictions at least partially overlap 
with mainstream and reasonable views—for instance, one shouldn’t smoke 
marijuana at work—his crackdowns as “volunteer sheriff ’s deputy” are pa-
tently disproportionate. He goes so far as to overrule Michael in this case, 
although the manager’s authority normally holds great sway for Dwight. 
He sternly rebuffs Michael’s various attempts to escape the drug testing: “It 
has to be official, and it has to be urine. . . . That is the law according to the 
rules.” Even in “Dwight’s Speech,” during his moment of greatest anxiety, we 
find him ultimately rallying as he communes with the authoritarian ethos 
of his (lightly revised) Benito Mussolini speech.19
Stern overreach is also inevitable when Schrute is delegated any sort of 
partial authority. This occurs far more often than it should, since Michael 
is constitutionally incapable of making a decision that might be unpopular 
with his employees. Beginning very early in his documented career, it has 
been Dwight alone who has been willing to fill that gap, whatever unpopu-
larity may come. Authorized to select a new and cheaper health care plan, 
he “slashed benefits to the bone,” saving the company “a fortune.” This was 
partly due to his sense of the basic frivolousness of health care, since it did 
not exist “in the wild” and he himself had never been sick, having a “perfect 
immune system.” Dwight’s response to the ensuing office revolt—a series of 
aggressive invasions of privacy—might not stand among the great profiles 
in leadership. Lacking charisma and a sense of proportion, he also inspires 
quitting rather than excellence both in his exotic initiation of Ryan at the beet 
farm and in his drill-sergeant approach to the “Beach Games.” In another 
instance, Dwight is faced with a severe case of negligence that is apparently 
the fault of the notorious slacker Creed Bratton, and then he confronts Creed’s 
(manufactured) evidence against one Debbie Brown. When Creed insists 
that there is “no time” to hear Debbie’s plea of innocence and that “someone 
Dwight Schrute and Servile Ambition 83
has to be held accountable,” Dwight agrees. It is “time to put this dog down,” 
since “mercy is for girl babies.” Here it is probably Jim Halpert who provides 
the best analysis of Dwight’s lesser forays into authority. As Dwight wields 
an oversized dry-erase board and vindictively pronounces that it will be Jim 
who will need to work on the coming Saturday, Jim finds the display “so 
sad,” as “the smallest amount of power I’ve ever seen go to someone’s head.”20
We might only beg for mercy, then, when a Schrute attains the heights 
of authority. Without ever being given official word from Corporate, in 
two cases Dwight is told by Michael that he will be promoted to Regional 
Manager. The first one is “The Coup.” Reversing his normal subservience 
to Michael, Dwight allows Angela to prod him into thinking that Michael’s 
bumbling ways—particularly, getting caught by Jan Levinson during “Movie 
Monday”—are going to get the entire branch fired and that only Dwight can 
save the branch. After much internal turmoil, Dwight stages a secret meeting 
with Jan and makes his bold proposal to her.21 Jan, in turn, secretly informs 
Michael of the treachery, and Michael gets his revenge by telling Dwight 
that Corporate seems to be reversing their job positions, all the while em-
phasizing Dwight’s unflinching loyalty and honesty. During his hour or so 
of presumed authority, Dwight’s new regime seems ominous. He announces 
to the crew: “I just want to say, to the few of you who will remain under my 
employ, that I intend to lead you into the black with ferocity!”
Dwight’s second pseudo-promotion occurs in “The Job.” He is then 
voluntarily granted the position by Michael, since the latter is fully self-
assured of earning a promotion to Corporate but his desperate attempts 
to find a replacement other than Dwight have come to nothing. Here one 
might grant that Schrute’s reign had some strengths. With the institution 
of “Schrutebucks,” he came to use some carrots alongside his many sticks 
(and looming axes). And his seminar on nitrogen and the origins of paper 
might, indeed, have been an improvement over Michael’s many meetings, 
which—as the new boss announced—“wasted an enormous amount of the 
group’s time and patience with non-work related ethnic celebrations and 
parades of soft-minded dogoodedness.” However, after Michael’s delusions 
of Corporate promotion vanish, he resumes his former authority and asks 
Dwight why his office has been painted black. Dwight can then only sheep-
ishly reply: “To intimidate my subordinates.”22
More generally, Dwight’s approach to subordinates is the inverse of 
Michael’s. In staging “The Coup,” Dwight’s leading proposal to Jan for re-
forming the branch is to “get rid of waste—which is half the people there.” 
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By contrast, Michael chides Donald Trump’s iconic “You’re fired!”; his own 
catchphrase would be, “You’re hired, and you can work here as long as you 
want.”23 In this connection, Michael invokes Machiavelli’s famous question 
of whether it is better for a prince to be loved or feared. But he offers a 
solution quite overlooked by the Florentine: “Easy: both. I want people to 
be afraid of how much they love me.”24 While Michael’s management style 
leaves almost everything to be desired, Dwight’s is apparently even worse. 
Even as a co-employee, Dwight’s manner of relating does not earn the af-
fection or even respect of his peers. When he is announced for any leader-
ship position, everyone—except for the like-minded and allied Angela—is 
filled with dread and disgust.25 There are many reasons for this, but perhaps 
the most important one is that although Dwight typically shows immense 
devotion and respect for Michael, he is almost always stern and full of 
contempt for everyone else. This follows a pattern observed by Tacitus and 
Rousseau—that when people have ambition but not substantive morals, they 
relate to others only with a view to benefiting themselves. Accordingly, such 
people treat the wealthy and strong with servile flattery but the poor and 
weak harshly as tools.26 For instance, upon receiving much-needed advice 
on a Valentine’s gift, Dwight immediately tells Pam, “Okay, shut up.” And 
expecting a Washington Post–caliber reporter to respond to his press release 
about the “product recall,” he only pretends to offer a drink to the Scranton 
Times reporter, before slamming the door in his face.27
Another philosophical implication of servile ambition is that a person 
can seem to faithfully adore his leader, and yet when their power relations 
are overturned, the adoration can turn instantly to jubilant scorn.28 Without 
going quite that far, we can see some of this in “The Coup.” When Michael 
tells Dwight he should inform “the troops” about his new position, Dwight 
casually brushes him aside: “When I’m ready, Mike.” But above all, what 
Michael could not forgive was Dwight’s failure to maintain his usual praise 
of the manager’s Sebring convertible—declaring it instead “a ridiculous 
choice for this climate.”29 This drew Michael’s hoax to an abrupt end, bring-
ing Dwight to new depths of humiliation in begging forgiveness from the 
man who was now revealed as supreme after all.
“Assistant (to the) Regional Manager”: The Soul of a Lackey
Given the results of his abortive attempts at leadership, then, his colleagues 
might be grateful that Dwight normally operates near the middle of the 
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hierarchy. Apart from the few exceptions discussed above, Dwight relates to 
Michael with preeminent obedience and dedication. Adding to the humili-
ation is the fact that, for all his efforts, he normally receives only mockery 
and derision from Michael. On the other hand, one factor weighing in favor 
of Dwight as a moral figure is that he seems to have a genuine admiration 
for Michael and to desire true friendship with him. Thus, if the essentially 
servile character is self-abasement and fawning solely to advance one’s own 
standing, then perhaps Dwight does not embody the purest sort of servility.
Dwight’s subservience to Michael knows few bounds, and I will not 
attempt to document it fully. In general, if there is a request that seems too 
frivolous (like picking up Michael after he burns his foot on a Foreman Grill), 
too demeaning (like rubbing butter on that foot), or too disgusting (like 
smelling Michael’s breath before a cocktail party), Dwight alone will accept 
the charge.30 And he does so with zeal. If Michael is lonely and depressed 
that his employees have inadequately celebrated his birthday and fears that 
only his mother will buy him a present, Dwight is there: “I probably care 
more than she does.”31 When Michael and Dwight arrive at CFO David 
Wallace’s house for a cocktail party among the company’s major players, 
Dwight observes that Michael is dressed “exactly like the servants.” He ea-
gerly accepts Michael’s demand that they change shirts and even expresses 
relief, without any regard to his own appearance at the party: “That would 
have been embarrassing. Crisis averted.”32 These are the sorts of incidents 
that lead Jim to describe Dwight as having a “dog-like obedience to author-
ity.”33 Despite his higher ambitions, Dwight often seems quite satisfied to be 
Michael’s lackey. But one need not have Rousseau’s level of outrage against 
constraint and subordination to be able to recognize that it is natural and 
proper to feel indignation when one’s human worth or distinctive merit is 
consistently overlooked or insulted.34
Meanwhile, for all Dwight’s efforts, Michael is almost always cold in 
return. Much of the scorn for Dwight is summarized in Michael’s early script 
for “Threat Level Midnight,” in which a character originally named Dwight 
is chided throughout as “such an idiot,” “the worst assistant ever,” and “dis-
gusting.” In reality, Dwight is not particularly unintelligent, incompetent, or 
unhygienic; it also doesn’t seem to be his servility that provokes Michael’s 
contempt. Rather, just as Dwight is drawn to authority and dominance, 
Michael is drawn to popularity and physical attractiveness—the status-
markers of the adolescent world. And by adolescent standards, Dwight is 
plainly a “nerd.” Unfortunately for Michael, the cooler youngsters in the 
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office pay little attention to their lonely, forty-something boss. Pam rebuffs 
his somewhat guarded romantic overtures, while Ryan and Jim make an art 
form of resisting his social invitations through feeble excuses.35 The result 
is a partial love triangle, with Dwight and Michael giving much love but 
receiving none from the ones they long for.
But occasionally Dwight’s heartache cuts deeper still, for two reasons. 
First, it is not merely out of ambition that he obeys Michael and craves his 
attention. Amazing though it may seem, Dwight offers several expressions 
of disinterested praise of Michael, often when he is beyond Michael’s ear-
shot. Michael did, after all, post the greatest sales numbers in the company’s 
history, and Dwight freely admits that he will never match them.36 Dwight 
also longs for friendship and a sort of fatherly approval from Michael.37 A 
second cause of heartache is that even though Dwight will undergo any 
breach of social dignity on behalf of Michael, he does have broader moral 
principles, which are not as easily suppressed. In “Drug Testing,” Michael 
believes he might fail a forthcoming drug test due to inadvertent drug use 
at an Alicia Keys concert. When his various pretexts for avoiding the test 
are foiled—mostly by the vigilant but oblivious Dwight—Michael demands 
a cup of urine from his most obedient and clean-living employee. After 
real resistance, Dwight succumbs, but he remains highly distressed. He 
even resigns as volunteer sheriff ’s deputy, having broken his oath. Again, it 
is Jim who is the mouthpiece of truth: “Why does he do the things that he 
does for Michael? I just don’t get it. What is he getting out of that relation-
ship?”38 Though sad for Dwight, the episode reflects upon him somewhat 
well. Servile ambition is worth understanding, in part, because it motivates 
a large share of participation in totalitarian regimes and atrocious acts. In 
this respect, the level of moral integrity that Dwight displays in resisting a 
fairly minor breach of justice may suggest that his servility is by no means 
the most sinister kind.
“I Really ‘Schruted’ It”: The Unbridled Servility of Andy Bernard
If Schrute’s combination of servility and ambition is staggering yet ultimately 
in tension with other moral standards, Bernard’s may be pure and bound-
less. In contrast to Dwight, with his country-bred industriousness and self-
reliance, Andy is characterized by privilege and entitlement. He schemes to 
climb the corporate ladder not through any objective professional achieve-
ments, but through “face time with the boss” and machinations to subvert his 
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chief rival—Dwight himself. His origins and ethos are more straightforward 
than Dwight’s. He often mentions his graduation from Cornell University, 
where he was admitted partly as a legacy and partly through a last-minute 
a cappella performance to the admissions office. He graduated from there 
in four years but “never studied once” and was “drunk the whole time.” His 
peculiar work ethic might also be inferred from his claim “Every success I’ve 
ever had at my job or with the lady-folk has come from my ability to—slowly 
and painfully—wear someone down.”39
Andy’s overbearing personality and groundless self-promotion were 
fully on display while he was working with Jim (as well as Karen Filippelli) 
at Dunder Mifflin Stamford. But his pathologies shift into higher gear upon 
his arrival at the Scranton branch, since apparently Michael presents himself 
as a perfect target for servile flattery, while Dwight presents himself as a 
grave obstacle to achieving domination. Andy vows to be “the number two 
guy” at Scranton within six weeks, through tactics such as “name repeti-
tion, personality mirroring, and never breaking off a handshake.”40 While I 
take these to be commonplaces of current pop psychology, it may be worth 
noting a parallel in Tacitus’s account of the ways Gaius Caligula was able to 
ingratiate himself with the emperor Tiberius, who had become morbidly 
suspicious, murderous, and perverse in his old age. According to Tacitus, 
“Gaius concealed a monstrous personality beneath a deceitful veneer of 
moderation. . . . Whatever Tiberius’ mood for the day seemed to be, he would 
adopt the same, using language little different from his.”41 While Andy is 
far more frivolous than monstrous, he does have a hidden, wrathful side. 
But early on, he seemed a perfect fit for his boss, since he could tirelessly 
ape, praise, and apparently delight in Michael’s standard, adolescent antics. 
As a pampered, perpetual adolescent himself, Andy might even have been 
sincere in channeling Michael’s humor in “Lazy Scranton” and “Night at 
the Roxbury.”42
As viewers know, Andy’s aggressive pursuit of “face time with the boss” 
eventually exasperated Michael and led to the Ivy Leaguer’s fall from grace. 
But his scheming initially found much success in a fine sequence of episodes, 
“Traveling Salesmen” and “The Return.” As the sales team is set to go out in 
pairs, and Andy is given the first choice of a partner, he turns to the obvious 
flattery, served as irony: “Hmmm, well. . . . Let me think about this for a 
minute. Oh, I don’t know: Michael Scott, Ph. D.! Doctor of Sales.” As Andy 
and Michael walk across the parking lot, Michael throws Dwight a bag of 
dirty laundry (the latter’s punishment for his attempted coup). Here Andy 
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lays on the servility, offering as a favor what Dwight has only consented 
to do under duress: “You know if you want your laundry done right. . . . I 
used to work at Abercrombie. So . . . pretty good folder.” While we cannot 
rehearse the many insults and allegations Andy hurls against Dwight, one 
exchange nicely captures Andy’s brazen manipulations as well as Michael’s 
cluelessness. Immediately following a sales meeting that was botched by 
Andy’s attempts to brag about himself or praise Michael rather than relate 
to their client, Andy makes another attempt in Michael’s car:
Andy. I . . . I’m so sorry, man. I really screwed that up.
Michael. Ah, no. Don’t worry about it.
Andy. I really “Schruted” it.
Michael. What?
Andy. “Schruted” it. It’s just this thing that people say around your 
office all the time. Like, when you screw something up in a really 
irreversible way, you “Schruted” it. I don’t know where it comes 
from though. Do you think it comes from “Dwight Schrute”?
Michael. I don’t know. Who knows how words are formed.
Displaying another characteristic of servile ambition, Andy is even willing 
to violate laws in order to advance his personal standing—in this case, by 
breaking into Dwight’s car. There he finds the (apparent) evidence he needs 
to frame Dwight and get him fired.43
Andy’s next character developments are of Roman proportions. Tacitus 
is in agreement with the leading tradition of ancient Roman historians that 
the pivotal factor in republican Rome’s moral and political decline was the 
loss of all serious external rivals with the final destruction of Carthage. Then, 
says Tacitus, “When once we had brought the world to our feet and extermi-
nated every rival state or king, we were left free to covet wealth without fear.” 
The “old ingrained human passion for power” could then burst into strife 
between patricians and plebeians, and a series of civil wars brought down the 
republic.44 Paralleling this, we find that Andy’s tiresome frat-boy ingratiation 
can only be fully unleashed once his great rival, Dwight, has been removed. 
Soon thereafter, Jim “Big Tuna” Halpert is under siege whenever at his desk, 
and Michael hides behind doorways to find some moments when Andy isn’t 
“being in my face and annoying the bejesus out of me.”45 Just before Andy’s 
fateful explosion of frustration, Michael is coming to realize the oversized 
role Dwight has long played in the office, not only in sales but in daily tasks 
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that Michael has long thought the cleaning crew was doing, such as watering 
the plants and arranging Michael’s desk toys “in a very pleasing way.” When 
Michael then discovers that Andy’s evidence against Dwight was wrongly 
applied, he displays some rare maturity in sincerely apologizing to Dwight 
and asking him to return to his old job.
Thus it seems that Bernard outdoes Schrute in servile ambition, since 
in Andy it is unqualified by moral scruple, cultural tradition, or personal 
affection. Michael himself comes to realize something of this after bringing 
Dwight back: “It takes a big man to admit his mistake and that’s what I did. 
The important thing is I learned something. I don’t want somebody suck-
ing up to me because they think I’m going to help their career. I want them 
sucking up to me because they genuinely love me.”46 Michael’s embrace of 
servility remains, but he recognizes here that Dwight has real admiration, 
respect, and loyalty for him—it is not a purely instrumental relationship. 
To this we might add that, for all the servility, paranoia, authoritarianism, 
and sheer nerdiness that can be found in Dwight, there are real elements 
of moral greatness in him as well. He is uniquely undaunted by “The Fire,” 
and he prevents Roy’s nasty attempted assault against Jim. What is more, 
when Jim then attempts to offer gifts in order to show his gratitude, Dwight 
persistently refuses: “I saw someone breaking the law, and I intervened. . . . 
Citizens do not accept prizes for being citizens.”47
To conclude, we might be grateful that Dwight’s pathologies and vices 
have prevented him from wielding real power for long. To a large extent, 
he embodies what might be seen as the two leading elements of servile 
ambition—a willingness to endure profound degradation in order to advance 
oneself and a tendency to treat people solely according to their instrumental 
worth and hence their social power and status. But he also has a certain 
love of the law and of the public good, which Tacitus and Rousseau would 
see as essential to a citizen’s character in a flourishing republic. They would 
also say that these republican virtues—which Tacitus links with “the old 
integrity of character” and Rousseau with the “old ruggedness”48—tend to 
flourish in more simple, independent, rustic environments. There is much 
in Dwight Schrute that seems as outdated as his ,87 TransAm, his outhouse, 
and his sixty-acre working beet farm. Time will tell whether his republican 
virtues will pass in the same way. But whether they combine it with older 
and higher virtues, as Dwight does, or serve it pure and unmixed, as Andy 
does, characters driven by servile ambition will continue to be found. And 
people who care about sustaining a just liberty should know a few things 
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about such characters’ tactics and motives, employed from ancient Rome 
and early modern France to current-day Scranton. These high-minded 
friends of liberty might even, from time to time, come to recognize—and 
hopefully resist—a bit of Schrutian servility within their own motivational 
patterns as well.
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Gulf War (“Booze Cruise,” season 3, episode 11, deleted scenes), and Josh the Stamford 
Regional Manager becomes a guru for having served in the Coast Guard and worked 
on a kibbutz (“The Convention,” season 3, episode 2, including deleted scenes).
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finally convinced that their branch will be closing and their jobs will be lost. “Branch 
Closing,” season 3, episode 7.
38. “Drug Testing,” season 2, episode 20.
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down, “Traveling Salesman,” season 3, episode 13.
40. “The Merger,” season 3, episode 8. To a similar list, Andy adds “positive rein-
forcement through nods and smiles” just before his entrance to the anger management 
program. “The Return,” season 3, episode 14.
41. Tacitus, Annals 6.20, p. 195; on Caligula’s ambition, see also 6.45, p. 210. For 
Plato, flattery and slavishness are thus rightly condemned because they accustom 
people to accept insults from the vulgar for the sake of money. The “spirited” part of 
the soul is thus distorted—instead of being like a proud, strong lion, it becomes like 
a ridiculous ape. Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1992), 8.590b.
42. “The Merger,” season 3, episode 8.
43. “Traveling Salesmen,” season 3, episode 13.
44. Tacitus, Histories, 2.38, p. 80.  See also Sallust, Catiline’s War, in Catiline’s War, 
The Jugurthine War, Histories, trans. A. J. Woodman (London: Penguin, 2008), secs. 9–16; 
Augustine, The City of God, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 2.18, 3.21; cf. the contention of Scipio against destroying Carthage, in Plutarch, 
Cato the Elder, in Roman Lives, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), sec. 27.  The Roman narrative of decline resulting from prosperity and 
grandeur also seems to play a role in the “meteoric rise”—and fall—of Ryan Howard 
(see especially “Night Out,” season 4, episode 15).
45. Michael also laments, “I don’t understand how someone could have so little 
self-awareness.” “The Return,” season 3, episode 14. Placed in the mouth of Michael, the 
claim has delicious irony. Apparently, just as Andy has outdone Dwight in servility, he 
is now outdoing Michael in narcissism and lack of genuine empathy.
46. “The Return,” season 3, episode 14. Andy confirms this hypothesis later on: 
“Let me be clear. There’s only one thing that’s important to me, and it’s not friendship. 
It’s dominance.” “Women’s Appreciation,” season 3, episode 21, deleted scenes.
47. “The Fire,” season 2, episode 4; and Roy’s violence in “The Negotiation,” season 
3, episode 19.
48. Tacitus, Annals 1.4, p. 5; see also 3.26, p. 108; Rousseau, Letter to d’Alembert 
on the Theatre, trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960), 112; 
see also 111–13. For positive models of robust, primitive freedom in Tacitus, see 
Annals 3.25–28; Agricola, secs. 13, 15–16, 30; Germany, e.g., secs. 7, 11, 21, 37, 44. 
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Agricola and Germany are in a combined edition, trans. A. R. Birley (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). And for Rousseau’s positive models, Discourse on Inequality, 
esp. part 1; and Essay on the Origin of Languages, in The Discourses and Other Early 
Political Writings, esp. chap. 9. Note also Rousseau’s extensive citations of Agricola in 
Social Contract, 3.9, pp. 105–6n.
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who watChes the watChmen?
Kant, Mill, and Political Morality in the Shadow of 
Manhattan
S. Evan Kreider
Watchmen is arguably the most revolutionary graphic novel ever written. 
It showed a generation of readers that a so-called super-hero comic book 
could engage a sophisticated adult audience and deal with complex moral 
and political issues. At the heart of the text is a classic quandary: is it ever 
morally acceptable to sacrifice the interests of a few for the greater good of 
the many?
Watchmen presents a not-so-alternate version of the 1980s in which the 
world stands on the brink of a massive nuclear war. Adrian Veidt, otherwise 
known as the hero Ozymandias (“The World’s Smartest Man”), has carried 
out a plan to save the world and to unite the people of all its nations by faking 
an alien invasion, killing millions of innocent people in the process. Once 
the other heroes discover this, Adrian persuades them to stay silent, so as 
not to destroy the utopia that he has created; or rather, he persuades all but 
one of the heroes. Rorschach, the most brutal and least sane member of the 
group of heroes—really more a vigilante than a hero—refuses to cooperate. 
In his mind, Adrian is a murderer, and justice demands that he be held ac-
countable, regardless of the consequences. He makes it clear that he will tell 
anyone who will listen to him about Adrian’s actions, even if the world dies 
by nuclear fire as a result. Finally, Dr. Manhattan, a man of almost godlike 
power over space, time, and matter itself, and the only truly superpowered 
member of the group, steps in and kills Rorschach to prevent him from 
pursuing a course of action that will likely lead to the destruction of all hu-
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man life. However, this resolution is not as simple as Dr. Manhattan siding 
with Adrian and vindicating his decision. When Adrian asks him: “I did the 
right thing, didn’t I? It all worked out in the end,” Dr. Manhattan responds: 
“ ‘In the end’? Nothing ends, Adrian. Nothing ever ends.”1
The authors of Watchmen refuse to give us a simple answer to the difficult 
issues that underlie this story. Instead, they present a variety of views, each 
delivered through a character that is flawed but merits sympathy in his own 
right. In this chapter, we will explore the three aforementioned characters 
and the values that each represents.
Rorschach: Deontology and Absolutism
After the rest of the heroes agree to remain silent about Adrian’s extreme 
solution to the world’s problems, Rorschach is the sole hero to break ranks. 
Rorschach decides to remain true to his value system, even though it could 
lead to the death of every person on earth, himself included. This value 
system can be characterized as deontological in that it is based on principles 
requiring that we determine the morality of our actions independently of 
their consequences. It is also absolutist in that it does not allow for any 
exceptions or compromise. The definitive example of a deontological and 
absolutist thinker in the history of moral philosophy is the eighteenth-
century German philosopher Immanuel Kant.
According to Kant, the essence of morality can be captured by a prin-
ciple that he refers to as the Categorical Imperative. Kant states that this 
principle can be given several different formulations, the first of which is 
“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law.”2 The basic idea behind this rather 
technical-sounding statement is fairly simple: for an action to be morally 
permissible, it must be something that everyone could do without becoming 
self-defeating or self-contradictory.
For example, imagine that I need a loan to pay my mortgage and avoid 
losing my home, but I know that I will not be able to pay back that loan. 
Since I know that the bank won’t give me the loan unless I promise to re-
pay it, I consider making a false promise, wondering if perhaps the severe 
circumstances might justify such behavior. Kant’s first formulation tells me 
that such a false promise would be morally permissible only if it could be 
universalized—that is, “What if everyone in similar circumstances did the 
same thing?” The answer is fairly obvious. If everyone made false promises 
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to repay loans, no bank would ever consider giving loans in the first place; 
in other words, such behavior would actually defeat its own purpose.
There are a couple of important things to note about this. Despite how it 
might sound at first, this formulation is not an appeal to consequences but, 
rather, to logical consistency. Kant is not asking us to consider whether a 
world in which people make false promises is a good or bad world. Rather, he 
is asking us to consider whether there is a logically possible world in which 
people make false promises to get loans. There is no such world, of course, 
for if everyone made false promises, there would be no loans to get. To put 
it another way, Kant is telling me that I cannot decide that a certain course 
of action is rational for me in my circumstances unless I can conceive of a 
world in which everyone in the same circumstances could (“could” in the 
sense of “logically possibly”) do the same thing. Morality requires rational, 
logical consistency: if it’s okay for me, then it must also be okay for you 
under the same morally relevant circumstances. The consideration of good 
or bad consequences is, according to Kant, extraneous and irrelevant. This 
kind of nonconsequentialism is called “deontology” because it derives from 
the Greek deon, meaning “that which is required.” Thus, as a deontological 
thinker, Kant believes there are certain things that morality requires of us 
(specifically, logical consistency), prior to and independent of any consid-
eration of consequences.
Another important implication of this process is that morality does not 
allow us to make exceptions for ourselves. “But I really need that loan,” I 
might be tempted to tell myself. “I’m not saying everyone should do this all 
the time, but isn’t it okay for me, just this once?” Kant makes it clear that 
this sort of reasoning simply isn’t moral reasoning. Precisely what it means 
to say that an action is morally permissible is to say that it is permissible not 
just for me but for anyone in the same circumstances. Making exceptions 
for oneself to rules that others ought to follow is the very definition of im-
moral behavior. In this regard, Kant subscribes to what is known as moral 
absolutism: there are moral rules that apply to everyone, and exceptions 
are never permissible.
Rorschach shows Kantian-style moral reasoning at the climax of the 
text. He refuses to deceive the world by helping to cover up Adrian’s actions, 
regardless of the potentially catastrophic consequences of revealing Adrian’s 
scheme. After the other heroes agree to keep Adrian’s secret, Rorschach 
simply responds, “Joking, of course,” and begins to walk away. When Night 
Owl, another of the heroes and the individual closest to being a friend of 
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Rorschach, says, “Rorschach, wait! Where are you going? This is too big to 
be hard-assed about! We have to compromise,” Rorschach replies “No. Not 
even in the face of Armageddon. Never compromise” (12:20). In Rorschach’s 
mind, there are moral absolutes, and they must be observed. Regardless of his 
reasoning, Adrian has murdered millions of innocent people, and an evil act 
such as that can never be justified by a greater good. Rorschach anticipates 
this earlier in the text, when he ponders to himself: “Is it futile? Soon there 
will be war. Millions will burn. Millions will perish in sickness and misery. 
Why does one death matter against so many? Because there is good and 
there is evil, and evil must be punished. Even in the face of Armageddon I 
shall not compromise in this” (1:24).
Rorschach also serves as an example of Kant’s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether 
in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as 
an end and never simply as a means.”3 Sometimes called the “respect for 
persons” formulation, this phrasing of the Categorical Imperative asks us to 
recognize and respect the intrinsic value of humanity. According to Kant, 
what gives humans a special kind of value and dignity above all other earthly 
creatures is our capacity for reason and autonomy—that is, the ability to 
think and to choose for ourselves.
One especially important implication of this principle concerns Kant’s 
views on punishment. We show respect for people’s rationality and autonomy 
by holding them responsible for their behavior. In the case of crimes, we 
hold criminals responsible for their behavior by punishing them for it, not 
because we hope to deter further crime, or because we hope to rehabilitate 
the criminal, but simply as a matter of justice; that is, simply because they 
deserve it. Furthermore, in order to hold criminals fully responsible for their 
crimes, we must punish them proportionately—the punishment must fit the 
crime, or “an eye for an eye.” Thus, Kant supports the death penalty for the 
crime of murder. When someone takes a life, the only truly proportionate 
punishment is death. Whether or not the death penalty has good or bad 
consequences for society (for example, whether or not it has a deterrence 
effect) is irrelevant to Kant. The criminal simply deserves to die, and we 
actually demonstrate our respect of the criminal as a rational, autonomous 
human being by putting him to death for his crimes.
Rorschach clearly endorses Kant’s view of retribution, including the 
use of the death penalty. “There is good and there is evil, and evil must be 
punished . . . but there are so many deserving of retribution and there is 
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so little time” (1:24). Rorschach has no problem administering the appro-
priate penalty to those who deserve it, as he demonstrates throughout the 
text. Perhaps the most important example is the one Rorschach discusses 
during his “origin story,” as he relates it to the prison psychiatrist while he 
is temporarily incarcerated, about midway through the text. As he tells it, 
Rorschach had been investigating the disappearance of a young girl, only 
to discover that she had been killed brutally and most likely abused before-
hand as well. It was this moment when he truly became Rorschach, when 
he saw the true evil of which humans are capable and saw that it was his 
responsibility to punish that evil appropriately—which in this case he does 
by chaining the murderer to his stove and setting his house on fire, allowing 
him to burn to death—a punishment arguably as brutal as the crime that 
he committed (6:18–26).
Furthermore, Rorschach clearly thinks of such punishment as a sign 
of respect for the criminals. He admits that earlier in his career as a crime-
fighter, he has not shown them such respect. “Soft on scum. Too young to 
know any better. Molly-coddled them. Let them live” (6:14). By failing to 
punish the criminals appropriately, he was treating them with kid gloves, as 
though they were mere children, incapable of understanding or controlling 
their own actions. By punishing them as they deserve, he is no longer “molly-
coddling” them but is treating them the way they deserve to be treated, as 
rational, free, adult human beings, who truly are capable of evil acts.
By now, the reader can be forgiven for any concerns about Kantianism. 
After all, although Rorschach is a fascinating character, he’s not exactly a 
moral exemplar of any sort. His behavior throughout Watchmen is extremely 
brutal, to say the least, and there are certainly some concerns about his san-
ity as well. If that is the case, then can we also infer that there is something 
immoral and possibly even psychotic about Kant’s moral theory? To Kant’s 
credit, the answer is no. Although it is true that Rorschach’s behavior bears 
some of the marks of Kant’s moral theory, Rorschach goes wrong precisely 
because he does not fully instantiate Kant’s views. Specifically, he actually 
fails to observe fully either formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
First, Rorschach’s vigilantism cannot be universalized and thus fails 
to meet one of the tests required by the first formulation of the Categori-
cal Imperative. Taking the law into one’s own hands and punishing people 
(especially by way of the death penalty) according to one’s own standards of 
right and wrong would be self-defeating if everyone did it. After all, there are 
plenty of folks on both sides of the law who consider Rorschach a murderer, 
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presumably deserving of death himself! So if everyone killed everyone who 
one personally thought deserved to die, there wouldn’t be anyone left to 
punish those who do deserve punishment, thus defeating the purpose of 
pursuing such punishment in the first place.
Second, Rorschach does not fully respect the rationality and autonomy 
of other people, as required by the second formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative. Unlike Kant, Rorschach does not believe that there are real, ob-
jective values in the universe. Instead, Rorschach embraces a kind of nihilism 
that is closer to some existentialist thinkers than to any Kantian. “Existence 
is random. Has no pattern save what we imagine after staring at it for too 
long. No meaning save what we choose to impose,” Rorschach says. “Was 
reborn then, free to scrawl own design on this morally blank world” (6:26). 
Since Rorschach believes there is no reason, purpose, or value to existence 
(much less to people), he believes that gives him the right to create his own 
values and impose them on the world. Not only can this not be universalized 
(it’s logically impossible for all of us to impose our own values on everyone 
else); it is completely disrespectful of everyone else.
As a result, we see that Rorschach’s moral shortcomings are not the result 
of his Kantianism, but rather of his failure to embrace Kant’s moral system 
completely and consistently. As much as we might admire and respect some 
aspects of Rorschach’s moral conviction, we certainly can’t view him as the 
hero of the piece in any final sense. Fortunately, the authors of Watchmen 
present us with a variety of other characters who might fill that role for us. 
In particular, Ozymandias seems to represent the diametric opposite of 
Rorschach’s views, so perhaps after careful examination, he might qualify 
as a true moral exemplar.
Ozymandias: Consequences and Exceptions
Adrian (aka “Ozymandias”) takes a very different approach to these issues 
than Rorschach. Specifically, he can be characterized as a consequentialist 
rather than a deontologist. Furthermore, the kind of consequentialism he 
seems to endorse also differs from Rorschach’s thinking in that it is not 
absolutist moral thinking: it allows for occasional exceptions to supposedly 
common-sense moral guidelines.
According to consequentialism, right and wrong are determined by the 
consequences of our actions. In the simplest terms, consequentialism states 
that an action is right if it has good consequences and an action is wrong 
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if it has bad consequences. Of course, this seemingly simple idea becomes 
much more complicated once we start talking about specific consequen-
tialist theories, of which there are many. Adrian’s approach to moral issues 
appears to demonstrate a particular brand of consequentialism known as 
utilitarianism.
The basic idea behind utilitarianism is “the principle of utility.” Simply 
put, the principle of utility states that we ought to promote the greatest good 
for the greatest number. In essence, the principle of utility tells us that we 
ought to consider the consequences of our actions not just for ourselves 
but for all of those who are affected by them. Then we are to calculate all 
the potential benefits and harms that could result to each of those affected 
by our actions, and finally, we are to choose the course of action that leads 
to the greatest good consequences for the greatest number. Different utili-
tarians have different ideas about what exactly counts as a benefit or harm 
in the morally relevant sense and different ideas about how exactly we go 
about calculating this greatest good and greatest number, but the sorts of 
things Adrian has in mind are fairly straightforward: he believes that he 
has an obligation to save humanity from a nuclear war, thereby preventing 
death, destruction, pain, suffering, and possibly even the extinction of the 
human race.
Furthermore, different utilitarians have different ideas about how exactly 
to apply the principle of utility to our actions. The earliest utilitarians were 
known as “act utilitarians.” The act utilitarians believed that each and every 
individual action needs to be judged based on the specific consequences 
that result from it. For example, if you were to ask an act utilitarian whether 
or not lying is morally permissible, his response would be “It depends.” If 
the lie in question leads to overall bad consequences—say a lie that ruins 
a personal relationship, or one that gets someone fired from her job—then 
that particular lie is morally wrong. However, if the lie in question leads to 
good consequences—perhaps by making someone feel better about herself 
or smoothing over an awkward social situation (a “white lie”), or even by 
saving someone’s life (e.g., a lie that deceives a crazed ax murderer about 
the whereabouts of his victim)—then that particular lie would be morally 
permissible. Having said that, most act utilitarians would be happy to admit 
that lying usually doesn’t promote the greatest good, and so under normal 
circumstances, we should probably avoid lying. That general guideline is not 
absolute and will have plenty of exceptions for the morally reflective person.
Adrian certainly seems to demonstrate a kind of act utilitarian thinking. 
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In Watchmen, the world is hurtling toward a nuclear war between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. If this happens, bil-
lions will die, either from the war itself or from the fallout from it. Adrian 
believes that the only way to prevent loss of life on this scale is to give the 
earth’s nations a common, external enemy, and so he hatches a plan to fake 
an alien invasion. Unfortunately, in order to make this invasion convincing, 
and in order to make sure that no one finds out that the invasion is a fraud, 
millions of innocent people must die. The text provides several examples 
of Adrian acting toward this greater good in an act utilitarian manner, at 
least at first glance.
At the very beginning of Watchmen, we discover that the Comedian 
(Edward Blake, another of the costumed “heroes”—a nihilist who thinks 
that life is meaningless and therefore “just a big joke”) has been brutally 
murdered. Later, we learn that the Comedian accidentally stumbled upon 
Adrian’s plan. Although he took no joy in it, Adrian realized that he would 
have to kill the Comedian to keep his plan a secret. “Blake understood, too. 
He knew my plan would succeed, though its scale terrified him. That’s why 
he told nobody. It was too big to discuss . . . but he understood. At the end, 
he understood” (11:25).
One of the things the Comedian had discovered was an island where 
Adrian had a team of people working to create the “alien” creature that 
Adrian would use in his fake invasion. Once the work is complete, Adrian 
puts his team on a boat, supposedly headed home—and then blows up the 
boat, killing them all (10:18).
Once it is time to carry out his plan, Adrian goes to his Antarctic re-
treat. After a long monologue in which he attempts to justify his extreme 
measures to save the world, he poisons all of his servants, so that they too 
might never reveal his plan. “Do you comprehend the triumph to which 
you have contributed, the secret glory that it affords? Do you understand 
my shame at so inadequate a reward?” (11:11).
All of these examples pale in comparison to the culmination of the plan 
itself, in which Adrian teleports his “alien” into the heart of New York City, 
the resulting explosion of which kills millions. Shortly thereafter, Adrian 
sees news reports that seem to vindicate his plan: the world powers put aside 
their differences, stop the “nuclear clock,” and agree to work together for 
the safety of Earth against the supposedly alien enemy. “I did it!” Adrian 
shouts—perhaps not catching the double meaning of his own words (12:19).
Once again, the reader may be forgiven for thinking that something 
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has gone seriously wrong here. Since there is something intuitively wrong 
about Adrian’s actions, does that imply that consequentialist thinking is 
incorrect? Not necessarily. There are a couple of ways the consequentialist 
might respond to our moral discomfort.
First, it might simply be that Adrian is using the wrong kind of con-
sequentialist thinking. There are many different consequentialist theories 
other than utilitarianism; furthermore, there are many different varieties of 
utilitarianism. For example, in addition to act utilitarianism, there is a form 
of utilitarianism known as rule utilitarianism. Some utilitarians abandoned 
act utilitarianism after considering several obvious objections to it. First, it 
completely omits any conception of individual rights or justice, seemingly 
allowing us to sacrifice the interests (and even lives) of the few in order to 
benefit the many, and there is something extremely counterintuitive about 
abandoning such core moral and political concepts as rights and justice. 
Moreover, critics claim that act utilitarianism falls prey to the so-called 
calculation objection. This objection comes in many forms, but the short 
of it is that it is impossible to calculate accurately all of the potential con-
sequences of every possible action that any of us might do. Worse, there is 
something “self-defeating” (in Kant’s terms) about act utilitarianism: we’d 
have to spend so much time calculating the consequences of our actions 
that we’d never have time to actually do anything! As a result, thinking about 
the greatest good for the greatest number that might result from each and 
every possible action guarantees that we won’t do any good at all, much less 
the greatest good.
To correct for these perceived problems with act utilitarianism without 
abandoning utilitarianism altogether, rule utilitarianism argued that we can 
simplify our consequentialist reasoning by acting according to general rules 
of behavior rather than calculating the consequences of each and every ac-
tion. For example, instead of thinking, “Should I murder this person? Would 
that bring about the greatest good?” every time we meet someone, the rule 
utilitarian would have us ask ourselves “In general, would a rule that allows 
murder be for the greatest good? Or would a rule against murder better 
promote the greater good?” Clearly, as a general policy, a rule against mur-
der better promotes the greater good than a rule that allows murder. Thus, 
the rule utilitarian would say that we ought to adopt a general rule against 
murder and simply follow it. By taking this approach, the rule utilitarian 
avoids the calculation objection.
A definitive example of a utilitarian thinker is John Stuart Mill, the 
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author of Utilitarianism. Mill is also a strong supporter of individual rights, 
which he defends in his work On Liberty. For Mill, the most important 
rules of society are those that protect its members from others: “The only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”4 How-
ever, Mill makes it clear that this is not a separate (much less deontological) 
principle but rather a derivative of the principle of utility: “I regard utility 
as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the 
largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive 
being.”5 Essentially, Mill argues that the best way to bring about the greatest 
good for the greatest number is to structure society around a set of rules 
that protect people’s rights.6
Mill spends a great deal of time discussing which specific rights society 
needs in order to promote the greatest good for the greatest number. Some 
of the specific ones he discusses may be debatable, but no champion of 
individual rights (much less Mill) would disagree that at a bare minimum, 
innocent people ought to have the right not to be murdered. A society that 
does not protect its members from murder is as far from the greatest good 
for the greatest number as one could get—in fact, it’s not clear there could 
even be such a society at all (very quickly, there would be no one left . . . ). 
Thus, the right to be protected against murder can be conceived of as a rule 
that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number, and Adrian has 
clearly violated that rule in a big way.
There is also another way someone might criticize Adrian’s thinking 
without abandoning consequentialism—indeed, without necessarily even 
abandoning act utilitarianism. Specifically, an act utilitarian might agree 
in principle that sometimes extreme measures are required to prevent 
something even worse from happening but argue that Adrian simply didn’t 
go about calculating the consequences of his action carefully enough. In 
particular, his solution to the threat of nuclear war rests on keeping his 
scheme a secret indefinitely, and that’s just not very likely. As we’ve already 
seen, the Comedian came across Adrian’s plan quite by accident, and there’s 
no reason to think that someone else might not do the same. Furthermore, 
Adrian was assuming that he would be able to persuade the rest of the 
heroes to keep his secret, and that clearly failed with Rorschach. Adrian 
might counter that he could always kill them as well. Perhaps that would 
be possible for most of the heroes—after all, he did kill the Comedian, and 
he allowed Dr. Manhattan to kill Rorschach—but killing Dr. Manhattan 
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would certainly present a much, much greater challenge. In fact, we see the 
failure of Adrian’s calculation with regard to this precisely: Adrian created 
a chamber to destroy Dr. Manhattan, but it failed, and even Adrian himself 
admitted he wasn’t sure in the first place whether it would work (12:14). 
Finally, we see on the very last page of the text that his plan is likely to come 
to light, as Rorschach’s journal, which Rorschach mailed just before leaving 
for the Antarctic, does indeed find its way to the press. The implication is 
that Adrian’s plan will be revealed, and the murder of millions of innocent 
people will have accomplished no good (12:32).
As a result, it seems that Adrian’s problem isn’t so much his consequen-
tialism as the fact that he’s a rather poor consequentialist. In that regard, he’s 
not unlike Rorschach, who was guilty of comparable errors as a deontologist. 
Thus, all we have so far is a critique of two wrong ways to think about things, 
but surely the text of Watchmen provides us some clue about the right way 
to think. To that end, let us now turn our attention to Dr. Manhattan—argu-
ably the true “hero” of the piece.
Dr. Manhattan: The Value of Life and Compromise
Although it might seem so from the above examples, consequentialism and 
deontology are not necessarily incompatible. Indeed, some philosophers 
would argue that an adequate theory of right and wrong has to combine 
elements of both. This seems to be the approach of Dr. Manhattan. His own 
views rest on a deontological principle concerning the value of human life, 
but he also uses consequentialist thinking in order to calculate the best way 
to preserve life.
During a pivotal section of the text shortly before the climax of the 
story, Dr. Manhattan teleports his recently ex-girlfriend Laurie Juspechyk, 
also known as the hero “Silk Spectre,” to his retreat on Mars so that they 
can debate his possible intervention in Adrian’s plan. Dr. Manhattan (who 
views the world through the lenses of physics more than those of ordinary 
human life) begins the debate by claiming that life has no intrinsic value. 
At first, he does not see any value in the lives of ordinary people, but only 
because he is thinking in strict consequentialist terms. “Humanity is about 
to become extinct,” Laurie says. “Doesn’t that bother you? All those people 
dead . . .” “All that pain and conflict done with?” he replies. “All that needless 
suffering over at last? No . . . No, that doesn’t bother me. All those genera-
tions of struggle, what purpose did they ever achieve? All that effort, and 
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what did it ever lead to?” (9:10). At first, Dr. Manhattan seems to be taking a 
utilitarian approach and arguing that the suffering of human life outweighs 
its benefits; thus the “greatest good” might actually be extinction.
However, he soon changes his mind, once he sees that the value of hu-
man life isn’t something to be determined by its benefits. Rather, life has 
intrinsic value as a “thermodynamic miracle,” that is, an event
with odds against so astronomical they’re effectively impossible, 
like oxygen spontaneously becoming gold. I long to observe such a 
thing. And yet, in each human coupling, a thousand million sperm 
vie for a single egg. Multiply those odds by countless generations, 
against the odds of your ancestors being alive; meeting; siring this 
precise son; that exact daughter . . . until your mother loves a man 
she has every reason to hate, and of that union, of the thousand 
million children competing for fertilization, it was you, only you, 
that emerged. To distill so specific a form from that chaos of improb-
ability, like turning air to gold . . . that is the crowning unlikelihood. 
The thermodynamic miracle. (9:26–27)
Of course, this is true not only of Laurie, but of anyone. Each life is a miracle 
of physics and statistics, making each life precious beyond measure. From 
this, Dr. Manhattan finally concludes that each life does have an intrinsic 
value that deserves to be preserved, whether or not that life leads to par-
ticularly good consequences for the world or even itself.
Once he establishes this deontological principle of the intrinsic value of 
human life, Dr. Manhattan is willing to engage in consequentialist thinking 
about how to best preserve life. Toward the very end of the text, when the 
heroes are coming to the conclusion that they must keep Adrian’s secret, Dr. 
Manhattan concurs. “Logically, I’m afraid he’s right. Exposing this plot, we 
destroy any chance of peace, dooming earth to worse destruction. On Mars, 
you [Laurie] demonstrated life’s value. If we would preserve life here, we 
must remain silent” (12:20). The value of life—and the obligation to preserve 
it that this value entails—outweighs the value of other moral considerations 
such as truth-telling.
Furthermore, in such an extreme circumstance, that also means that 
the value of many lives may outweigh the value of a single one, in typical 
consequentialist fashion. Dr. Manhattan confronts Rorschach before he can 
leave and inform the world about Adrian’s plot. “You know I can’t let you do 
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that,” Dr. Manhattan tells Rorschach. “Of course,” Rorschach replies. “Must 
protect Veidt’s new utopia. One more body amongst foundations makes 
little difference. Well, what are you waiting for? Do it” (12:23–24). And Dr. 
Manhattan does. He certainly takes no pleasure in it, and would prefer not to 
do so, but if life has value, then in such circumstances, Dr. Manhattan must 
think about the preservation of life, even if it requires the sacrifice of one.
Who Watches? The Political Implications of Watchmen
The implications of the competing moral views depicted in Watchmen are 
far-reaching. These views give us guidelines for not only personal behavior, 
but also political organization. In particular, the text serves as an endorse-
ment of the principles behind modern rights-based democracies, seen as 
a reasonable compromise of deontology and consequentialism. In other 
words, the careful line that Dr. Manhattan walks between the extremes 
of Adrian and Rorschach is precisely that line around which rights-based 
democracies are built.
One implication of the text concerns the idea of the importance of trans-
parency in a rights-based democracy. After all, a democracy is supposed to 
be government by the people. Of course, we elect representatives to make 
some decisions for us, and we hope that they are informed enough to make 
good decisions on our behalf, even at times when they can’t let everyone 
know exactly what they’re doing, such as during a time of war. They are still 
supposed to be our representatives, ruling on our behalf, according to the 
will of the people. As such, we expect a certain degree (a fairly large degree, 
actually) of transparency, so that we the people can decide whether they are 
doing their jobs the way they are supposed to do them. We may not need to 
know every little detail in every situation, but at no time do we agree that 
our government may act in complete secrecy or even deception—to do so 
is to act as tyrants, not as representatives.
Of course, Adrian demonstrates exactly these dangers. His tragic flaw is 
the oldest of them all—hubris. He believes that he is smarter than everyone 
else—and perhaps he is. However, he thinks that his intelligence gives him 
and him alone the right to make decisions on everyone else’s behalf. He 
consults no one—not the people at large, not their elected representatives, 
not the other heroes, and not even Dr. Manhattan (the only other person on 
earth at least as smart as Adrian). This hubris is precisely how he is led down 
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the tragic path that ends in the death of millions and, as the end of the text 
suggests, the revelation of his plan to the world, making it all for naught.
Another and even more central political implication of the text con-
cerns the way in which modern rights-based democracies strive to find the 
appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and the greater 
good of the larger citizenry. For example, the American Constitution does 
this in part through the Bill of Rights. These rights protect the individual 
from society—whether that be another individual, the government, or, as 
Tocqueville (and later Mill, quoting Tocqueville) put it, “the tyranny of the 
majority.” At the same time, limits are placed on individual rights when the 
right of individual action is outweighed by the significant threats it might 
pose to society.
A clear example of this is freedom of expression. The first amendment 
protects the right of individuals to express their opinions, whether moral, 
political, religious, or otherwise, regardless of how unpopular those opinions 
might be. At the same time, this right does not grant individuals free reign 
to say whatever they want in any manner, at any time, in any place. There 
are occasions when the expression of opinion goes beyond mere expression 
and constitutes a serious harm or threat of harm to others, such as reveal-
ing military secrets to the enemy during a time of war, or even just yelling 
“Fire!” in a crowded movie theater. By granting such rights but also clearly 
delineating their limits, we do our best to find that line between the deon-
tological sovereignty of the individual over himself and the consequentialist 
greater good of society at large.
It’s not difficult to imagine on which side of the line our various heroes 
would fall. Adrian, concerned only with the greater good (and in a far too 
simplistic manner) would be likely to ignore individual rights such as free 
speech altogether—after all, the story he has invented to save the world is 
little more than propaganda, and he kills everyone involved in his scheme 
who might be tempted to tell anyone about it. Rorschach clearly favors in-
dividual rights such as free speech, without thought of the consequences, 
no matter how severe—he demonstrates this by his determination to tell 
the world about Adrian’s plot. Arguably, Dr. Manhattan is the one who most 
closely resembles the compromise between the rights of the individual and 
the greater good of society—he was convinced by Laurie of the value of the 
individual but is also willing to intervene in extreme circumstances, as he 
does when he kills Rorschach. This certainly suggests that Dr. Manhattan is 
the closest thing to a true hero in the text, given that he most closely embod-
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ies the moral compromise between deontology and consequentialism on 
which modern rights-based democracies are built, as endorsed by Watchmen.
The Shadow of Manhattan
Watchmen is truly a complex tale of competing values and difficult dilemmas. 
Both Adrian and Rorschach are interesting characters who evoke sympathy; 
indeed, both are honorable men in their own ways. As such, they provide 
excellent examples of some of the most important philosophical theories 
of right and wrong. However, they are also obviously flawed heroes, and as 
a result, they show us the potential flaws of their philosophical viewpoints, 
as well as how those viewpoints can be misused. Although the authors of 
Watchmen provide no easy answers, there is certainly a suggestion that if 
anyone is the true hero of the piece, it may be Dr. Manhattan. If that is correct, 
then truly, “we are all of us living in the shadow of Manhattan” (4:32)—and 
perhaps that’s not such a bad place to be.
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Have you ever had a lousy job? A job that sucked the life out of you, ground 
you down, made you feel like a cog in the impersonal machinery of paying 
rent and staying fed? Philosophically speaking, Karl Marx remains the expert 
on what makes a lousy job lousy. It’s an experience common to everyone, 
and it drew Marx’s attention in the 1840s as he watched industrialization, 
with its social and psychological fallout, roll out across Europe. The issue 
is just as important for us today, and yet it is easier to find Marxist political 
philosophy in recent movies than in recent politics. For example: consider 
James Cameron’s 2009 sci-fi blockbuster Avatar.1
Cameron’s film follows the adventure—the pilgrimage—of Jake Sully, a 
crippled and discarded fragment of industrial-corporate society. Jake knows 
all about lousy, and his story embodies everything Marx had to say about a 
world in which economic relations have replaced social ones. Jake’s world 
is run by corporations, corporations so big that they have taken over the 
functions of government; corporations that dictate not only the economic 
and political realities of life, but the social and cultural ones as well. These 
social and cultural realities determine what counts as happy, what counts as 
successful, and what counts as meaningful; Jake’s life is a failure on all three. 
We can imagine him discharged from the military, crippled in the line of duty, 
soured and curdled by his experience. Alienated from his culture, from his 
fellow humans, and even from himself, Jake goes to work for the gargantuan 
RDA Corporation. He is flown to a distant mining colony on a moon called 
Pandora. His job: take part in a scientific study of the indigenous, humanoid 
116 Mark C. E. Peterson
population called the Na’vi. Pandora’s atmosphere is toxic to humans, so, in 
order to initiate relations with the Na’vi, the corporation developed biological 
robots, or “avatars,” by merging Na’vi and human DNA. These artificial bodies 
are designed, ostensibly, to facilitate anthropological studies, but their real 
mission is to expedite the exploitation of Pandora’s most important natural 
resource: a mineral—and metaphorical sledgehammer—called unobtainium. 
The avatars look and function like Na’vi but are engineered to contain the 
consciousness of a remote human operator, so that their human “drivers” 
can move around on Pandora as if they were Na’vi themselves. Jake lands 
the job because his identical twin brother Tommy, a PhD certified genius 
under contract to the corporation, was killed. Avatars, genetically tailored 
to a single driver, are expensive. Hiring Jake, an uneducated former Marine 
grunt, is simply more cost-effective than growing a brand new avatar for 
someone else.2
Once he arrives on Pandora and gets plugged into his avatar, Jake’s 
adventure begins in earnest: working as a security escort, he goes into the 
field to study the Na’vi and is nearly killed; he is rescued by Neytiri, daugh-
ter of the local Na’vi chieftain, adopted by the tribe, taught their customs, 
integrated into the spiritual-neural network that permeates everything on 
Pandora—the network  that the Na’vi identify as “Eywa,” their mother god-
dess—and, of course, inevitably, he falls in love. In the course of learning 
to operate his avatar, Jake, whose human body was broken and crushed 
into a wheelchair, regains full use of his physical functions. Back on his 
feet again, physically and psychologically, he comes to see himself and his 
culture from the Na’vi point of view. Along with his mobility, Jake’s avatar 
restores the human experiences his human life has denied him. Recover-
ing his humanity, so to speak, he seizes control of his avatar and leads the 
Na’vi—and Pandora itself—in a rebellion against the human occupation. At 
the end of the movie, Jake’s consciousness is transferred permanently into 
his avatar. Leaving his human body behind, Jake becomes a Na’vi. As Jake 
saves the Na’vi from the invading and alien human beings, the Na’vi save 
Jake from his own alienated humanity.
And here’s the punch line: Jake overcomes his alienation by becoming 
an alien.
Now, is Cameron simply making a terrible pun, or is something else 
going on here? The answer is, Both. Avatar the movie provides an excellent 
example of Marx’s philosophical account of what makes a lousy job lousy, 
or, to use Marx’s technical jargon, what creates estranged or alienated labor.3
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We’ll begin with a quick tour of Marx’s core ideas and then, like the 
RDA Corporation itself, mine the movie to expose just how these themes 
move around, like tectonic plates, underneath the topography of the plot 
and characters. Exploring the Marxist themes in Avatar reveals not only the 
relevance of Marx today, but how Jake’s journey is our own.4
Marx watched alienation spread across Europe during the early and 
middle 1800s as capitalism, in the form of industrial assembly lines, shoved 
the guilds and artisans to the margins of economic power. Highly skilled, 
individual workers were less efficient. They couldn’t compete. They got run 
over. They were replaced by assembly line workers. Marx noticed that the 
key to this new mode of production was in the way it changed the relation-
ship between workers and the products they produce. On the surface this 
looks like a small change, but it is the trigger, the butterfly’s wing, the first 
domino in a cascade that affects the entire economic and psychological 
structure of work. Once this relationship has been altered, alienation is the 
natural consequence—and from here it spreads. Having become alienated 
from what we produce, we next become alienated from our own labor, then 
from ourselves, and finally even from our fellow, equally alienated, workers. 
Cameron’s dystopian future is simply nineteenth-century Europe writ large, 
so we can count on Avatar to provide useful examples of all four flavors of 
alienation.
Estrangement from the Object of Labor
Let’s spend a few moments working through the changed relationship be-
tween workers and the objects they produce: this is the core, underlying cause 
of alienation. What does it mean exactly to say that industrial production 
changed this relationship in a way that causes alienation? Think about build-
ing a horse-drawn carriage. Teaching a person to build an entire horse-drawn 
carriage takes years of dedicated, time-consuming, and expensive training. 
An assembly line reduces the job to one repetitive task per worker—such as 
attaching the wheels. Industrial capitalism changed the worker’s job from 
making a whole carriage to making only the wheels, then to making only 
the spokes and sprockets, and finally to making—money: earning wages. 
Marx suggests that making money is not as personally satisfying as mak-
ing things. Industrial production takes the objects produced away from the 
worker and replaces them with wages.
In fact, you become a slave to the object you make, because making 
118 Mark C. E. Peterson
that object is the source of the wages that keep you alive. Marx put it this 
way: “The worker becomes a servant of his object, first, in that he receives 
an object of labor, i.e., in that he receives work, and, secondly, in that he re-
ceives means of subsistence. This enables him to exist, first as a worker; and 
second, as a physical subject. The height of this servitude is that it is only 
as a worker that he can maintain himself as a physical subject and that it is 
only as a physical subject that he is a worker.” In simpler language, jobs that 
turn you into a wage-slave, a servant of your own productions, satisfy you 
only as a wage earner, not as a human being—and that’s what it means to be 
estranged or alienated from the products of your labor. How many people 
have said, “This job is sucking the life out of me?” Marx thinks we should 
take that idea seriously.5
What was true of assembly lines, or mining, in nineteenth-century En-
gland is no different from corporate, white-collar, assembly lines today. We 
still call our jobs “the salt mines,” paper pushing, or the grist mill. Nothing 
we “make” belongs to us; everything we make we make on behalf of “the 
company” or “the boss.” Even in professions like medicine, industrial pro-
duction techniques have begun to change the relationship between doctor 
and patient. The healthy patient is no longer something produced by the 
physician; patients are now a product of the medical-insurance-health-care 
industry. Education too is threatened by industrial production techniques, 
turning schools into assembly lines and teachers into wage slaves. Extended 
three hundred years into the future, we can find this situation played out in 
Cameron’s movie in one particularly clear example. Jake, with some disgust, 
describes the mercenaries who were serving as a security force for mining 
operations on Pandora. Like him, most had been in the military back on 
Earth; but back on Earth, Jake tells us, they were fighting for freedom. On 
Pandora they were only fighting for the money. Here too wages had replaced 
the personally satisfying object of their labor.
In order to get a clearer idea of what Marx has in mind, it might be 
useful to consider what a nonalienating job looks like. Here’s a non-sci-fi 
example: my friend Brian installed tile in my bathroom. I could call him a 
“professional tile-installer” or even a “handyman,” but these labels hardly 
scratch the surface. In reality, Brian is a highly skilled artisan who loves what 
he does. Think about his relationship to the things he makes, such as my 
bathroom. I paid him for his labor, and the bathroom is in my house, but I 
am under no illusions about whose bathroom it is: it is Brian’s bathroom. If 
he dropped by, he’d probably say, “Let me have a look and see how my work is 
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holding up.” It remains his work even though, legally, it belongs to me. Even I 
think of it as “Brian’s work.” Brian’s relationship to the objects he produces is 
quite different from the relationship an industrial assembly-line worker has 
to his or her work. What’s the difference? Marx suggests that, in a perfectly 
practical sense, we always put ourselves into our work, whatever it is. The 
only question is, What do we get back in return? Brian gets a lot back; but 
on an assembly line, when you put yourself into your work, you don’t get 
anything back—except the wages you earn. The industrial economy itself is 
structured in such a way that whatever you make is taken away from you. 
Whatever you make belongs to the company’s owners. This is true whether 
you’re working on an assembly line, in an office, or guarding giant bulldozers 
on a distant off-world mining colony.
Estrangement from the objects you produce is stage one.
Once you find yourself in this situation, alienated from the objects you 
produce because of the way the economic system has structured your rela-
tionship to what you produce, alienation creeps into every part of your life.
Estrangement from the Labor Itself
What’s next? The worker becomes estranged from her or his own labor. 
Marx writes:
Till now we have been considering the estrangement, the alienation 
of the worker only in one of its aspects, i.e., the worker’s relationship 
to the products of his labor. But the estrangement is manifested not 
only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing 
activity, itself. How could the worker come to face the product of his 
activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production 
he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but 
the summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of 
labor is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the 
alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement 
of the object of labor is merely summarized the estrangement, the 
alienation, in the activity of labor itself.6
In simpler language, once you have sold your labor, even your labor does 
not belong to you. Your boss owns it. This is stage two.
The best example from the film is when Sigourney Weaver’s character, 
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Dr. Grace Augustine, scientific director of the avatar program, insists that 
“her” work—anthropological and biological studies of the Na’vi and Pan-
dora—belongs to her rather than to the corporation. She continually acts as 
if her scientific investigations were independent from and more important 
than the company’s economic motives. She is clearly in denial about who 
owns what. The corporate executive on-site, Parker Selfridge, is operating 
under no such delusions. Grace is rudely awakened to the truth when Self-
ridge explains that the local Na’vi clan lives atop one of the richest deposits 
of unobtainium and that, regardless of their value to science, he would be 
sending in the company’s security forces to drive them away—and blow the 
place up. When she objects that she still has work to do collecting (invalu-
able!) scientific data, he reminds her that the corporation owns her work 
and that she works for the corporation. She protests. He locks her up. End 
of discussion.
Estrangement from Self and from Species-Being
The third kind of alienation is the one people usually notice first. Marx calls 
this alienation from yourself, from your own human nature. We’ll turn to 
Marx and Avatar in a moment, but there is a quick and easy litmus test for 
this experience in your own life. Ask yourself this question: “When you’re at 
work, is that who you really are?” You might stop and take a quick inventory: 
you have an idiotic and vindictive boss, overly entitled customers, and you 
have to constantly fake a friendly smile in order to avoid being fired. If this 
describes your job even remotely, then the answer is easy: “Nope, that’s not 
who I really am. I can’t be me at work.”
Welcome to stage three.
Once again, if we take this common experience seriously, we can throw 
some light into the existential wasteland of the past hundred years. Think 
about this: most people in industrialized countries work eight hours a day, 
five days a week. If you subtract another eight hours for sleep, then most 
people get to live their “real” lives for only about eight hours a day. Plus 
weekends. Unless you work overtime. And if alienation is bad nowadays, 
imagine what it was like when Marx was writing in the nineteenth century. 
In those days industrial workers put in ten-hour days, six days a week. If 
you take out time for sleep, then typical industrial workers might have 
been able to live their “real” lives for only a few hours a day. Every hour on 
the job is an hour being “someone else.” Alarmingly, if a lousy job prevents 
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you from being “the real you” when you’re at work, then who or what are 
you? Everyone with an alienating job knows the answer. You’re part of the 
machinery. You’re another brick in the wall.7
Marx takes it a step further:
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not 
belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not 
affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, 
does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies 
his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself 
outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at 
home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not 
feel at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is 
forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely 
a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges 
clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion 
exists, labor is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which 
man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification. 
Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in the 
fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong 
to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another.8
That original, seemingly simple change in the relationship between worker 
and object eventually distorts even your personal identity. If your job ever 
made you feel like a stranger in your own life, this explanation accounts for 
it. It certainly accounts for Jake’s state of mind as he rolls off the transport 
onto Pandora.
Marx notes that when you cannot be your “self ” at work, even more than 
your personal identity is put at risk: your humanity is. We hear this all the 
time. People chained to alienating jobs regularly complain that they aren’t 
treated as human beings. The job alienates them not only from themselves 
as individuals, but from themselves as human beings. Marx describes this 
experience as alienation from one’s own “species-being.” At first glance, 
jargon like this looks irritatingly obscure, but jargon is simply shorthand 
for more complex ideas. The original German term, Gattungswesen, might 
be better translated as one’s “essential” or “inherent” nature as a human be-
ing. Marx writes that estranged labor “estranges from man his own body, 
as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect.” Tying 
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this back to the beginning, once you find yourself in a relationship that 
produces alienation, and the dominoes start to fall, you inexorably wind 
up alienated from your own human nature. If you’ve ever had a truly lousy 
job, you know exactly what he’s talking about.9
The principal administrator on Pandora, Selfridge, and the head of 
corporate security, Colonel Quaritch, have both clearly lost their humanity; 
they have confused their personal identities with their identities as employees 
of the corporation. Like many people in positions of power, they have been 
positively reinforced for this confusion. This is evident in Selfridge, who 
despite being a good “company man,” seems to struggle for a moment or two 
with his decision to “pull the trigger” and send Quaritch in to exterminate 
the Na’vi. His corporate identity prevails, however, and he gives the order to 
go. Colonel Quaritch, the perfect soldier whose sole identity is defined by the 
company that hires him, has become his title; the human being who might 
have felt compassion and prevented him from slaughtering the Na’vi is long 
gone. When the scientists try to appeal to this humanity, their arguments 
fall on deaf ears. Deafness to human compassion is one of the symptoms of 
an alienated personal identity.
And here we run head first into the front end of Cameron’s terrible pun. 
What’s the difference between the business executive who straps on the tai-
lored business suit of his or her work-related identity and Jake, who straps on 
a genetically tailored avatar? It’s that Jake, by becoming a nonhuman, regains 
his humanity, while Selfridge and Quaritch, by exploiting aliens, lose their 
humanity. For Jake, alienation from his human life is literally what restores 
his human life. For the company men, their alienation from human life has 
cost them their humanity.
Again, compare this to a nonalienating job. In nonalienating jobs people 
are able to be who they really are: the list often includes people in religious 
professions, teachers, doctors, lots of small-business owners, and my friend 
Brian, the tile guy. These workers, no matter how long their working day, get 
to be who they are twenty-four hours a day. In nonalienating jobs, your life 
still belongs to you. In alienating ones, it doesn’t. For Brian, his labor is the 
activity by which he makes things (bathrooms), but in a perfectly concrete 
and practical way, his work with tile is actually what it means to be Brian. 
Put more simply, when your activity is owned by someone else, so are you. 
What becomes clear as the film proceeds is that Jake will not allow his activ-
ity to be owned by someone else.10
We have one more piece of alienation to consider.
Avatar, Marx, and the Alienation of Labor 123
Estrangement from Other Humans
Alienation’s most toxic effect is found in Marx’s final observation: the capi-
talist economic system (the system that changed the relationship between 
workers and the objects they produce) alienates us not only from what we 
make, from our activity as workers, and from ourselves as human beings, 
but also from other, equally alienated, workers—from the very people with 
whom we have the most in common. This is stage four.
How does alienation poison my relationships with other workers? After 
a while, feeling alienated becomes normal, ambient, and invisible. You stop 
paying attention to it. When you get home, rather than face the uncomfort-
able process of shifting gears back to your real identity (when you are no 
longer pretending to be Clark Kent) and admitting to yourself that the job 
is literally preventing you from living your own life, you numb your brain 
with television or the Internet or beer until you fall asleep. Alienation seeps 
into your identity, and once alienation becomes a normal part of human 
life, anyone who is not alienated from her or his job will not seem to be 
“normal.” In fact, if being human means being an alienated assembly-line 
worker, and for many people it does, then anyone who is not alienated will 
not look “human” at all. Such a person will not act in the way a properly 
alienated human is supposed to act.
Example: Were you ever hired for a lousy job and at some point early 
on, you decided to do a “good job” anyway? Did you try to make lemonade 
out of lemons? Did you try to enjoy yourself and find a crumb of cheerful, 
personal satisfaction despite the soul-crushing lousiness? Probably. And 
did you discover that this approach made your fellow workers angry? Prob-
ably. Here’s the reason: from their point of view—as human beings already 
alienated from what they make, from their own work, and from their own 
essential human nature—you look like an irritating newbie, like some weird 
creature too stupid to see how lousy the job is. There must be something 
fundamentally wrong with you since, from their point of view, there must 
be something wrong with anyone who enjoys his or her work. Worse, if 
you try to treat them as human beings, they will resent it. Treating them as 
anything but estranged will remind them that they’re estranged: from what 
they make, from their work, and—worst of all—from their own lives. People 
do not like to be reminded that they have lousy lives.
Have you run into that?
Once people are sufficiently estranged from each other, each person 
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views every other person “in accordance with the standard” of estrangement. 
People who are not alienated from their work don’t share in the defining, 
alienated, identity. To workers whose identity consists in being alienated 
from other workers, nonalienated workers are, therefore, not identifiable as 
“real” workers at all. In extreme cases, they are barely identifiable as “real” 
human beings. Marx expressed it this way: “The estrangement of man, and 
in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is realized and 
expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men. 
Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other 
in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds 
himself as a worker.”11
This particularly pervasive aspect of alienation appears in Avatar in 
the way Selfridge and Quaritch treat the science team. The scientists are 
untrustworthy, from the company’s point of view, specifically because they 
don’t seem to be estranged: the scientists are engaged in and love their jobs; 
scientists don’t simply do science, they are scientists; they might be in denial 
about who really owns them, but this is a good mistake to make—from their 
point of view, their identity continues to be determined by their own interests 
and by their own actions. They are their work in a way that makes Selfridge 
and Quaritch suspicious. They are not cogs in the corporate machinery. Dr. 
Augustine’s most important personal payoff is not financial, but rather her 
personally fulfilling investigations and discoveries about the Na’vi. Estranged 
workers don’t act that way, and so Quaritch asks Jake to spy on them.
One final counterexample: have you ever had a nonalienating job and 
tried to explain it to people who have alienating jobs? It can be dangerous. 
When you do, someone will usually scoff and, incredulity dripping from 
her or his lips, say, “Why don’t you get a real job?” You’ve heard it if you’re 
an artist or a musician or a teacher—or if your work satisfies you in ways 
that inoculate you from alienation. Following Marx’s observation almost 
to the letter, alienated workers measure everyone in accordance with the 
standard of estrangement. If you’re not alienated, then there’s something 
wrong with you. In fact, let’s follow this thread for a moment. Here are some 
consequences of accepting the logic of alienation. In a culture of alienation, 
(1) all work creates alienation, and therefore, if you are not alienated, you 
must not be working; (2) work that does not create alienation cannot be 
“real” work; (3) people who are not alienated, therefore, must not be “real” 
people; and finally, (4) the only way to be accepted by your fellow alien-
ated workers is to be an alienated worker too. From this, alienated, point 
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of view, a happy nonalienated life is not possible; therefore, if you happen 
to be happily nonalienated, you must be crazy. This explains why, from the 
point of view of the RDA Corporation executives, the scientists don’t seem 
to be doing anything “serious” at all.12
This concludes our look into Marx’s sketch of estranged labor. Examining 
the way a new economic system—in this case, nineteenth-century capital-
ism—changes the relation between a worker and what she or he produces, 
Marx noticed that the industrial worker (unlike a skilled artisan) becomes 
alienated from the objects he or she produces. The alienation created by 
this changed relationship then takes root in the work itself, in our essential 
identity as human beings, and in our relationships to other workers. Since 
our economic system, like the one Marx criticized and the one Jake Sully 
lives in, is grounded in the same alienating relationships, we are subject to 
the same trap. This is why most sensible people, once aware of the predica-
ment, simply throw their hands in the air or crawl under a rock—but not 
Jake Sully. This is precisely where Jake’s salvation begins.
Solution to Alienation
Jake arrives on Pandora fully estranged by his immersion in the social-
economic system. He’s been alienated from everything he makes, from his 
activity as a worker, from his own soul, and from everyone he works with. 
His life is lousy, because, in a word, he’s been thoroughly alienated; every-
thing in his life has worked to make him a stranger in his life. Even though 
his circumstances are extreme, Jake faces the same dilemma confronted by 
anyone in an alienating life: How do I escape? It’s a dilemma because in order 
to crawl out of an alienated life, you have to find a way to live a nonalien-
ated life, something seemingly impossible when the economic system, the 
system that keeps you alive, reinforces the very circumstances that create 
your alienation. What to do? There is one obvious solution. If everything 
about being human is alienating—and for Jake, it is—then, in order to stop 
being alienated, you have to stop being human.
But before we follow Jake into the alien life that saves him from the alien-
ation of being an alienated human being, let’s take a moment and consider 
the wrong way to resolve alienation, especially since becoming an alien is, 
technically, not an option available to most of us. Yet.
In real life, people cope with alienation using a catalog of wrong-headed 
solutions, all of which fail because they treat the symptoms (the lousy pay, 
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lousy hours, or lousy boss) instead of the cause (the dysfunctional relation-
ship our economic system creates between workers and the objects they pro-
duce). Most people begin to engage their alienation by asking for a raise—on 
the assumption that more money will take care of the problem. This is a bit 
like asking for more candy to distract yourself from a toothache caused by 
too much candy—but it’s a normal and human reaction. Marx is blistering 
on this subject: “An enforced increase of wages,” he states, “(disregarding all 
other difficulties, including the fact that it would only be by force, too, that 
such an increase, being an anomaly, could be maintained) would therefore 
be nothing but better payment for the slave, and would not win either for the 
worker or for labor their human status and dignity.” You can put the slave in 
a nicer house, buy the slave a nicer car, or a personal jet—but nothing really 
changes. A slave with better pay, better hours, or a better boss, remains a slave. 
Marx’s observation from 1844 is played out explicitly in the movie. The RDA 
Corporation’s head of security on Pandora, Colonel Quaritch, promises Jake 
that if he spies on the scientific personnel, the company will get him “new 
legs” and deliver him from his wheelchair. New legs are no different from 
a corner office or a company car, and the scene illustrates the difficulty of 
escaping from a worldview in which alienation is the norm. Most sensible 
people in that position would have accepted the offer, but this promise, this 
Faustian deal, to heal Jake’s estrangement from his own, nonfunctioning 
body requires that Jake go back to work for the very system that broke him 
in the first place.13 Jake has other plans.
But why do people make this mistake? Why do they treat the symptoms 
of alienation rather than the cause? Because it’s trickier than it looks. Marx 
suggests that “Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the na-
ture of labor by not considering the direct [unmittelbare] relationship between 
the worker (labor) and production”—it masks the alienation it creates, like a 
disease that hides behind a lot of easily treatable symptoms. So long as you 
focus on anything other than the immediate, and dysfunctional, relation-
ship between yourself and the things you make, you’ll never get around to 
noticing the estrangement and its viral consequences. People raised inside 
the economic system often don’t believe it is possible to find a nonalienat-
ing and personally satisfying job that does not depend on good wages, easy 
hours, or a decent boss. Most people don’t seem to believe it’s possible to 
find happiness, in other words, outside of the economic system—and in our 
case that means an economic system that creates alienation. This might be 
one reason why it is easier to find alienation in movies about aliens than it 
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is in real life. Seeing things on the Big Screen is easier, and more believable, 
than seeing them in our own lives.14
So what’s the correct solution?
The Marxist answer is to address the real cause: change the dysfunctional 
relationship between the worker and the object he or she produces. Unfor-
tunately, changing this relationship is difficult, even after the alienation is 
no longer hidden from view. People take lousy, alienating jobs not because 
they want to, but out of necessity. Our lives often depend on entering into 
that initial, alienating relationship and turning ourselves into wage slaves. 
Our society, like Jake’s, is held in place by an economic model that creates 
and then depends upon estranged labor. Marx’s solution, and Jake’s, is to 
replace an economic system that creates alienated labor with a system that 
doesn’t; in other words, with a system in which personal satisfaction, rather 
than wages, is the ground of our relationship to what we produce. Economic 
systems, once well established, are famously unwilling to bend. Marx suggests 
that to avoid alienation like this, only a revolution (literally, turning things 
around) can do the trick—exactly what we see in the film.15
Jake’s revolution begins by wresting control of his avatar away from the 
corporation and, in this way, regaining control of his own identity. He then 
rallies the indigenous population to throw out the capitalist, alienation-
creating, human colonizers. In the end, the Na’vi transfer his consciousness 
permanently into his avatar; his human body is sacrificed to his new alien, 
but nonalienated, identity. Not only metaphorically but literally, Jake over-
comes the estrangement and alienation of his human life by becoming an 
alien: at first in surrogate form and in the end really.
From here, the rest of our analysis is easy. Once Jake moves into and 
takes control of his avatar, he establishes a new, nonalienated relationship to 
the things he makes. Consequently, (1) Jake is no longer alienated from what 
he makes. What he makes now belongs to him, and once this fundamental 
relationship is restored, the other three aspects of alienation evaporate. (2) 
His work once again belongs to him rather than to the corporation and 
his activity becomes an expression of his own existence, of himself. That 
“work” is to rally the Na’vi and fight off the corporate humans who have 
brought alienation to Pandora. Jake becomes this liberating activity, not only 
metaphorically but really. (3) By moving into an “alien” body, Jake ironically 
recovers his true humanity. No longer alienated from himself, even though 
he has become an alien, Jake becomes what he would have been all along 
but for the snare of alienation. Finally, (4) Jake is no longer alienated from 
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others: in fact, like every other living thing on Pandora, he is literally plugged 
into the all-encompassing neural network that is Pandora itself: Eywa.
By changing the relationship in which he stands to his work, Jake finds 
himself no longer estranged from what he makes, from his labor, from 
himself, or from others. He is no longer a stranger in his own life. What 
was required? Jake had to let go of a set of culturally imposed economic 
relationships that prevented him from overcoming his alienation. Think of 
how many stories follow this model—one in which human beings recover 
their humanity only when exposed to aliens, aboriginal peoples, and so 
forth, and are thus put into conflict with their own alienating culture. The 
aliens, as often happens in stories like this, turn out to be more human than 
human beings. You should be able to see Marx’s discussion of alienation in 
all such stories now.
Bringing Alienation Back to Earth
The idea of overcoming alienation by becoming an alien—metaphorically 
rather than literally, perhaps—is interesting, at least, but what does this movie, 
or Marx, have to do with you? You’ll need to consider two questions: (1) Do 
you live in a culture that tends to create the conditions of alienation? (Quick, 
can you be who you really are at work?) And (2) if you do, how do you avoid 
becoming alienated yourself? Do you have to leave your life on Earth behind in 
order to get over your alienation from your job, yourself, your fellow humans? 
Switching sci-fi metaphors, do you have to become a Stranger in a Strange Land 
to move beyond your estrangement?16 The answer, it seems, is yes.
Marx’s eventual solution to this quandary—spelled out across the 
volumes of his later work—is roughly the same solution Jake reaches: Jake 
plugs into Eywa, literally, and discovers that his relationships, now social 
rather than economic, are no longer alienating. Back on Earth, we need to 
ground our lives in a web of social relationships that are not merely economic 
ones—so long as by “economic” we mean the kind of system that puts us 
into a dysfunctional relationship with the objects we produce.
Fortunately, we do not need to leave the Earth to do as much.
Notes
1. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Dirk J. Struik, 
trans. Martin Milligan (New York: International, 1964), 106–19, cited hereafter as 
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“Struik.” Variations in translations are from Struik’s revisions of Milligan (from the edi-
tion published by Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, at www.marxists.org [accessed 
June 2, 2011]) and my own. Marx’s discussion of alienation is found in “The Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” and to a lesser extent in his “Grundrisse,” unpub-
lished manuscripts in which the young Marx began to work out the dialectical analysis of 
political economy that he explores in Capital. Although these texts thus do not provide 
a fully argued philosophical account, Marx’s essay “Estranged Labor” contains a con-
stellation of illuminating insights into how an economics-based culture can condition 
the identity of nations and workers. Among Marx scholars, questions remain regarding 
whether these unpublished early notebooks are the “real” Marx. As the reader should be 
aware, questions like this held profound and, during the Soviet era, lethal importance. 
For a succinct account of these scholastic and ideological divisions, see the preface to 
John McGuire’s Marx’s Paris Writings: An Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).
2. Avatar is the term generally used to describe the incarnation of a Hindu deity 
in human form. It contains the etymological root ava- “down” attached to tarati “(he) 
crosses over.” The biomechanical avatar in Cameron’s movie is precisely what makes 
it possible for Jake Sully to “cross over” from an alienated to a nonalienated life—by 
becoming an alien.
3. The German for estrangement is Entfremdung; for alienation, Entäusserung. R. G. 
Peffer, in his Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 50–55, does a nice job of distinguishing the three bits of German that go 
into understanding alienation: vergegenständlichung, entäusserung, and entfremdung.
4. It is important to be on your guard when reading anything that claims to 
explicate complex philosophical themes in popular culture; to be on the lookout for 
what Nobel Prize–winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann calls “quantum flapdoodle,” his 
criticism of the way New Age mysticism has inappropriately appropriated the language 
of modern quantum physics. The use of sexy, often impenetrable, jargon can make any 
article look important even when it means nothing at all. The same thing happens in 
political science and philosophy, so watch your back. Cf. Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark 
and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex (New York: Owl Books, 2002), 
chap. 12, “Quantum Mechanics and Flapdoodle,” 167.
5. Struik, 109.
6. Struik, 110.
7. Estimates from the Weeks Report, prepared by Joseph Weeks as part of the 
census of 1880, suggest average work weeks of more than sixty hours. This form of 
alienation is illuminated with lucid and terrible clarity in Pink Floyd’s 1979 album The 
Wall and Fritz Lang’s classic film Metropolis.
8. Struik, 110–11.
9. Struik, 114. For the etymologically minded, check the component parts of this 
term: Gattung and Wesen. Like a lot of Marx’s technical vocabulary, this term is fright-
ening at first but, once you crack it open, it turns into an Easter egg.
130 Mark C. E. Peterson
10. Kurt Vonnegut once summed it up this way: “To be is to do—Socrates. To do 
is to be—Sartre. Do Be Do Be Do—Sinatra.”
11. Struik, 114–15.
12. The best discussion of the effects of alienating labor on society can be found 
in Josef Pieper’s Leisure, the Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander Dru (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1952). It has an introduction by T. S. Eliot.
13. Struik, 117–18. This is something to consider next time your boss promises 
you a raise. It is impossible, in this context, not to think of Kenny Dobbins, one of the 
people interviewed in Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation (New York: Harper Perennial, 
2005). Mr. Dobbins is a tragic example of how a “good employee” can be worked to 
death—and not notice until it’s too late.
14. Struik, 109–10.
15. Marx’s discussion of a revolution in consciousness and political culture goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter. See, in particular, Marx and Engels’s The Communist 
Manifesto.
16. See Robert Heinlein’s influential 1962 Hugo Award–winning novel Stranger in 
a Strange Land (New York: Putnam, 1991) about a human raised by Martians.
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disne y / Pixar’s the inCredibles
C. Heike Schotten
Bob [to wide-eyed, expectant child]. Well, what are you waiting for?
Child. I don’t know! Something amazing, I guess.
Bob [sighing]. Me, too, kid.
—The Incredibles
And to ask it once more: today—is greatness possible?
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §212
In the penultimate scene of Pixar / Walt Disney’s animated film The In-
credibles, ten-year-old superhero Dash Parr is about to run a sprint race in 
his elementary school’s track meet. As the race begins, his parents buoyantly 
cheer him on. “Run, Dash, run!!” they yell excitedly—and, glancing up at 
them, young Dash propels himself within seconds to the front of the pack. 
Alarmed at their son’s swift ascent into first place, however, his parents sud-
denly reverse course, yelling “Pull back! Pull back!” Following their cues, 
Dash drifts to the back of the pack of racers. This causes his parents to change 
directives yet again, his father yelling audibly, “Don’t give up! Make it close!” 
Speeding up for the last time, Dash eventually finishes second in a race that, 
without his parents’ interventions, he could easily have won. Flushed with 
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pleasure if not exertion, Dash turns wide-eyed to his family in the stands, 
smiles tentatively, and gives them the thumbs-up.1
As anyone who has seen The Incredibles knows, the reason for Dash’s 
parents’ mixed messages is not their failure to understand the point of a race, 
but rather their desire to limit their son’s success to within a “normal” level 
of achievement. For running is Dash’s superpower. Dash is not simply faster 
than a speeding bullet—he runs so fast he can escape video detection and, 
like Christ himself, can traverse water without sinking due to his astound-
ing speed. Obviously, Dash is worlds beyond any elementary school track 
meet and could easily crush any competitor in any race, even an Olympic 
marathon. Indeed, were he truly to run as fast as he could, the race would 
be over before it even got started.
Dash’s dilemma in this scene—and its compromise resolution enforced 
by his parents’ mixed messages from the stands—can be read as an allegory 
of Nietzsche’s critique of modern doctrines of equality. Dash is a kind of 
genius—he is an extraordinary boy, so extraordinary that he is, in fact, 
superhuman, and the superheroes of The Incredibles can be read as literal-
izations of Nietzsche’s notion of greatness or superiority.2 Like the higher 
man of Nietzsche’s philosophy, Dash cannot be given free rein to express 
his greatness, because to do so would ruin things for everybody else. His 
incredible speed would ruin the track meet for other children, who could no 
longer look forward to competing, as well as for other parents, who could 
no longer nourish beliefs in their children’s talents. Indeed, Dash’s prowess 
would ruin the sport of competitive racing for every other runner in the 
world. Moreover, rather than celebrate his achievements, the school might 
deal with Dash’s greatness through exclusionary limitations—by, for example, 
putting a ceiling on the number of wins allowed each runner or capping 
the maximum speed at which competitors can run. Such consequences, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, are the predictable if undeserved fate of anyone who 
is truly exceptional. As he explains in Beyond Good and Evil:
The highest and strongest drives, when they break out passionately 
and drive the individual far above the average and the flats of the 
herd conscience, wreck the self-confidence of the community, its 
faith in itself, and it is as if its spine snapped. Hence just these drives 
are branded and slandered most. High and independent spiritual-
ity, the will to stand alone, even a powerful reason are experienced 
as dangers; everything that elevates an individual above the herd 
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and intimidates the neighbor is henceforth called evil; and the fair, 
modest, submissive, conforming mentality, the mediocrity of desires 
attains moral designations and honors. (§201)
Were Dash truly to run the race as fast as he could, he would violate the norms 
and presuppositions of social life, which include, among others, notions of 
equality, fairness, inclusion, and “normal” ten-year-old behavior. According 
to Nietzsche, the good of the community and the enhancement of the higher 
type are at odds with each other. Given this conflict, society typically chooses its 
own self-preservation over recognition and honor of the exceptional person’s 
greatness. The result? Mediocrity is rewarded and greatness demonized, pun-
ished, even sacrificed for the “common good.” Nietzsche does not disguise his 
contempt for this decision calculus: “ ‘The general welfare’ is no ideal, no goal, 
no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emetic.” He continues, “What is 
fair for one cannot by any means for that reason alone be fair for others,” and 
“the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher men.” This 
is the case because some people are just better than others; or, in his words, 
because “there is an order of rank between man and man” (BGE, §228).
Dash’s dilemma is the basic plot premise of The Incredibles: faced with 
a caste of superpowerful heroes, society would rather eliminate them than 
honor their greatness. Nietzsche calls this sort of resentfulness slave moral-
ity. A slave morality is any ethical, religious, or political code that vilifies 
greatness. It is articulated in a tone of resentment, by and on behalf of the 
majority of people—in Nietzsche’s view, the many, the mediocre, all those 
who are not great—and advocates the restriction, limitation, or diminution 
of the rare, powerful few. In subtly advocating for the rights of superheroes 
to live their lives as superior and exceptional beings, then, The Incredibles 
offers a Nietzschean critique of equality and takes a rather Nietzschean 
position with regard to greatness. In what follows, I discuss two versions of 
slave morality that arise in the film—the lawsuits against the supers and the 
villain Syndrome’s evil plot—and conclude by arguing that The Incredibles 
ultimately falls prey to the slave morality it seems to critique.3
Superheroism, Suburbia, and Slave Morality
The film opens by introducing us to Mr. Incredible and his troubles, which 
begin (not accidentally, as we’ll see) on his wedding day.4 On his way to the 
chapel, Mr. Incredible is alerted to the unfolding of a crime, which he nimbly 
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foils. However, yet more criminal activity is afoot elsewhere in the city, de-
manding Mr. Incredible’s attention and threatening to prevent him from getting 
to the church on time. At this important moment of conflict, we meet Buddy, 
aka Incrediboy, Mr. Incredible’s “biggest fan” (and soon to become his biggest 
enemy). Buddy’s annoying, intrusive, tag-along presence as aspiring sidekick 
disrupts Mr. Incredible’s heroics, allows villain Bomb Voyage to escape, and 
wreaks altogether new havoc for Mr. Incredible to salvage. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Incredible does indeed make it to the church just barely in time to pronounce 
his wedding vows. In these brief opening scenes, the greatness of Mr. Incred-
ible is established (through his initial, successful crime-fighting activity) and 
the seeds are planted for what will emerge as the two major threats to his su-
perheroism: the vengefulness of the weak, on the one hand, and the demands 
of marriage and family, on the other. As it turns out, many of the people Mr. 
Incredible saves on his wedding day later become litigants in lawsuits against 
him, while Buddy, burned by Mr. Incredible’s rejection, begins nursing a resent-
ful grudge that develops into a murderous revenge, ominously transforming 
him into Mr. Incredible’s arch-nemesis, Syndrome. Meanwhile, complaining 
about his lateness, Mr. Incredible’s fiancée (a superheroine herself) says to him, 
“I love you, but if we’re gonna make this work, you’ve gotta be more than Mr. 
Incredible. You know that. Don’t you?” His evasion of the question with an 
“I do” to the priest rather than to her makes it clear he is seeking to evade the 
conflict between heroism and family that his fiancée foresees. Regardless, the 
two threats to greatness have been established: the vengefulness of the weak 
and the enervating demands of married life.5 Both are Nietzschean themes: 
the first is Nietzsche’s critique of slave morality; the second, his critique of 
marriage and the great man’s association with women.6
We next meet our protagonists fifteen years later. No longer Mr. Incred-
ible, Bob now works for an insurance company; Helen, formerly Elastigirl, 
seems happy to care for their children and endlessly vacuum their sprawling 
suburban home. The Parrs have been relegated to this nostalgically 1950s 
existence because of a series of lawsuits against Mr. Incredible for saving 
people who “didn’t want to be saved.” Relayed to the viewer in newsreel 
form (harking back to an even earlier, prewar period in U.S. history), foot-
age shows newspaper headlines and front-page photos of protesters holding 
signs saying “Hang Up the Cape,” “Stop Hiding behind the Mask,” and “Go 
Save Yourself.” One photo shows an angry crowd burning Mr. Incredible in 
effigy. In response to this public protest, the government institutes a Super-
hero Relocation Program, providing “amnesty” to all supers in exchange for 
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their retirement into a life of anonymity.7 As a politician says on television 
about the superheroes, “It is time for their secret identity [i.e., their nonsuper 
identity] to be their only identity. Time for them to join us, or go away.”
The ludicrousness of these lawsuits is played for comedy, and the film’s 
literalization of Nietzschean greatness as superheroic saving of the innocent 
is meant to highlight the absurdity of the many’s resentment of greatness. 
After all, how could anyone resent being saved from death? But that is 
precisely what the litigants allege. Although the superheroes’ exceptional 
powers seem to legitimate their intrusion into the daily lives of ordinary 
people, apparently these ordinary people don’t want this intrusion and ac-
tively reject it. Moreover, many of the newspaper headlines invoke security, 
asking if the public would be safer without superheroic interventions, sug-
gesting that the superheroes’ greatness is a danger to public welfare. Finally, 
the relocation of the supers does not necessarily alleviate public fear. As the 
announcer says, “Where are they now? They are living among us. Average 
citizens, average heroes.” Further bolstering the 1950s feel of this part of 
the film, McCarthyist anxieties echo in the newsreel reporter’s words: like 
Communists and homosexuals, former superheroes walk among “average 
citizens” undetected, an invisible threat to the community at large.8 In short, 
the superheroes’ superiority threatens the safety of “average citizens” who 
no longer want or need their greatness. The government thus takes action to 
disempower the supers and render them just like everybody else. This is the 
film’s depiction of what Nietzsche calls the “common war on all that is rare, 
strange, privileged, the higher man” (BGE, §212), waged by “the herd animal 
with its profound mediocrity, timidity, and boredom with itself ” (GS, §352).
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction, conflict, and ennui pervade the Parrs’ subur-
ban idyll.9 Bob must daily conform his enormously powerful, beefy body to the 
stifling contours of his now-normal life: he hunches over a disproportionately 
tiny desk at work and stuffs himself into the cramped space of his compact car 
twice daily for a mind-numbing commute.10 He tries, ineffectively, to sublimate 
his superheroic penchant for saving people into helping policyholders success-
fully navigate his insurance company’s bureaucracy, an activity for which he 
is ultimately fired. Meanwhile, Dash is getting into trouble at school because 
he has been forbidden to go out for sports. Promising to “slow up” and “only 
be the best by a tiny bit!” Dash complains:
Dash. You always say, “Do your best.” But you don’t really mean it. 
Why can’t I do the best that I can do?
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Helen. Right now, honey, the world just wants us to fit in, and to fit 
in, we just gotta be like everybody else.
Dash. Dad always said our powers were nothing to be ashamed of. 
Our powers made us special.
Helen. Everyone’s special, Dash.
Dash. Which is another way of saying no one is.
Dash’s discontent indicates that he understands the driving force behind 
the lawsuits and forced retirements, even though all of it happened before 
he was born. He knows that being prevented from playing sports means 
quashing his superiority, prowess, and skill. It means sacrificing his indi-
vidual achievements to shore up the mediocrity and self-pity of everyone 
else. And it means disguising that sacrifice with the saccharine platitude that 
everybody is “special.” Like his father, however, Dash knows that special, in 
its true sense, means “better.” As Bob complains regarding Dash’s impending 
fourth-grade graduation ceremony, “It’s psychotic! They keep creating new 
ways to celebrate mediocrity. But if someone is genuinely exceptional . . .” 
Bob doesn’t complete this sentence, but he and Dash know its conclusion: 
if someone is genuinely exceptional, he must be cut down to size and made 
mediocre in order to “fit in” and “be like everybody else.”
The male half of the Parr family is miserable in its mediocrity; both 
Dash and his father feel (rightly, in Nietzsche’s view) punished by the re-
strictions on their activity. By contrast, the female half of the family either 
longs for normality—teenage Violet wails, “We act normal, mom. I wanna 
be normal!”—or else rigorously enforces it: it is Helen who forbids Dash to 
play sports, while she reprimands Bob for reprising the glory days when he 
returns late from “bowling,” spotting rubble on his coat lapel as if it were 
lipstick on his collar. Helen’s anxious disapproval makes clear that Bob’s 
antics—just like his son’s—have the potential to give them all away. For the 
men of the family, superheroics are the only viable outlet for their super 
powers. For the women of the family, however, superheroics pose a threat 
to the happiness, normality, and long-term stability of the family unit.11
Syndrome, Slavishness, and the Will to Power
While the bland social conformism of the herd dictates that the Incredibles 
live their lives in hiding, as “normal” people, the bitter and vengeful Buddy 
seeks not simply to normalize Mr. Incredible but to punish and eventually 
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displace him. This, too, is in keeping with Nietzsche’s critique of slave moral-
ity, which also has a psychological dimension: Nietzsche finds the longing for 
equality to be resentful, dishonest, and vengeful. Slave moralities, he claims, 
are formulated by weak people who punish strength in order to compensate 
for their own weakness, which they reinterpret as a kind of virtue. Strength 
and greatness, by contrast, they interpret as injury, attack, and injustice—as 
wrongs that must be redressed. Slave morality, then, effects a fundamental 
reversal of natural hierarchy the only way it can—through deceit. The weak 
triumph over the strong by lying—by reinterpreting strength as harm.
Syndrome exemplifies these psychological dysfunctions. His transforma-
tion from the awkward, copycat, unsuper kid Buddy into the vengeful, fully-
grown, arch-nemesis Syndrome is instigated by Mr. Incredible’s rejection 
of young Buddy’s proffered crime-fighting companionship. Buddy refuses 
to accept the fact that he is not super; he experiences Mr. Incredible’s rebuff 
as an unforgivable personal rejection (rather than, say, as a necessity of the 
very greatness and independence that he so admires in his hero).12 Buddy 
thus proceeds to produce himself as a superhero named Syndrome by con-
structing machines that function as superpowers.13 Although Buddy does 
not lie his weakness into merit (as Nietzsche argues slavish types do [GM, 
1:14]), choosing instead to imitate his hero (“I’ll give them heroics. I’ll give 
them the most spectacular heroics anyone’s ever seen!”) to the point at which 
he will surpass him (as he says to Mr. Incredible, “I’ll be a bigger hero than 
you ever were!”). Nevertheless, the point of carrying out his vendetta against 
Mr. Incredible is the same as that of the slave: to reverse the relationship 
between them so that he, Buddy, is the strong and powerful one and Mr. 
Incredible is the weakling begging for favors. And Buddy accomplishes this 
reversal through lies—by blaming Mr. Incredible for his own inadequacy, 
manufacturing fake superpowers, and secretly assassinating all the other 
superheroes so that he, Syndrome, can claim to be the world’s only hero.14 
Mr. Incredible’s incredulous response to this plan is eminently Nietzschean: 
“You killed off real heroes so that you could . . . pretend to be one?!” This is 
precisely Syndrome’s revenge.
Unfazed, however, Syndrome insists: “Oh I’m real. Real enough to defeat 
you! And I did it without your precious gifts, your oh-so-special powers.” In 
other words, Syndrome is saying that he has changed the rules of the game. 
Greatness is no longer inborn, as the supers may believe (as Helen tells Vi, 
“You have more power than you realize. . . . It’s in your blood”), but rather 
manufacturable and possible to mandate. This belief that anyone can do 
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anything is, Nietzsche thinks, a hallmark of democratic and egalitarian ages 
that do not recognize natural distinctions or orders of rank: “The individual 
becomes convinced that he can do just about everything and can manage 
almost any role, and everybody experiments with himself, improvises, 
makes new experiments, enjoys his experiments; and all nature ceases and 
becomes art” (GS, §356). This tampering with nature is one more effect of 
the generalized disregard for greatness that Nietzsche believes characterizes 
modern egalitarianisms. Syndrome’s plan, then, is actually strangely demo-
cratic insofar as it seeks to dismantle, through his own initiative and artifice, 
the natural schema according to which some people are super and others 
are not. Its “evil” is precisely its refusal of natural superiority; in Nietzsche’s 
words: “Today nobody has the courage any longer for privileges, for mas-
ters’ rights, for a sense of respect for oneself and one’s peers—for a pathos 
of distance. Our politics is sick from this lack of courage. The aristocratic 
outlook was undermined from the deepest underworld through the lie of 
the equality of souls” (A, §43).
Syndrome’s nefarious plan culminates in an unexpected twist that is 
nevertheless in keeping with his denaturing of greatness and the film’s overall 
critique of egalitarianism: “And when I’m old and I’ve had my fun, I’ll sell 
my inventions so that everyone can be a superhero. Everyone can be super! 
And when everyone’s super . . . no one will be [evil laughter].” In a clear 
echo of Dash’s earlier lament, Syndrome makes explicit the ominous threat 
to greatness lurking behind the democratic imperative and reveals that even 
the aspiration to equality is itself a longing for domination or, as Nietzsche 
would say, a will to power. As Syndrome’s dreams of becoming the world’s 
only superhero make clear, the desire to denature and democratize greatness 
is actually a drive toward mastery and domination. Syndrome’s mantra is 
that only he will be super, and after him nobody will be. Nietzsche’s point is 
that this is the aspiration of all slave moralities, even those that pretend to 
argue for the common good. Syndrome’s plot is the culmination and logical 
consequence of civil society’s legalized resentment and containment of the 
supers; his will to power is the ugly underside of the more banal containment 
of herd morality. In determining who can and cannot be super, Syndrome (or 
the law or society or the common man) determines that it or he shall rule.15
Ultimately, Syndrome’s plot fails and ends up resuscitating the super-
heroes to their former greatness. This proves that the weak are essentially 
so and cannot do otherwise. When they attempt to assume the guises and 
behavior of the strong, they can only imitate, never be authentically. Ironi-
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cally, this is also what puts the citizenry back on the side of the supers. Far 
from successfully conquering the world, Syndrome’s artifice is foiled by the 
natural forthrightness of the supers’ true superiority.
The Incredibles’ Concession to the Herd
These concluding scenes reveal The Incredibles’ unwitting investment in 
normality, however—an investment that is far from Nietzschean. Caving 
to conventionality, the film retreats from its critique of equality and refuses 
to follow Nietzsche’s views to their conclusion, instead taking refuge in the 
familiar comforts of care and community. For, however great the Incredible 
family is, they remain committed to using their greatness to preserve the 
“common good” and “public safety” that threatened their very existence in 
the first place. They remain, in other words, superheroes in the conventional 
sense: their powers serve the common good (rather than their own) and 
aim at preserving the human race (rather than leaving it to destroy itself if it 
must). In Nietzschean terms, we might say that the Incredibles’ superpow-
ers are hyperbolizations of herd instinct.16 The “greatness” they represent is 
not really the greatness of which Nietzsche speaks, a greatness he believes 
to be at odds with the common good because it is and must be, effectively, 
self-serving.17 The Incredibles simply ignores these difficulties by reconciling 
individual greatness with the welfare of all in the figure of the superhero 
who uses his or her greatness to serve humanity.
The film also departs from Nietzsche’s teachings in its reconciliation of 
superiority and domesticity. Confronted with the possible death of his wife 
and children, Bob confesses what he has failed to understand up to this 
point; namely, “I’ve been a lousy father. Blind to what I have. So obsessed 
with being undervalued that I undervalued all of you.” Bemoaning his desire 
for a superheroic life as a selfishness that detracted from what is truly im-
portant, Bob tells Helen and the kids: “You are my greatest adventure. And 
I almost missed it.” In other words, the man who used to revel in a solitary 
life of superheroic activity now understands the daily travails of homework 
and housekeeping to be his “greatest adventure.” Dash, too, is returned to 
the familial fold: after they escape from Syndrome’s clutches (an adventure 
Dash calls “the greatest vacation ever”), he concludes with the heartwarm-
ing admission, “I love our family.” The restraints that formerly chafed both 
father and son and made them miserable are now perceived lovingly and 
as essential to their happiness (perhaps in part because their recent crime-
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fighting adventure fulfilled long-repressed superheroic desires). It remains 
to be seen, however, how long this contentment can last.
Ultimately, although The Incredibles seems initially to defend the exis-
tence and prerogative of superior types, by the end of the film we discover 
that these are permissible only to the degree to which they are reconcilable 
with the demands of the weak, the many, the neighbor, the herd—and the 
household. This seeming contradiction evidences a crucial question that goes 
both unasked and unanswered throughout the film: why do the supers mix 
with humanity (or women)—much less care about their welfare—at all?18 
For reasons unknown, the supers care what humanity thinks about them 
and long for their acceptance. From a Nietzschean perspective, such a need 
for recognition from one’s inferiors is incomprehensible and suggests that 
The Incredibles is actually a snapshot of the nobility’s overall decline.19 While 
Mr. Incredible’s insistence that he works alone is an entirely appropriate and 
necessary characterization of his activity, throughout the film we see this 
resolve crumble in the face of an adoring and bratty child fan, an ungrateful 
civil society, a nagging wife, and demanding children. That Bob should have 
pity for human vulnerability or that Dash might be excited to come in second 
at his elementary school’s track meet, however, otherwise defy comprehen-
sion. The Incredibles ignores this unlikely reconciliation of greatness with 
herd morality, playing to its audience’s own longings for normality and a 
neat narrative conclusion without conflict. Rolling the family, community, 
and superheroics into one big happy ending, The Incredibles ultimately 
teaches a very un-Nietzschean lesson: that the purpose of greatness is to 
serve the weak and the many rather than the happiness and enhancement 
of the superior few.
Notes
1. Brad Bird, director, The Incredibles, 2004, scene 30. All quotations from The 
Incredibles are taken from the complete script published online at the Internet Movie 
Script Database, www.imsdb.com/scripts/Incredibles,-The.html. No emphases are 
specified in the script; however, I have added them when I believe they reflect the de-
livery of the character and help specify the lines’ meaning (thus I have italicized “up” 
in this quotation because I believe it accurately reflects Craig T. Nelson’s delivery of this 
line in the film and helps clarify Bob Parr’s investment in his child’s success). Works 
by Nietzsche will be cited in text in parentheses by work and aphorism, according to 
the following abbreviations: GS for The Gay Science: La gaya scienza, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann  (New York:  Vintage,  1974); BGE for Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a 
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Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966); GM for 
On the Genealogy of Morals:  A Polemic, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:  Vintage, 
1967); A for Antichrist(ian), in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York:  Penguin, 1968).
2. Nietzsche sometimes even talks about a kind of “super” man (Übermensch in 
German—the prefix über meaning “over” or “beyond” or, in some translations, “super,” 
and Mensch meaning “man” or “human”). This Übermensch is a sketchy figure whom 
Nietzsche discusses primarily in his most literary text, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. While 
some commentators see the Übermensch as a crucial figure in Nietzsche’s overall philoso-
phy, they disagree about who this person is and what exactly he signifies (as witnessed in 
part by the different choices of translation; e.g., “overman” versus “superman”). For the 
purposes of this chapter, I am leaving the controversies surrounding Nietzsche’s notion 
of the Übermensch aside and restricting my discussion to a more generalized notion 
of “greatness” or “superiority,” a notion that may or may not (exclusively) characterize 
the Übermensch.
3. But first, a few caveats: (1) It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what Nietzsche means 
by greatness—both because he is evasive about the details and because scholars have 
different plausible interpretations of his writings. Some view Nietzschean greatness as 
an individualized ethic of self-mastery (e.g., artistic creativity, cultivation of one’s own 
virtues, or a psychological self-overcoming), while others view it as a more political 
orientation toward mastery over others (e.g., the Nietzschean great man as lawgiver 
and/or destroyer of the existing order). All of these interpretations are credible and 
none is definitive (they may even be harmonious to some extent). (2) Another ques-
tion is how far to take Nietzsche’s statements about the “order of rank” between man 
and man. Sometimes he seems to suggest that there are essentially two basic types of 
human beings: the few strong, masterful ones and the many weak, slavish ones. There 
is ample textual evidence to suggest Nietzsche believes this and, particularly in the 
Antichrist(ian), one of his very last books, he explicitly advocates an aristocratic social 
hierarchy as the only healthy political arrangement because it is sensitive to this natural 
hierarchy (§57—although here he specifies that there are three types of human beings, 
ranked nevertheless). Commentators, however, have many different views about the 
kind of politics Nietzsche ultimately endorsed (or can be interpreted to endorse to-
day); they also disagree about whether Nietzsche believes the designations “strong and 
weak” or “master and slave” are intractable essences or designations that are subject to 
change. Luckily, we don’t have to take decisive positions on either of these issues for the 
purposes of understanding Nietzsche’s critique of slave morality or its allegorization in 
The Incredibles. The important, more general, and largely uncontroversial points here 
are these: (1) Nietzsche is no believer in natural equality when it comes to human be-
ings; (2) he generally celebrates the “higher man” and his greatness; and (3) he believes 
this type to be rare and laments the generalized underappreciation of greatness that he 
believed rampant in the Europe of his day.
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4. Although the film’s very opening scene introduces us to three protagonist 
superheroes—Mr. Incredible, Elastigirl, and Frozone—all of whom are being inter-
viewed about their superheroic lives, the most time is devoted to Mr. Incredible, who 
is established here and in the very next scene as the truly main character of the film, 
a primariness reflected in the film’s title and family patronym, which subsumes each 
family member’s individual powers into an undifferentiated Incredible-ness and clearly 
establishes Frozone as a sidekick or supporting character.
5. That Mr. Incredible recognizes these impending threats, however unconsciously, 
is attested to by the fact that he rebuffs the help of both Buddy and his fiancée in these 
opening scenes with the same words: “I work alone.”
6. Nietzsche’s views about women—if they are taken into consideration at all 
(many readers dismiss them as inconsequential or too ridiculous to take seriously)—are 
a source of much controversy among scholars. I myself believe they are worth taking 
seriously (especially since he says so very much about women, gender, sexuality, and 
marriage in so many of his books), that they are consistent with one another, and, most 
importantly, that they are essential to his overall philosophical project. More of my 
views about these matters may be found in my book, Nietzsche’s Revolution: Décadence, 
Politics, and Sexuality (New York: Palgrave, 2009). For now, a few quotes from Nietzsche 
will suffice—and should serve to remind us that if Nietzsche considers women to be 
obstacles to greatness, the consequence is that only men can be great. Regarding mar-
riage—for any man, not just a higher one, Nietzsche says it is “a hindrance and calamity 
on his path to the optimum” (GM, 3:7). Regarding association with women, Nietzsche 
says in The Gay Science, §59, in 1885: “When a man stands in the midst of his own 
noise, in the midst of his own surf of plans and projects, then he is apt also to see quiet, 
magical beings gliding past him and to long for their happiness and seclusion: women. 
He almost thinks that this better self dwells there among the women, and that in these 
quiet regions even the loudest surf turns into deathly quiet, and life itself into a dream 
about life. Yet! Yet! Noble enthusiast, even on the most beautiful sailboat there is a lot 
of noise, and unfortunately much small and petty noise. The magic and most powerful 
effect of women is, in philosophical language, action at a distance, actio in distans; but 
this requires first of all and above all—distance.”
In 1888, in Nietzsche’s very last work, The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage, 1967), he says: “Translated into reality: the danger for artists, for 
geniuses—and who else is the ‘Wandering Jew’?—is woman: adoring women confront 
them with corruption. Hardly any of them have character enough not to be corrupted—or 
‘redeemed’—when they find themselves treated like gods: soon they condescend to the 
level of the women.—Man is a coward, confronted with the Eternal-Feminine—and the 
females know it.—In many cases of feminine love, perhaps including the most famous 
ones above all, love is merely a more refined form of parasitism, a form of nestling down 
in another soul, sometimes even in the flesh of another—alas, always decidedly at the 
expense of ‘the host!’ ” (§3).
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7. The front-page photo illustrating this new amnesty policy shows construction 
workers taking down a large public statue of three superheroes, a possible allusion to 
the removal of the statue of Saddam Hussein by U.S. troops in Baghdad in 2003 (The 
Incredibles was released in theaters in 2004). As the headlines surrounding this image 
suggest, the people will be “safer without” the supers and the “public” will be “safe 
again,” just as, it was argued, the Iraqi people—and the United States—would be safer 
without Hussein in power.
8. Indeed, the Parrs’ relocation to suburbia and their faithful reproduction of 
the 2.5 child ideal not only mirror the actual historical movement of white American 
families to the suburbs and the dramatic rise of U.S. birthrates in this era, but also un-
derscore the fact that the Parrs’ superness is, indeed, a real threat to the social order, a 
threat that must be normalized.
9. Given the nostalgic chronology of the film’s allusions, “fifteen years later” would 
situate the Parrs in the middle to late 1960s, a time of increasing dissatisfaction with 
the American Dream and widespread social rebellion against its white, middle-class, 
patriarchal norms. So it is no surprise that the Parrs are unhappy.
10. Bob’s size literalizes his superness, and the dramatic physical disjuncture 
between his body and his surroundings symbolizes his discomfort and dissatisfaction 
with life as an “average citizen.” As his very body makes clear, Bob is not, in fact, aver-
age: his overwhelming strength is impossible to ignore; it is extremely difficult to hide 
(he damages his car merely by gripping it too tightly and saws through Dash’s plate at 
dinner by cutting a piece of meat); and it is a fact about him that is not going to change, 
regardless of social outcry.
11. These familiarly gendered roles reveal the latent sexism of the film and resonate 
with Nietzsche’s overt sexism, revealing how little has changed in the more than one 
hundred years since his death. Although The Incredibles was billed as a feminist film and 
received accolades for the ostensible equality between the two married partners, the film 
nevertheless presents women as naturally inclined toward love, marriage, children, and 
domesticity. Although she may have once been Elastigirl, fiercely unwilling to “settle 
down” and “leave the saving of the world to the men,” Helen nevertheless seems to 
experience no conflict whatsoever in having exchanged superheroism for vacuuming, 
changing diapers, and picking up the kids from school. Moreover, the familiar tropes 
of woman as guardian of hearth and home who must reignite her husband’s wandering 
interest and boredom with the humdrum reality of domesticity show that “superness” 
is not only a literalization of Nietzschean greatness but also a stand-in for heterosexual 
male infidelity and midlife crisis behavior. The film only uneasily resolves these by 
threatening Bob with the death of his wife and children—more on this in the conclusion.
12. Says Nietzsche: “Every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering—in 
short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, 
actually or in effigy: for the venting of his affects represents the greatest attempt on the 
part of the suffering to win relief, anaesthesia—the narcotic he cannot help desiring to 
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deaden pain of any kind. This alone, I surmise, constitutes the actually physiological 
cause of ressentiment [resentment], vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain 
by means of affects . . . ‘Someone or other must be to blame for my feeling ill’—this kind 
of reasoning is common to all the sick, and is indeed held the more firmly the more 
the real cause of their feeling ill, the physiological cause, remains hidden” (GM, 3:15).
13. Buddy is engaged in this project from the very beginning—when we first meet 
him, he is showing off his new rocket boots to Mr. Incredible, who is unimpressed and, 
once again, tries to shake Buddy off. Recoiling from this rejection, adamant about his 
own greatness, and subtly denigrating Mr. Incredible even while hoping for praise and 
recognition from him, Buddy wails, “This is because I don’t have powers, isn’t it? Well 
not every superhero has powers, you know. You can be super without them. I invented 
these. I can fly. Can you fly?” As Nietzsche says, “The slave’s eye is not favorable to the 
virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and suspicious, subtly suspicious, of all the ‘good’ 
that is honored there—he would like to persuade himself that even their happiness is 
not genuine” (BGE, §260).
14. In Nietzsche’s terms, “the man of ressentiment [resentment] is neither upright 
nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints; his spirit loves 
hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, 
his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how 
to wait” (GM, 1:10).
15. As Nietzsche says about Christians: “These weak people—some day or other 
they too intend to be the strong, there is no doubt of that, some day their ‘kingdom’ too 
shall come—they term it ‘the kingdom of God’ ” (GM, 1:15). For Nietzsche, Christianity 
is the slave morality par excellence, and its will to power is manifest in its longing for 
the day when wrongdoers will be punished and the virtuous rewarded. On this day, as 
the saying goes, the last shall be first and the first shall be last. In Nietzschean terms, this 
means that the great shall be enslaved and the slaves shall rule. Notably, Nietzsche argues 
that Christianity’s triumphant overturning of natural hierarchy has been secularized in 
the movements for democracy and equality (“the democratic movement is the heir of 
the Christian movement” [BGE, §202]) and declares, “To us the democratic movement 
is not only a form of the decay of political organization but a form of the decay, namely 
the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value” (BGE, §203).
16. Nietzsche says: “Whether I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil 
eye, I always find them concerned with a single task, all of them and every one of them 
in particular: to do what is good for the preservation of the human race. . . . this instinct 
constitutes the essence of our species, our herd” (GS, §1).
17. Indeed, Nietzsche cites approvingly the “egoism” of the higher man and con-
sistently argues that condemnation of selfishness is yet one more way in which the herd 
limits and forbids greatness. For example: “At the risk of displeasing innocent ears I 
propose: egoism belongs to the nature of a noble soul—I mean that unshakable faith 
that to a being such as ‘we are’ other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to 
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sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question 
mark, also without any feeling that it might contain hardness, constraint, or caprice, 
rather as something that may be founded in the primordial law of things: if it sought a 
name for this fact it would say, ‘it is justice itself ’ ” (BGE, §265; cf. GS, §328, GM, 1:2).
18. Mr. Incredible, at least, professes ambivalence about his role as humanity’s 
savior. In his television interview at the beginning of the film, he laments with some ir-
ritation, “No matter how many times you save the world, it always manages to get back 
in jeopardy again. Sometimes I just want it to stay saved, you know? For a little bit. I 
feel like the maid. ‘I just cleaned up this mess. Can we keep it clean for ten minutes?’ ”
19. I owe this insight to Dan Conway, who generously suggested the line of analysis 
offered in this paragraph. Evidence of this decline is Mr. Incredible’s admission, after his 
complaint about humanity’s penchant for getting itself into trouble: “Sometimes I think 
I’d just like the simple life, you know? Relax a little and raise a family.”
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muggles, magiC, and misFits
Michel Foucault at Harry Potter’s Hogwarts
Jamie Warner
Welcome to Hogwarts! At this school of witchcraft and wizardry, magical 
boys and girls will learn to hone their potential in spell-casting, potion-
making, divination, and the mystical arts. They will learn how to fly on 
brooms, play Quidditch, and duel with wands, and they will be taught the 
proper way to greet a Hippogriff. Students will also be monitored day and 
night, their actions under constant surveillance. Anyone caught breaking the 
rules will be disciplined. Punishments can range from a loss of “house points,” 
needed for receipt of the coveted House Cup, to detention, suspension, a 
revocation of privileges, or even expulsion. Students will also be monitored 
at all times by the Ministry of Magic, who, through the Improper Use of 
Magic Office (a division of the Department of Magical Law Enforcement), 
will make sure that no underage witch or wizard performs magic and that 
no magic is performed in the presence of Muggles (nonmagical persons). 
Surveillance, discipline, and conformity: Never forget your place, young 
witches and wizards!
J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series—the story about eleven-year-old 
Harry, who, out of the blue, gets a letter informing him of his acceptance 
to Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry—has captivated literally 
hundreds of millions of people. As a franchise, Harry Potter is among the 
most successful in history. It is widely reported that by 2008 the number 
of books sold had surpassed the 400 million mark and the books had been 
translated into sixty-seven languages. The last movie, Harry Potter and the 
Deathly Hallows: Part 2, broke opening weekend box-office records around 
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the world with a total of $476 million in ticket sales.1 Harry’s adventures, 
leading up to the final battle with the dark wizard, Lord Voldemort, have 
caught the imagination of people across the globe. It is a phenomenon of 
epic proportions.
Potter is popular, but where are the politics? At the most explicit of 
levels, Harry Potter’s author, J. K. Rowling, provides her readers with the 
outlines of a political system. Not surprisingly, it looks much like her home, 
Great Britain, and thus there is  both a “Minister” and a “Ministry of Magic,” 
both very important to the story through the seven books. In the world of 
Harry Potter, this somewhat parallel political system is completely hidden 
to nonmagical people (“Muggles”).2 In fact, according to Rowling, wizards 
and witches have lived as a community within a community, with only oc-
casional contact with Muggles, since 1689, when the International Statute 
of Secrecy was signed.3
There are also plenty of less overtly and explicitly structural but still 
very “political” themes in the books, and many scholars have written about 
themes such as sexuality, gender, race, and more.4 However, one of the most 
critical and underappreciated aspects of the Potter series, as a broader work 
of political theory, is its presentation of different manifestations of power. 
Most obviously, there are the Nietzschean themes of power and ethics that 
are present in the struggles between Voldemort’s Death Eaters and the rest 
of the wizarding community (for example, Professor Quirrell’s claim at the 
end of The Sorcerer’s Stone that “there is no good and evil, there is only power, 
and those too weak to seek it”).5 Less obvious are the forms of power that are 
present in all aspects of the magic-using world, from the Ministry of Magic 
to Hogwarts itself. Such power structures directly reflect Michel Foucault’s 
concept of “disciplinary power” as put forward in his book Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison and allow us to hone in and analyze how 
power works on a deeper level.6 Specifically, using Foucault’s description of 
the disciplinary tactic of hierarchical observation not only leads us to see 
more depth and nuance in the texts but also gives us insight into Foucault’s 
ideas and our own “Muggle” politics.
The Panopticon: I Always Feel Like Somebody’s Watching Me
In Harry Potter and the Half Blood Prince, Professor Dumbledore argues that 
“Voldemort himself created his worst enemy, just as tyrants everywhere do! 
Have you any idea how much tyrants fear the people they oppress? All of 
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them realize that, one day, amongst their many victims, there is sure to be 
one who rises against them and strikes back!”7 Dumbledore continues his 
warning to Harry that Voldemort remains “always on the lookout for the 
one who would challenge him” and that therefore, through his magic and 
his minions, he maintains perpetual surveillance over the wizarding world. 
Voldemort’s goal is to identify those who might oppose him and punish or 
remove them, so as to create and consolidate his own position of power. 
Interestingly, although the Dark Lord Voldemort is the antagonistic villain 
who threatens Potter and his friends (not to mention the entire magical and 
nonmagical worlds), his attempts to monitor the world and conform it to 
his designs are not at all unlike the rigid structure and enforcement of rules 
at Hogwarts, where free will and genuine action on the part of students are 
actively suppressed and discouraged through the establishment of collective 
norms and values that are administratively enforced. In both cases power 
seeks to control toward conformity.
Before attempting to see how disciplinary power allows us a more de-
tailed and subtle discussion of power at Hogwarts, however, we first need to 
look more closely at Foucault’s argument. In his book Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault claims that a new kind of power has evolved, beginning around 
the eighteenth century, a kind of power that is excluded from traditional 
conceptions of power. This power is “mild, subtle, insidious and disciplin-
ary.”8 The liberalizing tendencies of democratic institutions in that period 
limited the overt and obviously repressive power of the king, the church, 
and the aristocracy (this time period, the late 1700s to the mid-1800s, for 
example, gave rise to both the American and the French revolutions) but 
masked the institutionalization of a more insidious type of power. We are 
implicated in it whether we realize it or not, in the sense that it defines what 
is “normal.” While this might not seem nearly as problematic as the poten-
tially limitless power of a king, it is even more dangerous, more powerful, 
if you will, because we internalize these definitions of normality and then 
police ourselves.
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault lists a series 
of disciplinary tactics, techniques, and procedures that were and are vari-
ously employed by various institutions since the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. This is not at all what we are used to when we discuss “power.” 
He does not mean an overwhelming show of military force or variations of 
agenda-setting by politicians but instead assorted methods of the spatializa-
tion of bodies and the timing, duration, and repetition of their activities, 
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the hierarchical observation of which has allowed us to both reward good 
behavior and punish the smallest of infractions (Sit up straight. Be on time. 
Work hard. Pay attention). These tactics are not necessarily original to these 
two centuries, but they became widespread as the growing institutions of that 
time period (factories, prisons, schools, asylums, hospitals, and government 
institutions) and the newly instituted social sciences combined to form a 
matrix of power-knowledge relations that climaxed in theory, according to 
Foucault, in the figure of the Panopticon.
The Panopticon was the architectural wonder of English philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham; it was designed to be a place where “morals [are] re-
formed—health preserved—industry invigorated—instruction diffused—
public health burdens lightened.” Such benefits, according to Bentham, 
could be derived “all by a simple idea of architecture.”9 This “simple idea 
of architecture” consisted of a central tower in which a prison guard or 
schoolmaster or psychiatrist or foreman could stand and watch each and 
every inmate or student or patient or worker. The cells would be arranged 
in a circle around the tower with only the side of the cell facing the tower 
visible from the outside. Each cell would also be backlighted so the body 
inside would be in plain sight of the watchman in the tower at all times. 
While the inmate or student or patient or worker could be plainly seen, those 
watching inside the tower would not be visible to those being watched. It 
would be impossible to know whether anyone was inside the tower watch-
ing at any given time. Bentham thought this to be the ultimate instrument 
of correction. Since those confined had no idea when or whether anyone 
was watching, they would eventually learn to internalize this external au-
thoritative gaze and police themselves: “So it is not necessary to use force 
to constrain the convict to good behavior, the madman to calm, the worker 
to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the 
regulations. . . . He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows 
it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relations in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection” (203).
Foucault uses the Panopticon to illustrate the effectiveness of this new 
type of power at its logical extreme. The Panopticon is also a metaphor for 
modern life. We have become, according to Foucault, a panoptic society. 
While the law has progressively limited the overt power of traditional insti-
tutions and recognized more and more people as equal subjects with rights, 
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this internalized panoptic policing of ourselves according to such disciplinary 
norms has worked to homogenize and then individualize us only according 
to the appropriate norms. From the moment we are born, we are constantly 
watched and measured against norms. We know what is “normal” for just 
about every behavior in society. We know the “normal” range for IQs, for 
hair color, for the height of five-year-olds, for classroom behavior, for sexual 
conduct, for responses to lie detector tests. There is intense social pressure 
to conform to the normal or risk exclusion as a case to be treated or a prob-
lem to be solved. On the whole, he argues, most of us submit to this social 
pressure to be normal and become our own jailers—modern, disciplined 
subjects. What, Foucault implies, is lost as we strive for normality? Persons 
who fail to measure up to these somewhat arbitrary, historically situated 
norms, purposefully or not, become the Other, the “abnormal,” and are 
excluded from society in prisons, asylums, and hospitals. There they are 
carefully watched, documented, and put through an even more strenuous 
regimen of correction and rehabilitation.
Hierarchical Observation, Real and Imagined
While Foucault argues that a myriad of small tactics and techniques, a 
“micro-physics of power,” are used in disciplinary power,10 one of the most 
important of these many and overlapping techniques is what he calls “hi-
erarchical observation.” I would argue that this is the lynchpin that holds 
the others together. It is done with the help of seemingly banal things, such 
as the placement of beds in a hospital or encouraging comments from a 
supervisor. According to Foucault, the very position of buildings, walls or 
half walls, doors, windows, and furniture can affect how people behave, 
because people act differently if they think they might be watched. As in-
stitutions began to be very aware of this principle in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries,
[a] whole problematic then develop[ed]: that of an architecture 
that is no longer built simply to be seen (as with the ostentation 
of palaces), or to observe the external space (cf. the geometry of 
fortresses), but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed 
control—to render visible those who are inside it; in more general 
terms, an architecture that would open to transform individuals: to 
act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry 
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the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, 
to alter them. Stones can make people docile and knowable. (172)
The institution of supervisory positions at institutions as diverse as facto-
ries and elementary schools (individuals who watch those below them and 
then are, in turn, watched by their supervisors) works the same way as the 
decisions about architecture that Foucault discusses. Many small, seemingly 
unrelated decisions, he argues, become geared toward establishing perma-
nent inspection: “Hierarchized, continuous, and functional surveillance 
may not be one of the great technical inventions of the eighteenth century, 
but its insidious extension owed its importance to the mechanisms of power 
that it brought with it. . . . It functions like a piece of machinery” (176–77). 
People are constantly watching and being watched.
We must not forget, however, that these techniques are not necessarily 
designed with the explicit goal of domination. Foucault argues that they do 
make people “docile,” especially if the power is successful and they internal-
ize the possibility of external gazes and then police themselves, but he also 
insists that these techniques make us “useful.” Foucault says: “Discipline 
increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and dimin-
ishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience).”11 This is not all 
bad. My classroom is a much more useful place for learning when students 
have internalized being watched in an educational institution—and thus 
aren’t texting and messing around on Facebook during class, for example.
Magic, however, has the power to create the ultimate Panopticon, 
surveillance beyond Jeremy Bentham’s wildest dreams (or Foucault’s worst 
nightmare). Foucault points out, “The perfect disciplinary apparatus would 
make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly,” and magic 
certainly has that potential.12 If we look at the Harry Potter series through 
this lens, we see many different methods of surveillance beyond that which 
is available in the Muggle world, starting right away in the first book of the 
series when the almost-eleven-year-old Harry gets a letter inviting him to 
attend Hogwarts. The letter is addressed not just to the house where he lives 
with his aunt and uncle, but specifically to “Mr. H. Potter, The Cupboard 
under the Stairs, 4 Privet Drive, Little Whinging, Surrey.”13 How would any-
one from Hogwarts know that Harry’s relatives make him sleep in a small 
broom cupboard under the stairs? When Harry’s Uncle Vernon refuses to let 
Harry have that first letter, more letters begin arriving, so many that Uncle 
Vernon nails the mail slot shut.14 Letters then begin arriving through any 
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available cracks in the house and the chimney; they follow the family to a 
hotel and finally to a shack on a rock out at sea, where Harry is at last given 
his letter in person. Someone must be watching.
Once Harry gets to Hogwarts, he finds a combination of both nonmagi-
cal and magical methods of surveillance. One of the most effective is quite 
nonmagical: the caretaker Filch and his cat, Mrs. Norris. They patrol the 
dark stone halls of the school to make sure that no students are making 
mischief or are out of their beds at night, and Harry and his friends spend 
quite a lot of time avoiding them. In fact, students at Hogwarts are watched 
in many of the ways Foucault describes in Discipline and Punish. In addition 
to being watched by Filch, they are also watched by other students, who hold 
supervisory positions such as “prefect” and “head boy” and “head girl” and 
who run constant surveillance. And then they are watched and evaluated by 
their professors academically in ways that all of us would recognize: lots of 
constant homework and tests culminating in standardized exams (O.W.L.s 
[Ordinary Wizarding Levels] and N.E.W.T.s [Nastily Exhausting Wizarding 
Tests]), the scores from which allow or refuse them entrance into certain 
professions upon graduation.15 In many ways, Hogwarts is a normal school 
with a mission like any other educational institution: to mold its charges 
into reputable and skilled individuals. Foucauldian discipline is working 
quite nicely.
But there are other ways students are watched at Hogwarts that are 
quite different from that which Foucault describes. For example, the halls 
are watched not only by Filch and Mrs. Norris, but also by the portraits that 
line the walls and the ghosts that inhabit the school.16 Once followers of 
Voldemort take over the Ministry of Magic, magical means of communica-
tion, such as the owl post and the floo network, are monitored.17 Students 
are watched outside of school, too. For example, the Ministry of Magic is 
notified as soon as a student performs underage magic, and in the final book 
of the series, a jinx is put on the evil Lord Voldemort’s name, so the location 
of anyone who uses it can be instantaneously traced.18 Aside from physically 
watching to ensure proper behavior, however defined, there are also magical 
ways to do more serious surveillance, not just surveillance of bodies and 
actions but direct observation of what is going on inside a person’s head. For 
example, the Sorting Hat, a hat that first-year students put on as soon as they 
enter Hogwarts for the first time, can see your most important qualities as a 
person, and it sorts you into one of the four “houses” at Hogwarts accord-
ingly: Griffindors (brave and daring), Hufflepuffs (hardworking and loyal), 
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Ravensclaws (witty and smart), and Slytherins (cunning and ambitious).19 
The Mirror of Erised will show you your heart’s desire when you look into 
it.20 More ominously, there is a magical truth-serum potion, called “veritas-
erum” that is used on one of Lord Voldemort’s servants by the Headmaster, 
Albus Dumbledore, and also on students by Dolores Umbridge, who replaces 
Dumbledore for a short but memorable time in the fifth book, even though 
the Ministry of Magic supposedly has very strict guidelines about the use 
of the potion.21 Perhaps the most interesting and important, not to mention 
creepiest, magical inner surveillance in the series is “Legilimency,” or “the 
ability to extract feelings and memories from another person’s mind.”22 It’s 
not as blunt as what we might call mind reading, as explained to Harry by 
his least favorite professor, the potions teacher, Severus Snape, but is still 
very effective:
Only Muggles talk of “mind reading.” The mind is not a book to 
be opened at will and examined at leisure. Thoughts are not etched 
on the inside of skulls, to be perused by any invader. The mind is a 
complex and many-layered thing, Potter. . . . It is true, however, that 
those who have mastered Legilimency are able, under certain condi-
tions, to delve into the minds of their victims and to interpret their 
findings correctly. The Dark Lord, for instance, almost always knows 
when someone is lying to him. Only those skilled at Occlumency 
are able to shut down those feelings and memories that contradict 
the lie, and so utter falsehoods in his presence without detection.23
This is very advanced magic, but because Harry is mentally and emotionally 
connected to Lord Voldemort through the scar Voldemort left on Harry’s 
forehead when he tried to kill him as a one-year-old child, Voldemort might 
also be able to use Legilimency on Harry from afar, even unknowingly.
Zones of Shade
Even with the increased number of ways to watch and thus influence and 
normalize behavior, the magical world of Harry Potter also provides an 
extraordinary number of what Foucault calls “zones of shade,” or places 
where the machinery of hierarchical observation fails, where one cannot 
be watched.24 These secret or hidden places work against the power of the 
Panopticon, allowing Harry and his friends ways to disrupt the power 
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structure, to plot and plan and rebel against the rules. Indeed, the entire plot 
through all seven books hinges on the fact that Harry is not “docile” and 
“useful” at all, but, because of his celebrity status as the “Boy who Lived,” the 
only person ever to survive the killing curse, he instead operates somewhat 
outside the parameters of “normality,” as storybook heroes often do. To do 
this, however, requires thoughts and actions that are shielded from the gaze 
of others, including both villains and well-meaning adults.
There are many, many magical ways to hide.25 Occlumency, mentioned 
in the quotation above, is a very important one. While Legilimency is the 
art of looking into someone else’s mind for hints of that person’s emotional 
state, Occlumency is the opposite: closing one’s mind down, shielding it 
from the gaze of others. The “great Snape debate” that occurs between 
the publishing of the sixth and seventh books—Is Severus Snape good (as 
Dumbledore insists) or bad (as Harry feels)?—hinges on Snape’s amazing 
talent for Occlumency, shutting out perhaps the greatest Legilimens of all 
time, Lord Voldemort, so he can operate as a double agent. In fact, Snape 
operates almost completely shaded from practically every gaze, including 
both Voldemort and the reader, for that matter, and not until the end of the 
last book do we find out his true leanings.
Although Snape’s Occlumency is crucial to Harry’s final defeat of Lord 
Voldemort, it is certainly not the only magical zone of shade. Two interesting 
and indispensable ways to avoid being watched come to Harry as Christmas 
gifts: the Marauder’s Map and an Invisibility Cloak. A gift from the resident 
mischief-makers and class clowns, Fred and George Weasley, the Marauder’s 
Map is a piece of parchment that shows all of Hogwarts, including secret pas-
sages leading into and out of the school. More importantly, it also shows, with 
tiny, labeled dots, the location of every person in the school. With the map, 
Harry is able to avoid those whose job is to watch. While the Weasley twins 
embody the spirit of the map, which is activated only when it is touched by 
a wand while saying “I solemnly swear that I am up to no good,” and use the 
map for silly pranks, Harry uses it for much more serious sneaking around.26
The Invisibility Cloak is given to Harry as an anonymous Christmas 
present his first year at Hogwarts (the unsigned note says only that it was 
originally his father’s and that Harry should “Use it well,” although we find 
out later that it was actually a present from Dumbledore).27 This zone of shade 
opens up an entire new world to Harry: “Suddenly, Harry felt wide-awake. 
The whole of Hogwarts was open to him in this Cloak. Excitement flooded 
through him as he stood there in the dark and silence. He could go anywhere 
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in this, anywhere, and Filch would never know” (205). This was a zone of 
shade like no other in that it was mobile, not only allowing hidden thought 
and activity, but allowing the wearer (or wearers) of the Cloak the freedom 
to move around undetected by the authorities. We find out in the final book 
of the series that it is actually one of the three Deathly Hallows, objects that, 
when united under one master, allow that person to master death.28 Although 
an advanced wizard like Dumbledore may be able to make himself invisible 
with a spell,29 young Harry and his friends use the Cloak on almost every 
adventure they have, from helping Hagrid, the groundskeeper, sneak his pet 
dragon Norbert out of Hogwarts in the first book (240), to allowing Harry to 
reenter Hogwarts during the final battle to fight Voldemort.30
In addition to spells and magical objects that allow one to operate 
unseen, the very architecture of Hogwarts works against the idea of the 
Panopticon, since it was built more than a thousand years ago, well before 
the time when Foucault argues that disciplinary power evolved.31 Even with 
all the magical ways to watch, normal day-to-day student life at Hogwarts 
seems to be more shaded than that of students in secondary schools in the 
United States. The hallways of Hogwarts, for example, are dark and mysteri-
ous, lit only by sunlight during the day or torches and the occasional wand 
at night. It is even a challenge for new students to find their classrooms in 
the daylight. There are 142 staircases at Hogwarts, “some that led somewhere 
different on a Friday. . . . Then there were the doors that wouldn’t open un-
less you asked them politely, or tickled them in exactly the right place, and 
doors that weren’t really doors at all, but walls just pretending.”32 While the 
outside of Hogwarts is hidden to Muggles by a spell that makes the castle 
look like a “moldering old ruin,” the inside also houses many unwatched 
places and thus, many secrets.33 There are many places to get lost—and to 
hide away from prying eyes. There are even places that Dumbledore himself 
admits to not knowing:34
Only this morning, for instance, I took a wrong turning on the way 
to the bathroom and found myself in a beautifully proportioned 
room I have never seen before, containing a really rather magnificent 
collection of chamber pots. When I went back to investigate more 
closely, I discovered that the room had vanished. But I must keep 
my eye out for it. Possibly it is only accessible at five-thirty in the 
morning. Or it may only appear at the quarter moon—or when the 
seeker has an exceptionally full bladder.
Muggles, Magic, and Misfits 157
Harry snorted into his plate of goulash. Percy frowned, but 
Harry could have sworn that Dumbledore had given him a very 
small wink.35
Dumbledore was talking about one of the most interesting hiding places at 
Hogwarts: the Room of Requirement. The Room of Requirement first ap-
pears in the fifth book of the series, after the arrival of another powerful gaze, 
Ministry bureaucrat Dolores Umbridge. Ostensibly, she is sent to become 
the new Defense against the Dark Arts professor, who will teach students 
the theory, but not allow them to practice, how to defend themselves against 
dark wizards. Soon, however, Umbridge is appointed by the Ministry to the 
post of “Hogwarts High Inquisitor.” According to the wizarding newspaper, 
The Daily Prophet, “This is an exciting new phase in the Minister’s plan to 
get to grips with what some are calling ‘falling standards’ at Hogwarts. . . . 
The Inquisitor will have powers to inspect her fellow teachers and make 
sure that they are coming up to scratch.”36 In addition to observing all the 
Hogwarts teachers and forcing them to stop teaching most practical appli-
cations of magic, one of her first big moves, a classic by dictators of every 
stripe to prevent dissent, is to disband, on threat of expulsion, any groups, 
teams, societies, clubs, and organizations that she has not explicitly approved 
(351–52). Harry and his friends want to avoid her panoptic gaze and practice 
magical defense. But where?
Dobby the House Elf provides Harry with the answer: the Room of Re-
quirement. According to Dobby, “it is a room that a person can only enter 
. . . when they have a real need of it. Sometimes it is there, and sometimes 
it is not, but when it appears, it is always equipped for the seeker’s needs.”37 
We find that Dobby has used it himself to allow fellow house elf Winky to 
sleep off hangovers, Filch has found extra cleaning materials there, and 
tricksters Fred and George Weasley have used it to hide from Filch (387, 
391). When Harry and his friends Ron and Hermione stand outside its 
supposed location and wish for a secret room where twenty-eight students 
can practice Defense against the Dark Arts, the Room of Requirement 
appears, complete with bookcases full of books, dark magic detectors like 
Sneakoscopes, Secrecy Sensors, and silk cushions on the floor to protect 
them when they practice stunning spells (390). Dumbledore’s Army (D.A.) 
is thus born, allowing Harry and the rest of the students a safe place to chal-
lenge the increasingly hostile scrutiny of Umbridge and the Ministry: “He 
and the D.A. were resisting under her very nose, doing the very thing that 
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she and the Ministry most feared” (392, quotation on 397). While the D.A. 
is eventually caught by Umbridge, it is only because one of the students in 
the group reveals the secret. Unless you know exactly what the room is used 
for, no gaze can penetrate. In the final book, after the Death Eaters take over 
Hogwarts, Dumbledore’s Army regroups and uses the Room of Requirement 
as a hideout and staging area for raids.38
As befits a story as complicated as the Harry Potter series, the Room 
of Requirement is not only used by the “good guys” to pull pranks or hide 
from menacing authorities like Dolores Umbridge; it is also used by Harry’s 
arch-enemy, Draco Malfoy, a fellow student who hides out in the Room of 
Requirement plotting the murder of Dumbledore for much of the sixth book. 
Harry knows that Draco is using the Room of Requirement, but Draco is 
protected from Harry’s gaze because Harry doesn’t know why Draco is using 
the room and thus can’t ask for the room to open for him.39 In the final book, 
we learn that the room was used long ago for its most sinister purpose: to 
house one of Lord Voldemort’s Horcruxes, an object magically transfigured 
to hold part of one’s soul. While that portion of soul exists, the maker of the 
Horcrux cannot die. This is dark magic indeed, as a Horcrux can be created 
only by committing the ultimate act of evil: murder. Voldemort made not 
one but seven Horcruxes and hid them in various places protected by com-
plicated and dangerous enchantments. The Horcrux he hides in the Room 
of Requirement, however, has no magic protecting it. Voldemort thought, 
mistakenly, that he had been the only one to find the Room of Requirement 
and relied completely on its ability to provide “shade” to this most important 
of objects. Unfortunately for Voldemort, the protection from Harry’s prying 
eyes was only temporary.40
Harry Potter and Political Theory
If Harry Potter had been a nicely disciplined subject, he would have been 
killed, Voldemort would be running the Ministry of Magic, and the Muggles 
would be enslaved. But like most heroes, Harry was neither docile nor useful, 
in Foucauldian terms. More specifically, if Hogwarts had been a “normal” 
educational institution, where the ability to watch—and thus control—stu-
dents was at a premium, Harry would have had neither the knowledge nor 
the skills to vanquish the Dark Lord. However, both the architecture of 
Hogwarts and the magical objects that were given to Harry (one by Dum-
bledore himself) provided zones of shade that allowed Harry the freedom 
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he needed to develop along a different path, to become supremely “useful” 
(you can’t get any more useful than defeating the arch-enemy), but in a very 
different way than the Panopticon normally allows.
Focusing Foucault’s theoretical lens on a make-believe world might seem 
like a waste of time, or perhaps just a disciplinary exercise designed to help us 
practice our craft. After all, Foucault was talking about our world, the “real” 
world, and there are plenty of things to argue about right here without talk-
ing about invisibility cloaks and rooms that can morph to fit your unspoken 
needs. I would claim, however, that not only does thinking about hierarchical 
observation, for example, within the context of Harry Potter allow us to see 
new themes in the books themselves; it also forces a fresh perspective when 
we look back at the world Foucault wanted us to analyze. I argue that finding 
magical examples of both surveillance and zones of shade shows both the 
applicability and the limits of Foucault’s analysis. By examining how well 
Foucault’s concepts and ideas match up in the world J. K. Rowling created, 
we can turn a more critical eye to the world we create every day.
It was remarkable to me to see just how many zones of shade exist in 
the world of Harry Potter, which begs the question about our own world. 
We don’t have the magical zones of shade that are available with magic, but 
the Panopticon has yet to be implemented in the seamless way that Jeremy 
Bentham hoped. There are still zones of shade where we can gather to think 
our own thoughts and learn new skills away from prying eyes. But are they 
disappearing? Think of the ways we can be watched today, with our consent: 
social media, No Child Left Behind, assessment reports, cell phones, video 
cameras at red lights, supervised or organized play. What does it mean 
that so much of our life is continually assessed by others, others who dole 
out rewards and punishments for those who docilely follow the rules? The 
combination of Michel Foucault and Harry Potter gives us much to ponder.41
Notes
1. See Guy Dammann, “Harry Potter Breaks 400m in Sales,” Guardian, June 18, 
2008, www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/jun/18/harrypotter.news (accessed November 
21, 2011); and Brooke Barnes, “Millions of Muggles Propel Potter Film at Box Office,” 
New York Times, July 17, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/movies/harry-potters-
opening-weekend-breaks-box-office-records.html (accessed November 21, 2011).
2. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (New York: Scholastic, 1997), 
53, hereafter referred to as Sorcerer’s Stone.
160 Jamie Warner
3. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows (New York: Scholastic, 
2007), 318, hereafter referred to as Deathly Hallows. For a detailed description of the 
explicitly political world that Rowling creates, see Benjamin H. Barton, “Harry Potter 
and the Half-Crazed Bureaucracy,” Michigan Law Review 104 (May 2006): 1523–38.
4. See, for example, Tamar Szabó Gendler, “Is Dumbledore Gay? Who’s to Say?” in 
The Ultimate Harry Potter and Philosophy: Hogwarts for Muggles, ed. Gregory Bassham 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 143–56; Elizabeth E. Heilman and Trevor Donaldson, “From 
Sexist to (Sort-of) Feminist: Representations of Gender in the Harry Potter Series,” in 
Critical Perspective on Harry Potter, ed. Elizabeth H. Heilman, 2nd ed. (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2009), 139–61; and Jackie Horn, “Harry Potter and the Other: Answering the Race 
Question in J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter,” Lion and the Unicorn 34, no. 1 (2010): 76–104.
5. Sorcerer’s Stone, 291.
6. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979).
7. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (New York: Scholastic, 
2005), 510, hereafter referred to as Half-Blood Prince.
8. Peter Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power,” Journal of Politics 54, no. 4 (No-
vember 1992): 993.
9. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 207.
10. Ibid., 203.
11. Ibid., 138.
12. Ibid., 173.
13. Sorcerer’s Stone, 34.
14. For those who are not familiar with the storyline: Harry lives with his aunt 
and uncle, the Dursleys, because his parents were killed by Lord Voldemort when he 
was one year old. Voldemort also tried to kill Harry, but his killing curse rebounded, 
giving Harry a very distinctive lightning-bolt-shaped scar and turning Voldemort into 
a shadow of his former self. Although Harry’s parents had magical abilities that they 
passed on to Harry, the Dursleys are Muggles, with a very negative view toward magic, 
which Rowling uses to start the series: “Mr. and Mrs. Dursley, of number four, Privet 
Drive, were proud to say that they were perfectly normal, thank you very much. They 
were the last people you’d expect to be involved with anything strange or mysterious, 
because they just didn’t hold with such nonsense.” Ibid., 1.
15. For more information on the standardized exams, see J. K. Rowling, Harry 
Potter and the Order of the Phoenix (New York: Scholastic, 2003), chap. 31, “O.W.L.S.,” 
703–28, hereafter referred to as Order of the Phoenix.
16. Sorcerer’s Stone, 132.
17. Order of the Phoenix, 612.
18. Deathly Hallows, 389, 445. Harry thrice gets in trouble with the Ministry for 
using underage magic: once that is actually Dobby the House Elf ’s doing (Sorcerer’s 
Stone, 20–21), once when he purposely inflates Uncle Vernon’s sister, Aunt Marge (J. K. 
Muggles, Magic, and Misfits 161
Rowling, Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban [New York, Scholastic, 1999], 29, 
hereafter referred to as Prisoner of Azkaban), and once when Harry does a patronus 
charm to save his cousin, Dudley, from a Dementor, for which he is tried and acquitted 
by the Wizengamot (Order of the Phoenix, 32–33).
19. Sorcerer’s Stone, 117–22.
20. Ibid., 207–9. Harry’s greatest desire was to be with his parents and have a family.
21. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire (New York: Scholastic, 2000), 
683, 517, hereafter referred to as Goblet of Fire. Also see Order of the Phoenix, 744.
22. Order of the Phoenix, 530.
23. Ibid., 530–31.
24. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 177.
25. To list just a few: Polyjuice potion can temporarily transform you into some-
one else. J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets (New York: Scholastic, 
1998), 205–26, hereafter referred to as Chamber of Secrets. You can also magically turn 
yourself into an animal (Prisoner of Azkaban, 349–57) or do the complicated Fidelius 
Charm, in which a secret is magically hidden inside someone’s soul until the “secret 
keeper” divulges it (205). Harry’s parents were betrayed by their secret keeper, which 
led to their deaths at the hand of Lord Voldemort. The headquarters of the Order of the 
Phoenix, 12 Grimmauld Place, was also under the Fidelius Charm (Order of the Phoe-
nix, 59–78). In the final book, Harry could not have done his tasks without the books, 
pictures, clothing, tent, and equipment that Hermione had fitted in her little beaded 
bag with an Undetectable Extension Charm (Deathly Hallows, 162).
26. Prisoner of Azkaban, 192.
27. Sorcerer’s Stone, 202.
28. Deathly Hallows, 714–15.
29. Sorcerer’s Stone, 213.
30. Deathly Hallows, 733.
31. Chamber of Secrets, 150.
32. Sorcerer’s Stone, 131–32.
33. Goblet of Fire, 166.
34. What exactly Dumbledore knows is quite interesting in the series. There are 
certainly times when he appears to know everything that goes on in the castle, which 
brings up an intriguing point: If he does know what is happening at Hogwarts, why 
does he allow dangerous things to happen to children?
35. Goblet of Fire, 417–18.
36. Order of the Phoenix, 307.
37. Ibid., 386–87.
38. Deathly Hallows, 577–78.
39. Half Blood Prince, 458–59.
40. Deathly Hallows, 620, 626–37. For a discussion of the Room of Requirement 
using another Foucauldian concept, heterotopia, see Sarah K. Cantrell, “I Solemnly Swear 
162 Jamie Warner
I Am Up to No Good: Foucault’s Heterotopias and Deleuze’s Any-Spaces-Whatever in 
J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter Series,” Children’s Literature 39 (2011): 195–212.
41. I would like to thank my “Harry Potter and Political Theory” class in the sum-
mer of 2011 for fantastic discussions and thought-provoking papers, some of which 
inspired my thinking here.
163
10
Feminism, sexism, and 
the small sCreen
Television’s Complicated Relationship with Women
Denise Du Vernay
This is so weird. It’s like something out of Dickens. Or Melrose Place.
—Lisa Simpson
Culture critics have argued about the stupidity and dangers of television 
almost since the advent of the medium. We’ve been warned against spend-
ing too much time in front of the “boob tube” or the “idiot box” so many 
times that we don’t even register the warnings anymore. Some of us read 
Neil Postman’s seminal Amusing Ourselves to Death in media studies courses 
in college. While his arguments were certainly persuasive, I distinctly recall 
being happy when I finished it so I could watch The Simpsons. We know 
the evils of TV: it makes us want to buy things we don’t need. The beauti-
ful stars and advertisements for beauty products make us feel ugly and fat 
(and, of course, watching TV makes us fat because it is a passive activity that 
frequently involves snacking, drinking soda or beer, and not much moving). 
It “rots your brain” in some other vague ways that my parents were never 
quite able to articulate. But the truth is that television has changed in the past 
two decades, making consumers susceptible to new attacks that even Neil 
Postman didn’t warn us about. The popularity of reality TV and the advent 
of the TiVo and DVR have made product placement the rule, whereas it was 
previously the exception in both reality and scripted shows. Clever editing, 
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alcohol, bribery, and sleep deprivation are used to create drama on reality 
shows,1 frequently to the detriment of female contestants and the image of 
women in general.
Reality TV is one reason why many feminists are compelled to focus 
on culture critique. Certainly, many feminists continue to strive for equal-
ity in the workplace, rally against funding cuts for women’s health services, 
voice anger and frustration against legislation designed to nick away at 
hard-fought reproductive freedom, and argue in favor of comprehensive sex 
education and many other issues. So, with all of these issues still nagging 
at the conscience of the feminist activist or scholar, why would one choose 
to study and discuss pop culture? Why waste one’s time analyzing televi-
sion? The reason is simple: while television shows generally do not depict 
accurate representations of human beings and the way society functions, 
they do affect culture. Even with video games and the Internet, American 
children are watching more television now than ever before, approximately 
four and a half hours per day.2 From television children learn about society, 
plus gender relations, power structures, sexuality, and even how to perform 
their gender. And what they’re learning consists of heteronormativity, sex-
ism, and even misogyny. Girls come in two categories: good girls and sluts. 
Women are gold diggers and not to be trusted. And they’re certainly “not 
here to make friends.”3
While reality TV is reinforcing negative stereotypes, creating gender 
wars and intra-gender wars, and persuading millions of Americans to buy 
products that share parent companies with the broadcasters, scripted televi-
sion, especially dramas, are telling a different story. In fact, past decades have 
seen two simultaneous, but very different, changes in television. Although 
the major networks offer too much in the way of cheap (and I mean that in 
all connotations) reality shows, scripted television has gotten smarter. Some-
times, these smart scripted shows even offer feminist messages and positive 
images of women. There are countless means an individual might employ to 
determine whether a show is feminist (how many female characters there 
are, what positions they hold, etc.), but for the sake of simplicity, a materialist 
feminist criterion is that if a show seeks to keep women “in their place,” it is 
an antifeminist show. Various tactics are used by television and other media 
to stifle women: using sexist language that reinforces to boys and girls the 
notion that being a boy is better, manufacturing a feeling of mistrust among 
women, and not allowing women to be sexual and condemning them if 
they are (often referred to as slut-shaming), while simultaneously showing 
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women and girls that their value relies on their appearance and whether or 
not men find them sexy.
Judged on the use of these tactics, most reality shows are antifeminist; 
fortunately, some scripted shows depict women as complicated, interesting, 
and not bound by traditional gender roles and rules of sexuality.
Feminism 101
The types of feminism seen and discussed (and often misunderstood) most 
often in contemporary American culture are radical feminism and materialist 
feminism.4 The variety of feminism that gives feminists an overall unsavory 
reputation is radical feminism, which arose in the 1970s and is generally 
considered antimale. An argument can be made that radical feminists are 
cultural feminists and that their analysis comes from “a reification of sexual 
difference based on absolute gender categories.” In other words, radical 
(cultural) feminists believe there are inborn qualities in being female or 
male and that this system “gives rise to a formulation of femininity as innate 
and inherently superior to masculinity.”5 This type of feminism relies on a 
specious belief in intrinsically feminine characteristics and also presupposes 
a sisterhood—a unification of women and girls based solely on their sex. 
This is a dangerous, essentialist view that also leads to exclusion of the male 
sex. Also, in light of contemporary neuroscience research that proves no 
measurable differences in brain function between the sexes, thus suggesting 
that most or all sexual difference is learned, there is no basis for believing in 
“femininity,” let alone the superiority of femininity over masculinity.
Most feminists are not this militant or negative, but radical feminists 
are the most vocal, especially on the blogosphere.6 In fact, the blogosphere 
has created derogatory words, such as dood and mansplain,7 which are 
used to attack men, often when they dare to chime in on feminist blogs. 
Name-calling seems counterintuitive and hypocritical to some global goals 
of feminism (haven’t women fought for years against being called “bitch” 
or being accused of having PMS every time they have a bad day?), but such 
attacks seem to occur more and more often on feminist blogs. Sadly, many 
people, especially misinformed men and young people,8 envision man-haters 
when they hear the word feminist in large part because of this vocal minor-
ity.9 The negative connotation prevents them from identifying as feminists, 
even if they believe in basic tenets of feminism (equal pay for the same work, 
family leave for both parents, inviting more women to golf at Augusta, etc.). 
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Negative connotations of feminism also prevent people from speaking out 
against inequalities large and small, including antifeminist television shows, 
for fear of being labeled a “humorless shrill.”
On the other end of the spectrum is materialist feminism,10 which 
“deconstructs the mythic subject Woman to look at women as a class op-
pressed by material conditions and social relations,”11 removing notions of 
feminine superiority. Materialist feminism takes its cues from Marxist theory 
and views feminism as political, begun in movements built upon changing 
the power relations between men, women, society, and the status quo. The 
goals of materialist feminism do not arise from a desire for women to take 
jobs traditionally held by men (that ideology is closer to what is frequently 
called liberal feminism), but rather for women not to have their sexuality, 
femininity, and fecundity decided for them.12 Materialist feminism is also 
good for men in that it strives to remove gender stereotypes regarding par-
enthood and jobs, for example (gone would be the expression “male nurse”).
Looking at women as a social class is inclusive and, in my view, produc-
tive: A materialist feminist isn’t looking for improvements only for women 
and girls, but for any group (or class) that has been held back. A material-
ist feminist strives for a lovely ideal, a society that assesses a person based 
solely on his or her character, education, experience, and other qualities, 
and not on skin color, attractiveness, biology, sexual orientation, or religion. 
A materialist feminist is not upset if a white man gets a job instead of, say, 
a woman of color, if the white man is truly more qualified. (However, the 
materialist feminist may question the system that afforded that particular 
man more educational and professional opportunities than his competitors. 
She or he would rather work to combat social and educational injustices than 
blame the individual who benefits from the situation. This is why people of 
all backgrounds, including white males, can be, and often are, materialist 
feminists).
Feminism and Popular Culture
Although the focus of this chapter is mainly television, pop culture is not 
limited to television, of course. There is no shortage of sneers among readers 
and moviegoers surrounding the popularity of so-called chick lit and chick 
flicks. Building on Susan Faludi’s seminal 1991 text Backlash: The Undeclared 
War against American Women, many feminist critics report that the pop 
culture of the 1990s and early 2000s is bad for feminism and is damaging 
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the progress that feminism made in the preceding decades, in that pop 
culture has expanded on the lie perpetuated by the media, especially news 
and business magazines such as Newsweek and Forbes, that women were 
rejecting feminism. The media actually invented a neotraditionalist “move-
ment.”13 Culture critic Susan Douglas points the finger at Beverly Hills, 90210 
(which began in 1990, followed two years later by its spin-off Melrose Place) 
as the program that started the new trend: when television stopped mov-
ing in the right direction. Previously, shows like Roseanne, Murphy Brown, 
and L.A. Law were challenging stereotypical notions of family, women, and 
femininity, and then along came some very superficial, rich teenagers, gluing 
teens to the TV and derailing progress. As British culture theorist Angela 
McRobbie states, “elements of contemporary popular culture are perniciously 
effective in regard to this undoing of feminism.”14 The perceived undoing, 
along with other examples of backlashes to feminism, is often referred to 
as postfeminism, although Douglas refers to postfeminism, perhaps more 
aptly, as “enlightened sexism.” Postfeminism deals with the pervasive idea 
that feminism has happened, that it has come of age,15 and that its work 
here is done. Douglas has renamed postfeminism through her discovery 
that this mistaken notion of feminism being over has opened the door for 
greater sexism in television: “Under the guise of escapism and pleasure, we 
are getting images of imagined power that mask, and even erase, how much 
still remains to be done for girls and women, images that make sexism seem 
fine, even, and insist that feminism is now utterly pointless—even bad for 
you.”16 As I will discuss below, enlightened sexism has opened the door not 
just for girl-on-girl hate but also for advertisers and countless television 
shows to use damaging sexist language without controversy or public outcry.
Of course, in reality the work of feminism is far from over;17 there is no 
strong, feminist society in danger of being toppled over by pop culture, and 
those who tend to announce that feminism has achieved its goals most likely 
do so out of a genuine concern that their power position is under fire or 
that equality might actually be accomplished. There is fear in their words.18 
Many men’s rights activists and conservatives who argue against feminism 
point to laws that make sexual discrimination illegal as evidence that there 
is no such thing as sexism and thus no longer a need for feminism. While 
feminists acknowledge and welcome such protections, one only needs to 
look at the relatively small number of women who hold powerful positions 
in government and business to realize that equality hasn’t been achieved. 
Specifically in filmmaking, the numbers are dismal. According to the Center 
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for the Study of Women in Television & Film at San Diego State University, 
in 2010, of the 250 top-grossing films, women wrote 10%, directed 7%, and 
made up only 15% of executive producers. In television, the numbers are 
perhaps better but still not equitable. In the 2010–2011 television season, 
22% of executive producers were women, 15% of writers were women, and 
11% of directors were women. Reality programs employ the greatest num-
ber of women in behind-the-scenes roles at 28%, with dramas at 25% and 
comedies at only 22%. Interestingly, of all television characters in that same 
programming season, only 41% were female. Perhaps if more women had 
creative and executive positions in television, there would be more female 
characters (and female characters of higher quality); we do know that shows 
with at least one female writer or creator feature more female characters 
than shows without female creators and writers.19
While these numbers are telling, the concerns shared by feminists 
regarding pop culture are not limited to the statistics. Previously, if femi-
nists were looking at pop culture, they may have been concerned with how 
many female leads there were in prime time, or which shows (if any) were 
LGBT-friendly; or they may have been conducting content analyses such 
as the Bechdel Test.20 Currently, feminist media scholars (such as McRob-
bie, Douglas, and Jennifer Pozner) have more subtle, nuanced criteria for 
determining the values and dangers in popular culture.21 As a materialist 
feminist, my concern is with how much of the popular culture, namely 
television, affects girls and boys in positive or negative ways and what the 
takeaway message and attitudes are. For example, how often do shows that 
are deemed appropriate for all ages have instances of slut-shaming or sexist 
language? Many shows (plus the ads that pepper the commercial breaks) 
perpetuate sexual double standards and use sexist language. These practices 
are so ubiquitous that much of the time we don’t even notice. At the time of 
this writing, a commercial appears frequently during prime time in Chica-
goland for a chain of convenience stores called AM PM. In one version, a 
dorky man is so proud of the burger he has made that he says, “Thanks for 
playing, ladies” to the two jockish men in the store with him. In the same 
vein, the “man up” series of Miller Lite commercials is even more offensive: 
they frequently feature babes in the roles of bartenders who disparage male 
“customers” for being too girly to deserve a Miller Lite. If a bartender in 
a commercial refused to give a Miller Lite to a man she deemed too black 
or too Jewish (or fill in any other characteristic here) to deserve the beer 
instead of too girly, an outcry would cause the ad to be pulled and an apol-
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ogy provided (and rightly so). Various comedians have taught us the rules 
of comedy: although the dominant group is fair game, you can only make 
fun of a group not in power if you are a member of that group. For some 
reason, however, women (and so-considered girly men) are not afforded the 
same courtesy. Most kids realize that it is not okay to call someone’s shoes 
or a math test “gay” or “retarded,” but girlish insults persist.
ABC’s sitcom Modern Family has it both ways in an episode entitled 
“The Musical Man.” The show makes a sexist-language joke and immediately 
points out that the joke is not fair. Upon hearing one male character bash 
another male character by implying his shirt came from a women’s clothing 
store, Gloria (Sofia Vergara) deadpans, “It’s funny because women are so 
inferior.” The viewer notices, of course, that she is not laughing. With her 
ample cleavage and oozing sex appeal, Gloria is not the obvious choice as 
the feminist voice of reason on the show, which might actually make her 
the best pick to deliver such a line.
So-Called Reality Television
The depiction of women and girls in reality television shows such as My 
Super Sweet Sixteen and The Real Housewives franchise gives children and 
teens the wrong idea—that women are not doing phenomenal things every 
day (or worse, that they don’t have the desire to).22 Reality shows tend to 
show women and girls that their value is in their looks (Toddlers & Tiaras 
and America’s Next Top Model), that women are catty backstabbers who are 
not to be trusted (the Real Housewives and Real World franchises, and most 
elimination reality shows, including even my personal favorite, Top Chef), 
that women who own their sexuality or who behave sexually for any reason 
other than to please or keep a man are sluts (The Bachelor and basically 
any show with a hot tub), and that women are gold diggers (The Bachelor, 
Joe Millionaire, and basically any show with a hot tub). Reality shows also 
perpetuate the belief that only heterosexual relationships are appropriate, 
including even MTV’s lower-class version of The Bachelor, A Shot at Love 
with Tila Tequila, whose entire premise was the star’s bisexuality. The com-
petition began with an equal number of straight men and lesbian women 
vying for Tequila’s “love.” In the end, Tequila has stated, the producers would 
not allow her to select the female contestant she wanted as the winner but 
instead coerced her to choose a man.23
Popular culture has a huge role in shaping the gender and personal 
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identification of children, which is just one of the reasons why popular 
culture’s offerings deserve scrutiny and analysis.24 Numerous studies have 
proved that people’s opinions about themselves and others are influenced 
by stereotypes and gender priming. Behaviors and performance of gender 
are not “hardwired,” as many pop psychology books would have us believe; 
rather, social identities are flexible depending on context and expectations.25 
Girls and women are encouraged to be sexy but given the clear message that 
it’s not okay to want sex or sexual satisfaction. If that doesn’t confuse a kid, 
I don’t know what would. In addition, studies have shown that adolescents, 
especially LGBT kids, turn to television and film for information about sex 
rather than to the adults in their lives.26 With many states offering no sex 
education (or worse, abstinence-only sex education), it is indeed disturbing 
to consider the messages children and adolescents are receiving regarding 
sexual behavior and romance.
If pop culture is discussed rather than just passively consumed, even 
media that do not offer feminist messages or characters can become teach-
able moments in feminism. As Andi Zeisler reminds us, pop culture is a 
“key route to making the concept of feminism—which still manages to 
send many women and men into a kind of nervous tizzy—both resonate 
and relatable.” Therefore, parents and teachers have unlimited opportuni-
ties and material to teach children and students about feminism on a daily, 
low-impact basis: no heavy lectures are necessary. Discussing with young 
viewers the attitudes depicted on a television show, for example, creates 
critical thinking skills and better consumers of pop culture; this is a much 
more practical and useful task than attempting to ban television and other 
media. Gender studies scholar Merri Lisa Johnson explains, “Pop culture is a 
ubiquitous part of our lives. It is therefore necessary to address it, to develop 
a reading practice that attends to its contradictions in content, its role in our 
lives, and in its attitudes towards feminism.”27 I would take the sentiment 
further and suggest that a study of the effects of pop culture is imperative.
Scripted Television
It takes some searching to find them, but many scripted dramas in recent 
years have demonstrated prowoman, feminist depictions. To be prowoman, 
the characterizations of female characters needn’t be without flaws; a real-
istic depiction of women as complex and interesting, flaws and all, is more 
desirable than characters who are too good to be true. Take Buffy (from 
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Joss Whedon’s Buffy the Vampire Slayer series): she is strong but sometimes 
vulnerable, intelligent but also occasionally guilty of hubris. She falls in love, 
struggles with authority, and has great clothes and hair. None of these things 
weakens her character or her role-model status because she is realistic (as 
realistic as the chosen slayer can be, in any case). Buffy had a good run, but 
it ended in 2003 and there hasn’t been anything like it since.28 Quality shows 
like Freaks and Geeks and My So-Called Life had short lives, but because of 
their honesty and realistic characters, they have enjoyed cult success on 
DVD and cable.
Today, there are scripted shows that do feminism and entertainment a 
service. Shows like Justified, Mad Men, Breaking Bad, and The Good Wife 
feature female characters who are complex with story lines that don’t revolve 
solely around relationships, motherhood, and other such acceptable female 
concerns.
In Justified, Margo Martindale plays Mags Bennet, the head of a crime 
family. She doles out the punishments and completes business transactions 
as swiftly as any man. By and large, her sex is not made an issue on the show.
Mad Men, a show almost as consumed by Don Draper as Don Draper 
himself, has an unmistakable feminist subtext, perhaps because the show 
has many regular female writers. The female characters (with the exception 
of Betty) are as interesting and complex as their male counterparts in regard 
to their concerns, talents, personal lives, and opinions. Pregnancy out of 
wedlock is depicted accurately as the woman’s problem; Peggy does not tell 
her baby’s father about the pregnancy until long after she has placed the child 
for adoption. Another character, Joan, also faced an unplanned pregnancy 
and has opted to be a single mother while keeping her corporate job. Issues 
of early-1960s sexism in the workplace are treated matter-of-factly, with no 
overt commentary about how it was wrong and backward; the viewer picks 
it up on his or her own.
Breaking Bad features two strong female roles, sisters Skyler White and 
Marie Schrader. Although much of the drama unfolds around their husbands 
(in the first two seasons, their roles are mainly “wife” parts), the character-
izations of Skyler and Marie are realistic, yet positive. Both are flawed, but 
both become heads of their respective households. In the case of Marie, it 
is out of necessity (her husband, Hank, is injured on the job and becomes 
despondent and childlike). Skyler analyzes the dangerous and complicated 
situation (that most sane people would run from, never looking back), puts 
her accounting and negotiating skills to work, and takes over: season 4 finds 
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Skyler in charge of a money-laundering business and giving direction to her 
husband on how best to handle their financial situation.
The Good Wife has a clever, ironic title that is, unfortunately, mislead-
ing: the show is not about a “wife,” and it is certainly not a “chick show.” 
The show’s main character is a woman, Alicia Florrick (played by Julianna 
Margulies), whose husband, Peter, a former Cook County State’s Attorney, 
is incarcerated for a corruption and prostitution scandal. Alicia, also an 
attorney, has been out of the workforce for many years to raise her two 
children, now teenagers, and finds herself a junior at a downtown Chicago 
law firm. That is where Peter’s importance starts and ends; his existence, 
problems, and return to politics are mostly an irritation in her life as lawyer 
and mother. The show is a courtroom drama in the spirit of L.A. Law, with 
its ripped-from-the-headlines cases and humor thrown into the mix, plus 
just a dash of Ally McBeal–style quirk and romantic intrigue (but, thankfully, 
without the whining, painfully short skirts, and unisex bathrooms). Alicia 
is similar to Skyler White in that she finds herself making tough decisions 
regarding her career, her marriage, and how to best run her household and 
similarly does not avoid issues that are ugly or hard to deal with. She also 
finds, like Skyler, that she had the vigor to do all of these things the whole 
time. Both characters have emotion along with strength; they are complex 
and interesting people. These roles make both shows a pleasure to watch.
Alicia is not the only interesting female on The Good Wife; Christine 
Baranksi plays Diane Lockhart, a senior partner in the firm. While her 
screen time is considerably less than some of the other players’, Diane is a 
striking character. On the surface, she embodies liberal feminism: she is a 
woman who plays in the old-boys club as well as any man. She is smart and 
ethical but sneaky when the situation requires it. Diane is very liberal, but 
not doctrinaire—if she were, she most certainly would not allow herself to 
fall for a conservative ballistic expert and shoot guns with him. Kalinda 
Sharma (played by Emmy winner Archie Panjabi), the firm’s investigator, is 
also written with due consideration of the complexity of the human female. 
In dark clothes and with her hair up, she wears what Panjabi jokingly refers 
to as Kalinda’s “boots of justice.”29 Yes, she is sexy, but it’s Kalinda’s mysteri-
ous personal life, backstory, surprising wit, and intimidating strength that 
make her the viewers’ favorite. Her character is bisexual, and, refreshingly, 
her sexual orientation is not sensationalized by the show. With the channels 
saturated by reality shows bent on slut-shaming, it is a rare delight to see a 
show that allows a female character to own her sexuality.
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Sneaky Sexism
Instead of diminishing over time, the phenomenon of slut-shaming seems 
to be growing in intensity. And certain television shows only serve to exac-
erbate the problem. As if the orchestrated fights and girl-on-girl make-out 
sessions on reality shows aren’t enough, shows on ABC Family (which, 
one would think, would be family-friendly) also serve to perpetuate sexual 
double standards.
On the surface, ABC Family’s Make It or Break It appears to break out of 
the mold we’re so used to regarding depictions of teenage girls as vapid, as 
serving as the butt of jokes, or as simply an important character’s girlfriend. 
In most sports-oriented shows, boys and men are the athletes and women and 
girls are the supporting mothers, wives, girlfriends, sisters, and teachers. Not 
so on Make It or Break It; the girls are the athletes, and they take it seriously. 
Yes, as gymnasts they spend a fair amount of screen time in leotards (but at 
least leotards are realistic and functional, not merely ornamental—awfully 
convenient, I know), but the fact that the show focuses on female athletes 
with boys in supporting, onlooker roles is refreshing. This is a show about 
the sport; the romances and family dramas are secondary.
What is troubling about Make It or Break It is the reliance on stereotypes, 
rich white privilege, and religious overtones. The first two seasons focused 
on four top gymnasts, all with Olympic aspirations, training together at 
a gym in Boulder called “The Rock”: Payson Keeler, Kaylie Cruz, Lauren 
Tanner, and Emily Kmetko. Payson is the sweetest and most innocent and, 
not coincidentally, the most likable of the group. She’s a fan favorite because 
she overcomes a back injury through hard work and perseverance. Unfor-
tunately, she’s also the one with the requisite crush on her coach (one of 
them had to have it). Kaylie (a Latina and the only minority lead character) 
is the former champion who battles an eating disorder (again, one of them 
had to). Lauren is blond, sexy, dangerous, and heartless; and Emily comes 
from trailer stock and is the only one of the four on a scholarship, so her 
actions are even more carefully monitored than the others (she is, after all, 
getting free money).
Their coach enforces a rigid “no dating” rule, which on the surface seems 
to be in the girls’ best interests; the goal is to keep their minds on training 
and the prize. Instead, however, the idea that the girls’ coach has ownership 
over their sexuality is disturbing and follows the same trend so commonly 
seen on reality shows: a woman’s sexuality is for everyone but herself. Lauren, 
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whose father is wealthy and is in charge of The Rock, frequently breaks the 
rules and is sexually active, but she manages to manipulate the situation and 
not get into any serious trouble, not unlike a certain former reality star and 
future heir of the Hilton fortune. When a new coach takes over, the dating 
restrictions are lifted, although they remain in place for Emily because she 
is not allowed to date under the terms of her scholarship contract. To honor 
the contract, she ends her relationship with her boyfriend indefinitely and 
has goodbye sex with him (her first time). Disturbingly, Emily refers to the 
act as something that she “can give him.” She doesn’t think to use protec-
tion because she doesn’t menstruate, but, of course, she becomes pregnant 
anyway. She is literally sent away to her godmother’s home, where she will 
have the baby. The message is that unless you’re rich, if you break the rules 
and/or “give sex” to someone not your husband, expect to be punished and 
maybe even banished.
Emily’s single mother, Chloe, has had her sexuality used against her as 
well. Because of her lack of education, she works as a cocktail waitress in a 
strip club. She attempts to keep it a secret for fear of embarrassing Emily, 
who eventually finds out. Chloe has previously been involved with Lauren’s 
father, Steve, but at the end of season 2, Steve is engaged to Summer, a re-
ligious woman who works for him at The Rock. Summer’s “values” (which 
seem to consist of maintaining her virginity and not much else) are a big 
issue on the show. Obviously, the woman with “values” deserves to land the 
rich husband much more than the single mother willing to take a job that 
requires her to get tarted up on a nightly basis in order to feed her family.
Getting beyond Female Competition and Slut-Shaming
Twenty years after Susan Faludi first outlined the tactics in the war against 
American women, many of our television shows continue to perpetuate 
negative stereotypes of women, advocate sexual double standards and 
slut-shaming, and discourage women and girls from trusting each other. 
These are the reasons why feminists and culture scholars are (and should 
be) examining American television. The general pop culture consumer 
is best served by taking a materialist feminist approach when choosing 
which shows to watch and how to frame conversations with others (espe-
cially children) regarding these shows. We should ask ourselves and others 
questions as we watch: How are power relations between men and women 
depicted? Does the subtext or the narrative strive to protect the status quo? 
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Are female characters punished for acting out against expectations placed 
on them (be they sexual, academic, economic, or related to appearance)? 
Are women shown to be backstabbing and untrustworthy? Does the show 
have a heteronormative agenda? How realistically are the characters drawn?
When asking these questions, we may find many of the answers to be 
disheartening. For example, the narrative of Make It or Break It, a show aimed 
at teenage girls, appears concerned with the Olympic aspirations of several 
hardworking gymnasts, but the subtext projects a heteronormative standard 
and a society that punishes women for their sexuality and rewards women 
who suppress it. This message coincides with the dominant messages offered 
by reality TV shows in which women’s sexual attractiveness is currency and 
female sexuality exists solely for the enjoyment of men.
Furthering the media-driven sexism, television dialogue and adver-
tisements achieve cheap laughs at the expense of women and girls with 
derogatory language deemed acceptable to the general public because of 
enlightened sexism. Each time a father tells his son that he throws like a 
girl or that boys don’t cry, and each time a man teases a friend about being 
girly or a coach calls his male athletes “girls,” a message is sent to anyone 
listening that being female is inferior.
Not all humor is made at someone else’s expense, but for a society that 
generally approves such humor if the butt is the dominant group, sexist 
humor is confusing and inappropriate. Although women and girls do not 
hold the majority of the power in any element of contemporary culture, 
from political office to film editing, antifemale jokes abound. Referring to 
this “enlightened sexism,” Douglas explains that the reason for the paradox 
lies in the media-created myth that feminism has accomplished equality for 
women, and then some, supposedly causing many women to be unhappy 
and unfulfilled with their liberation. The myths of gender equality and fair-
ness have opened the doors for mockery and wisecracks on television and 
film, which leach into everyday conversation to the detriment of women 
and girls. Such language affects girls’ self-image and even achievement 
while perpetuating ideas of male superiority to boys and men. Since boys 
understand that the worst insults they can dish out or receive are ones that 
compare them to girls, imagine how bad it must be to actually be a girl!
I wish there were a forecast in sight for the elimination (or at least a dip 
in popularity) of reality TV, but unfortunately, reality TV does not seem 
to be a passing fad. Aside from the obvious financial incentives networks 
have in producing reality shows, the public has shown itself willing to be a 
176 Denise Du Vernay
consistent audience. The Academy of Television Arts & Sciences has also 
given validity to the genre; reality shows enjoy many of their own Emmy 
categories, divided into two separate categories for competition reality 
shows and noncompetition shows,30 just as scripted shows are divided into 
drama and comedy categories. James Poniewozik, television critic for Time 
Magazine, stated in early 2011 that reality TV “is simply now another genre 
of TV, like sitcoms or dramas.”31
While all reality shows employ many of the same disturbing tactics to 
varying degrees, some are fairer in their characterization of women than 
others. In general, the talent-based competition shows where men and 
women compete more or less as equals are markedly less sexist and hetero-
normative than shows such as The Bachelor that pit women against women 
to win marriage or a man as the prize (although all competition reality 
shows manufacture tension and the “I’m not here to make friends” mental-
ity between female opponents especially, often through clever editing and 
sleep deprivation). Also, there are bright spots in scripted television such 
as in The Good Wife and Mad Men, shows with complex female characters 
who are permitted to own their sexuality and have personal and professional 
aspirations separate from marriage or motherhood. The popularity of the film 
Bridesmaids, which showed that a female ensemble cast can bring the funny 
(and the money), might also be a positive sign that more female-created 
and female-produced scripted shows will hit our DVRs in coming years.
And if those examples aren’t comforting enough, we can take solace in 
knowing that television indefinitely has Lisa Simpson to speak up on the 
side of reason, fairness, and tolerance.
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America is in constant conflict. On one side of the divide rests America’s 
political foundation—the philosophy of liberalism and the companion 
governing system of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy cherishes the 
Enlightenment values of reason, discourse, and compromise and ensures 
due process, checks and balances, and tolerance for a plurality of viewpoints 
and identities.1
On the other side paces the most successful, accessible, and identifiable 
product of American culture—the Hollywood action-hero movie. It likes 
to blow things up.2
Both are major national exports. Both are quintessentially American. 
And both . . . well . . . this country just may not be big enough for both of 
them.3
The action-hero movie values emotion over reason, intuition over 
empiricism, order over rights, uncompromising action over debate and 
due process, suspicion over tolerance, and the need for the violent oblitera-
tion of problems. The action hero does not redeem or validate anything 
fundamental about American juridical or political ideals or Enlightenment 
values. Rather, the action-hero genre repudiates foundations of American 
liberal political theory, reminds us of its inefficacies, and evokes a need for 
something different. But the action-hero movie is not simply or broadly 
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“illiberal” or right-wing.4 On closer analysis, the metagenre reflects a criti-
cism and prescription that is very specific, quite foreign, and fundamentally 
un-American: the legal and political theory of a German jurist—and former 
Nazi—Carl Schmitt.5
As explained below, the action-hero film reflects key elements of 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and prescriptions for sovereignty, and 
these reflections suggest a connection between Schmitt’s theories and the 
American psyche.6 Thus, an analysis of these films can provide a means to 
understand not only Schmitt’s positive and normative theories, but Ameri-
cans’ view of their own political and legal ideals as well. Significantly, the 
intersection between these films and Schmitt’s theories shows the complexity 
and fragility of a country where political and cultural ideals are in conflict.7
About Schmitt
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and his positive and normative theories 
on sovereignty and democracy have always been a source of controversy 
in political theory, but his work has received increased attention in recent 
years.8 In the wake of 9/11, some have argued that neoconservatives and 
others on the American Right have evinced a distinctly Schmittian influence, 
specifically in the justifications for enhanced interrogation techniques, the 
noncombatant status of terrorist suspects, and the right to take preemptive 
strikes against sovereign nations.9 Theorists on the Left have increasingly 
referenced and examined Schmitt’s views to show whether and how liberal-
ism and constitutionalism can withstand his unavoidable critique.10
But Schmitt is perhaps most entertainingly seen and examined in Hol-
lywood action-hero movies, from the Western of yesteryear to the superhero 
movies of today. To detect the reflections of Schmitt—whether in a political 
speech, a policy paper, or a movie theater—we will need a brief overview 
of his core concepts.
First, Schmitt’s works critique liberal constitutional democracy as a 
political framework that cannot resolve the problems of pluralism, preserve 
order, address existential threats, or prevent collapse from internal or external 
enemies. Schmitt argues that liberal institutions, with their faith in rational-
ity, openness, and compromise, are at odds with the reality of politics and 
the human condition and thus are ineffectual.11
Second, in The Concept of the Political (1932), Schmitt draws the “friend-
enemy” distinction as a basis for sovereign autonomy. The enemy is, “in a 
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specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that 
in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” and intense enough to 
become violent.12
Third, in Political Theology (1922), Schmitt sets out his famous principle, 
“The sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” At the core, Schmitt 
is stating that only the sovereign can declare the moment at which he is 
entitled to exempt himself from the law in order to address the existential 
threats to the state. The sovereign is free from the strictures that normally 
apply to anyone else’s legal power. He “stands outside of the normally valid 
juridical order and yet belongs to it.”13
Schmitt’s “sovereign dictator” stands in contrast to the “commissarial 
dictator” of Roman law. Rome’s deliberative body would appoint a temporary 
dictator to address a specific problem, and that person was legally com-
missioned to operate outside of the bounds of law to address the problem 
within set bounds of time and duty. Once the task was accomplished, the 
“commissarial dictator” would relinquish his power, and the normal condi-
tions of law and politics would return.14
Schmitt contends that crisis is the norm, not a temporary situation. 
Therefore, the sovereign cannot be constrained by law, because all political 
problems present the possibility of existential conflict. The sovereign must 
be free to determine when it is necessary to stand outside the law in order to 
preserve order or create a wholly new order. Liberal constitutional constraints 
like checks and balances are fictions glossing over this sobering reality.15
Mr. Schmitt Goes to Hollywood
A word about fictions: Schmitt’s concepts are clearly about the sovereign; 
however, the action-hero genre rarely deals with an actual sovereign (notable 
exceptions are Independence Day and Air Force One).16 The action hero is 
rather an agent of the sovereign or a metaphor for him—usually a sheriff, a 
policeman, a soldier, or a special agent—who possesses abilities and a status 
that place him in position to declare the state of exception and step outside 
the rule of law to eliminate threats.
In many comic book hero films of relatively recent vintage, the hero is 
not a state official. This “private action hero” is, like the main character of 
The Dark Knight or Iron Man, a superequipped (and superrich) vigilante. 
This plot could be interpreted as an allegory for antistate conservative theory, 
from libertarianism to anarcho-capitalism. However, careful review of such 
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films reveals a closer connection between the private action hero and the 
state. The private action hero typically acts at the behest of the state, in uneasy 
alliance with the state, or with the state’s reluctant permission.
Whether the protagonist is an actual sovereign, an official state agent, 
or a partner of the sovereign, the action-hero film can be broken down into 
key elements that evoke and illustrate the conservative political theory of 
Schmitt described above:
1. A hero who literally or metaphorically is representative of the sov-
ereign;
2. a villain who poses an existential threat to a community, can be 
deemed alien to that community, and can be eliminated only through 
violence;
3. ineffective liberal democratic institutions and actors who serve only 
to enable the enemy and are unable to resolve the problem;
4. a hero who is of the community yet outside of it and thus is able to 
understand the enemy and how to destroy him;
5. an escalating narrative conflict and climax in which the hero effec-
tively and essentially declares a state of exception in acting outside 
the bounds of the law to preserve order;
6. the intimation that continual threats are the norm; and
7. in the denouement, the conveyance of the hero’s distrust or contempt 
for liberal democratic principles and the suggestion of the need for 
a new order.
An examination of iconic and trendsetting action-hero movies, from West-
erns to superhero movies, can help explain Schmitt’s theories, provide a dif-
ferent insight into this genre, and aid in understanding the conflict between 
our popular culture and our political ideals.
The Western at High Noon
While the action-hero film evolved from other well-established genres, 
including war films, police procedurals, and comics, the dominant parent 
of the metagenre was the Western. The Western setting presents a backdrop 
ripe for the action hero: a fledgling, frail civilization on the fringes of sav-
age land constantly besieged by external existential threats from American 
Indians and internal threats of lawlessness.17
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Such threats were omnipresent throughout hallmark Westerns, such 
as Stagecoach (1939), The Searchers (1956), Rio Bravo (1959), and True Grit 
(1969). Not coincidentally, these films all featured the man who created the 
modern action hero: John Wayne. Wayne (with major assists from John Ford 
and Howard Hawks) transformed the action hero from a “perfect” and “pure” 
lawman into a “dirty fighter,” beginning the evocation of Schmittian ideas.18 
But while an understanding of Wayne and his films is important, a non-Wayne 
Western—one that Wayne loathed and against which he waged a personal 
war—more fully reflects the elements of Schmitt’s criticisms and prescriptions.
In 1952, during the Korean War and America’s Second Red Scare, High 
Noon was released. The most-viewed movie in the history of the White House 
screening room and a favorite film of presidents from Eisenhower to Clinton, 
High Noon displays specific Schmittian elements that became touchstones 
for all action-hero movies.19 The hero, Marshal Will Kane (Gary Cooper), is 
a state official—an agent of the sovereign. The enemy, Frank Miller (along 
with his gang), is an existential threat to both Kane and the law and order 
within the town. Kane once sent Miller to jail, ending an apparent reign of 
terror.20 But civilization’s processes and procedures have enabled the enemy. 
The fecklessness of liberal democracy is more overt than in previous genre 
films and lies at the root of the film’s conflict.
Will Kane. I sent a man up five years ago for murder. He was 
supposed to hang. But up North, they commuted it to life and now 
he’s free. I don’t know how. Anyway, it looks like he’s coming back.21
Later in the film it is noted that “politicians up North” saved Miller “from 
hanging.” The more general failings of the legal process are noted when 
ex-marshal Martin Howe gives the following reasoning for his refusal to 
fight the villains:
Martin Howe. You risk your skin catching killers and the juries 
turn them loose so they can come back and shoot at you again. 
If you’re honest, you’re poor your whole life and in the end you 
wind up dying all alone on some dirty street. For what? For 
nothing. For a tin star.
No one is willing to help Kane. Not even, it appears, Kane’s new bride, Amy 
Fowler (Grace Kelly), who reasons that she became a Quaker due to her 
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opposition to guns and violence, regardless as to who is right or wrong. She 
prays, “There’s got to be some better way for people to live.”
But there is not any better way in High Noon. The tactics Kane must use 
to dispense justice are those of base, lethal force that stand in opposition to 
reason, civility, and compromise. In fact, these latter ideals provide some 
with a convenient rationale for avoiding any action. When Kane comes to 
the church to look for deputies, the religious service turns into a democratic 
town-hall meeting (once the children are dismissed so as not to hear the 
“difference[s] of opinion”). Some people lobby for Kane to take action, others 
recommend that Kane leave and let the new marshal take over the next day 
to handle the situation, and others suggest that the “politicians up North” 
who caused the problem should save them. Accommodation of Miller and 
his gang is even advocated to avoid violent conflict and appease investor 
interests of the “North.”
But Kane knows violence is the only solution. While of the commu-
nity, Kane is simultaneously not of the community and understands how 
the enemy operates. The town’s debate resolves nothing, and Kane must 
take exception. Kane does reject earlier advice to arrest part of the gang so 
that he’ll only have to deal with Frank Miller, rationalizing tersely that no 
laws have yet been broken. However, that reasoning rings hollow, as Kane 
instead waits for the entire gang to arrive at noon so he can kill them all. 
And despite the clichés about the genre, none of them are killed in a face-
to-face showdown. Kane kills the first villain with a bit of misdirection and 
the second from a hayloft’s hidden higher ground. Kane’s avowed pacifistic 
fiancée shoots the third villain in the back. After she is taken hostage by gang 
leader Frank Miller, she claws at his face, providing a moment of separation 
to give Kane a clear shot at eradicating the final enemy.
At the end, there is no sunshine in High Noon. Clearly, the “dirty little 
village” of Hadleyville will be besieged by conflict again, without an official 
like Kane. Yet Kane rejects his office and symbol of sovereign status, tossing 
his badge into the dirt. He shows contempt for his community—an outpost 
of liberal democratic civilization that dithered, debated, and rationalized its 
way out of action and into a paralysis of fear.
Like all great art, High Noon is something of a Rorschach test. The movie 
is generally considered to be liberal, even subversive, and for good reason. 
The screenwriter, Carl Foreman, was a former Communist and a critic of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), for which he refused 
to “name names.” He readily admitted that High Noon was an allegory for 
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the events surrounding that episode of American history. However, viewed 
outside the context of the HUAC controversy, High Noon can be seen as a 
marked movement toward the Hollywood action-hero story that evokes key 
Schmittian illiberal concepts. But at the time, the movie didn’t sit well with 
conservatives, particularly John Wayne.
After High Noon was released to critical and commercial acclaim, Wayne 
took both political and cinematic action against the film. First, he publicly 
decried the movie as un-American, partly because Wayne had misunder-
stood the final scene, in which Wayne incorrectly believed Cooper crushed 
his badge beneath his boot. Wayne prompted HUAC to act against the 
screenwriter, and Foreman ended up blacklisted and in self-imposed exile 
from the United States. Even as late as 1972, Wayne was still priding himself 
for driving Foreman out of the country.22
Wayne and filmmaker Howard Hawks produced Rio Bravo (1959) as a 
purported cinematic response to Foreman’s film. While Wayne does get help 
from a ragtag bunch of townies and retains his badge at the end, Rio Bravo 
as well as Wayne’s other action-hero films are not exactly reaffirmations of 
America’s founding ideal of liberal democracy. Instead, Wayne’s films, from 
the ridiculous to the sublime, recall elements of Schmitt’s criticisms of liberal-
ism and prescriptions for sovereignty. On the ridiculous end, in an express 
attack on HUAC targets like Foreman, Wayne starred as a HUAC investigator 
who breaks up a Communist terror plot in Big Jim McLain (1952). The film 
overtly wrapped itself in the flag yet simultaneously disparaged America’s 
liberal constitutionalism, specifically Fifth Amendment protections that 
inhibited HUAC’s efforts to destroy the enemy.23
On the sublime side was John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, 
which pitted the conservative man-of-action (Wayne’s Tom Doniphon) 
against the liberal man-of-thought-and-words (Jimmy Stewart’s Ransom 
Stoddard). The liberal tenderfoot Stoddard believed that justice under laws—
not men—could tame the uncivilized. Like Schmitt, Wayne understood that 
the one who protects the law cannot be constrained by it. And between them 
was the town thug Liberty Valance (Lee Marvin). As Schmitt would predict, 
the enemy was the “other” who necessitated violent conflict and the state 
of exception. In the end, Stoddard gets credit for shooting Valance in a fair 
and justified showdown and setting the town on a course to civilization. 
But in actuality, Doniphon was the dirty fighter who truly killed Valance, 
committing “murder” by shooting Valance in the back.
Upon hearing the real story years later, a reporter utters the famous line 
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“When the facts become legend, print the legend.” A myth was necessary to 
justify the frontier town’s transformation into a liberal democratic outpost. 
But as Schmitt would argue, the various institutions of liberal democracy 
were ineffectual in the final conflict—whether the press (newspaper offices 
are destroyed by Valance), the political process (which Valance disrupts), or 
the feckless marshal (at whom Valance scoffs). All the talking, deliberation, 
due process, and democracy in the world wouldn’t have saved the town. But 
murder did. And the idea that liberal democratic civilization, represented 
by Stoddard, can provide peace and contentment is dubious—since in the 
ending we understand that the liberal institutions have been built on a fic-
tion, we feel Stoddard’s wife’s longing for the true hero and “murderer,” and 
we witness a funereal image of a “tamed” West.24
Good Cop, Dirty Cop
In 1971, amid political and cultural tumult, Wayne’s heir apparent Clint 
Eastwood came out blasting with Dirty Harry, and the modern action movie 
was truly born, combining character, structural, and thematic elements 
of the Western but leaving behind the time, setting, and trappings of the 
frontier and the cowboy.25
As Schmitt would critique, liberal democratic institutions (represented 
by the Mayor, the D.A., the Judge, Dirty Harry’s police superiors, and other 
bureaucrats) are unable to deal with the threat of an inexplicably evil enemy 
(the “Killer”). Only the brutal, uncivilized tactics of the hero, Dirty Harry 
Callahan, operating in the state of exception, can preserve that civilization 
and obliterate the countercultural enemy. As in High Noon and Wayne’s 
movies, deliberation and due process are ineffectual:
Mayor. I don’t want any more trouble like you had last year in the 
Fillmore District. Understand? That’s my policy.
Callahan. Yeah, well, when an adult male is chasing a female with 
intent to commit rape, I shoot the bastard, that’s my policy.
Mayor. Intent? How did you establish that?
Callahan. When a naked man is chasing a woman through an alley 
with a butcher knife and a hard-on, I figure he isn’t out collecting 
for the Red Cross.26
Torture and brutality are necessary tactics, and rights assist the enemy:
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Killer. (begging Callahan for mercy) No, no, no, no. Don’t do 
anything more. You tried to kill me . . . Please no more, I’m hurt, 
can’t you see I’m hurt? . . . Let me have a doctor . . . Please give me 
the doctor, don’t kill me.
  . . .
  I have the right for a lawyer, don’t shoot me, I have rights, I want a lawyer.
After Callahan’s torture and illegal search of the Killer, liberal democratic 
rules and institutions release him:
District Attorney. You’re lucky I’m not indicting you for assault 
with intent to commit murder.
  . . .
  Where the hell does it say you’ve got a right to kick down doors, 
torture suspects, deny medical attention and legal counsel. Where 
have you been? Does Escobedo ring a bell? Miranda? I mean, you 
must have heard of the Fourth Amendment. What I’m saying is, 
that man had rights.
The Judge agrees:
Judge. Now, the suspect’s rights were violated, under the Fourth and 
Fifth and probably the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Liberal constitutional principles and high court interpretations serve to 
protect the Killer and enable him to kill again. As Schmitt might note, liberal 
civilization helps the uncivilized destroy civilization itself. But Callahan, the 
agent of the sovereign who is both of the community and also not of the 
community, understands how to handle the problem.
Dirty Harry goes on to shoot the Killer dead—in defiance of his supe-
riors’ orders—by declaring a state of exception. To effectuate his role and 
duty, he cannot be constrained by the law. Callahan then tosses his badge 
away (like Kane’s final act of contempt for the dilatory liberal community in 
High Noon).27 The conclusion is that liberal constitutionalism, quite literally, 
must change. As Schmitt would suggest, the system is simply incapable of 
dealing with real-world conflicts, rationalizing them as containable through 
process. But Dirty Harry will need to return, because the Killer is a nameless 
horde, a constant existential threat to a new Wild West of urban America.
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Die Harder with a President
Of course, Dirty Harry did return, in many sequels and imitations, for the 
next two decades. By the 1980s, the cops and soldiers became increasingly 
specialized and supersized. But in 1988, the action-hero genre was rejuve-
nated.28
John McTiernan’s Die Hard took the Dirty Harry framework and inge-
niously tweaked the characters and settings by presenting a more humorous 
and human hero in an unfamiliar, confined location pitted against highly 
skilled enemies. But Die Hard and its derivations still display Schmittian 
elements. These heroes of these films, by dint of their official status and 
training, have an ability to take on the fight that few others would. Further, 
as in Dirty Harry, the hero of Die Hard, Bruce Willis’s John McClane, decides 
on the exception and refuses to be constrained by the law in his efforts to 
preserve order and destroy the enemy.
McClane (trying to arrest a terrorist). Drop it, dickhead. It’s the 
police.
Villain. You won’t hurt me.
McClane. Oh yeah? Why not?
Villain. Because you’re a policeman. There are rules for policemen.
McClane. Yeah. That’s what my captain keeps telling me.29
McClane proceeds to kill him and use his corpse to terrorize the team 
of primarily foreign terrorists led by Hans Gruber (Alan Rickman). Like 
most film terrorists, the villains of Die Hard pose a constant, asymmetrical, 
and somewhat inscrutable threat. And finally, like Dirty Harry, Die Hard 
recalled the Western thematically, textually, and symbolically—specifically 
High Noon. Exchanges such as the following between Hans and McClane 
expressly make such references—and show the Schmittian “other” quality 
of the enemy.
Hans. You know my name, but who are you? Just another American 
who saw too many movies as a child. Another orphan of a 
bankrupt culture who thinks he’s John Wayne . . . Rambo . . . 
Marshal Dillon.
McClane. Actually, I was always partial to Roy Rogers actually. I 
really liked those sequined shirts.
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Hans. Do you really think you have a chance against us, Mr. 
Cowboy?
McClane. Yipee-ki-yea . . . mother fucker.
Holding McClane’s wife Holly hostage, Hans takes aim at the modern-day 
cowboy, and the final scene from the 1952 classic is reenacted.
Hans. Put down the gun . . . Well, this time John Wayne does not 
walk off into the sunset with Grace Kelly.
McClane. That was Gary Cooper, asshole . . .
Hans. No more jokes, drop it or she gets it between the eyes!
McClane (slowly puts down his gun). Whoa, Hans, now you’re the 
cowboy?
Hans. “Yippe-ki-yea, mother fucker”? Now you are fucked.
McClane. Holly, now . . . !
Taking McClane’s cue, Holly drives Hans away with an elbow. McClane pulls 
out a hidden gun, shoots Hans, and agrees with Hans’s opinion that indeed 
Americans “are cowboys.”30
Other parallels to High Noon and reflections of Schmitt abound in Die 
Hard. Like Kane, McClane seeks help early on, but the Los Angeles Police 
Department is slow and cynical in its response and tries to rationalize and 
negotiate around the situation, just as the townsfolk of Hadleyville did. The 
press and the FBI, unlike McClane, misunderstand the enemy and provide 
more harm than help. Key narrative differences separate Die Hard from 
High Noon (and Dirty Harry), since McClane doesn’t reject his office at the 
end of the film. Rather, McClane seems truly duty-bound, wherever he is. In 
fact, the President may want to get McClane’s appointment book and crank 
up the threat level wherever he is, because enemies are inevitably nearby.
Of course, if the President took a cue from Wolfgang Peterson’s Air Force 
One (1997), he wouldn’t need McClane’s help. In this Die Hard derivation, the 
sovereign himself plays the hero. The film truly begins in a state of exception, 
with President James Marshall (Harrison Ford) delivering a speech in Russia 
about the violent overthrow of an apparent terrorist regime in Kazakhstan in 
which Americans and Russians got their “heads out of the sand” and “stood 
up to brutality.” No longer would there be negotiating with such terrorists or 
brutal regimes. President Marshall threatens: “It’s your turn to be afraid.”31
After the terrorists overtake the eponymous aircraft and hold the Presi-
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dent, his family, and his aides captive, the Leader of the Free World remains 
true to his “Be Afraid” speech, telling his Vice President at the White House 
via satellite phone “We can’t give in to their demands; it won’t end there.” Of 
course, the enemies, á la Die Hard, underestimate the President and utilize 
tactics that might persuade a more reasonable, compromising person to ac-
cede to demands. Back in Washington, the very reasonable, process-obsessed 
Vice President and Secretary of Defense, pondering how to proceed, seek 
answers in the text of the U.S. Constitution. Relying on the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, the Attorney General opines that because the President is es-
sentially a hostage under duress, he may be declared incapacitated and no 
longer Commander-in-Chief.32
However, the sovereign is oblivious to these constitutionalist inquiries 
as he takes action in the state of exception. Unlike the compromisers and 
legal positivists, the President knows the enemy can only be dealt with vio-
lently, and the sovereign himself does the honors. In the end, the President 
annihilates the enemy without act of legislature, without regard to possible 
constitutional limitations, and despite objections and calls for compromise 
(but with a little help from the First Lady, recalling Die Hard and High Noon).
For some obvious reasons, Air Force One may be the most Schmittian 
feature in a metagenre filled with Schmittian elements. Significantly, it pre-
saged the Bush Doctrine, neoconservative policies, and unitary executive 
theory memoranda of post-9/11 America. Perhaps, once the Schmittian 
action hero had moved from agent of the sovereign to the sovereign himself, 
the genre needed to rise to the fantastical heights of the superhero. And the 
next decade gave us more iterations of that species of hero than the previ-
ous one gave us Bruce Willis clones. However, the most successful of these 
films stood out with the most profound reflections of Schmittian themes.
From High Noon to Dark Knight
In Christopher Nolan’s The Dark Knight, the constant threat of the criminality 
and corruption of Gotham is augmented by a sociopathic terrorist, Heath 
Ledger’s Joker, whose crimes are inscrutable in motive. This enemy is truly a 
Schmittian “other”—the Joker has no physical, mental, or cultural connection 
to the community of Gotham—not even to the existing criminal element.
Police Commissioner Gordon, District Attorney Harvey Dent, and 
Batman coordinate to combat the “normalcy” of rampant criminality and 
terror through employment of various extralegal measures. The sovereign 
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agents of Gotham—even the judge, who orders a highly unorthodox mass 
imprisonment of thugs—effectuate a state of exception. But Batman is their 
public contractor in the area of law enforcement. He tortures, maims, and 
terrorizes in ways perhaps officials cannot but are willing to permit. Even the 
prosecutor, Dent, knows that the state of exception must always be declar-
able and that only overwhelming force can eliminate the criminal element.
Nearly all aspects of Schmitt’s theories are present in The Dark Knight. 
But perhaps most interesting, The Dark Knight questions, as Schmitt does, 
whether liberal constitutionalism can truly make sense in a real world full of 
senseless threats. As in Liberty Valance, the projection of undeserved hero-
ism onto the respectable, civilized official betrays the fundamental problem 
of liberal jurisprudence in handling the crises and chaos of real society. At 
the end, in an exchange between Gordon and Batman, the Dark Knight has 
his own take on the “print the legend” concept:
Batman. You either die a hero or live long enough to see yourself 
become the villain. I can do those things because I’m not a hero, 
not like Dent. I killed those people. That’s what I can be.
   . . .
  You’ll hunt me. You’ll condemn me. Set the dogs on me. Because 
that’s what needs to happen. Because sometimes the truth isn’t 
good enough. Sometimes people deserve to have their faith 
rewarded.33
Life Imitating Art Reflecting Political Theory
The Hollywood action-hero movie is remarkable escapism—escape to a place 
very different from our own lives and reality, a place where the frustrations 
regarding inaction in our political and judicial systems can be alleviated. 
Still, Americans might be concerned that this product of popular culture—
so exportable and identifiable around the globe—reflects criticisms and 
prescriptions that are so illiberal. The action-hero movie suggests in some 
measure that liberal democratic ideals are a dangerous fictional overlay—
an attempt to govern in a way that is at odds with the true normal state 
of affairs—and that Schmitt’s state of exception must lie at the core of our 
political and juridical reality.
Over the past forty years, presidential politics and policies have never 
been too far removed from both Schmitt’s influences and action-hero ref-
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erences.34 Recall Nixon’s admiration for Wayne, his repeated viewings of 
Patton before the bombing of Cambodia, and his declaration that “when the 
President does it, that means it is not illegal.”35 Both Reagan and Bush I had 
a penchant for referencing Dirty Harry when discussing economic policy. 
During partisan showdowns and the 1995–1996 government shutdowns, 
Clinton found strength in his viewings of High Noon.
Before his inauguration, George W. Bush half-joked, “If this were a 
dictatorship, it’d be a heck of a lot easier, just so long as I’m the dictator.”36 
Then came 9/11, and his administration provided legal and political cover for 
preemptive strikes and enhanced interrogation techniques and proclaimed 
the noncitizen yet noncombatant status of terror suspects, while Bush made 
“Wanted: Dead or Alive” quips lifted from the Western genre and a fighter 
jet carrier landing evocative of Independence Day and Air Force One. Perhaps 
these are unconnected clips. But these incidents and intonations over the 
past four decades can be spliced to show that not only our popular culture 
but also our politics and policies at some level repudiate our founding ide-
als and have more in common with an illiberal German jurist than we may 
want to admit.
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J. r. r. tolKien’s the hobbit, 
or, there and baCK again
Recovering a Platonic-Aristotelian Politics of Friendship 
in Liberal Democracy
Mary M. Keys
It is well known that J. R. R. Tolkien’s tales The Hobbit and The Lord of the 
Rings have been immensely popular with democratic audiences, from their 
publication in the mid-twentieth century to their ongoing adaptation for 
the big screen. Perhaps not well known, however, is the surprising extent 
to which these same stories draw from and indeed embody central insights 
in political theory, especially from the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. 
The narrative of The Hobbit presents contemporary readers with a literary 
view, fresh and wonderful, of property, justice, and friendship. One could 
even consider the story as offering readers a dialogue about justice and 
friendship. Made more delightful by the presence of protagonists who are 
hobbits, wizards, dwarves, and elves, The Hobbit “holds up the mirror to 
the only nature we know, our own,” as W. H. Auden wrote of The Fellow-
ship of the Ring.1 In its subcreation of “imagined wonder,” the narrative 
sets in vibrant (and pathetic) relief the core human aspirations of justice 
and friendship. In so doing, it can open our eyes to some possibilities and 
problems of justice and friendship in this world; to the interconnectedness 
of the two; and to the arguably greater value of the latter for persons and 
polities.2 I will emphasize these aspects in sketching the tale of The Hob-
bit, bearing in mind Tolkien’s caution to persons engaged in this sort of 
“scientific” enterprise against “ignorance or forgetfulness of the nature of 
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a story (as a thing told in its entirety), [which] has often led such enquirers 
into strange judgments.”3
We can only understand the extent to which these stories apply to our 
politics, however, if we appreciate the intellectual relevance of Tolkien’s 
stories, admitted by their author to belong to the genre of fairy tales or fairy 
stories.4 This chapter addresses the significance of Tolkien’s stories through 
a three-part exploration. The first part makes a theoretical case for the rel-
evance of fairy story to political science and philosophy based especially on 
Tolkien’s essay “On Fairy-Stories.” In this text, the master craftsman explains 
how he understands his literary art; its relation to reason, nature, and truth; 
and its value for human life. Among the functions Tolkien considers fairy 
story’s fantasy apt to fulfill, the one he terms “recovery” is of special impor-
tance for our topic here. The second part of the chapter reflects on Tolkien’s 
portrayal of property, justice, and friendship in The Hobbit, as an excellent 
example of this “recovery.” The final section considers what relevance this 
sort of recovery, facilitated by Tolkien’s fantasy, might have for citizens of 
liberal democracies today.
Fairy Stories, Truth, and Literary “Recovery”
If we ask what relation Tolkien’s fairy stories properly have to the study of 
political science and philosophy, the answer would seem at first sight to be 
“none,” for at least four reasons.
First, according to both common opinion and scholarly classifica-
tion, fairy stories are considered by definition children’s literature.5 They 
are written for, appreciated by, and perhaps at times useful to precisely 
that “class” of human beings who are immature, little educated, and too 
inexperienced in social and political affairs to be appropriate students 
of political science and philosophy. If Aristotle doubts the preparedness 
for political studies of most young people and perhaps even of most 
adults,6 he never even contemplates the possibility of teaching political 
science to children. From Plato’s and Xenophon’s works we likewise gather 
that, while older teenagers and young adults grouped around Socrates 
to engage his moral and civic dialectic, the first thinker “to bring phi-
losophy down from the heavens and into cities” was not a pied piper for 
youngsters aged twelve and under. And this concurs with contemporary 
common sense.
A second and related reason why Tolkien’s tales and political philosophy 
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seem poles apart has to do with fairies and the realm of faerie they are said 
to inhabit. Fairy stories are mainly about these imaginary beings and their 
imaginary principalities, and even about imaginary worlds. By compari-
son, the much-maligned city founded in speech in Plato’s Republic appears 
a model of social-scientific realism.7 Of all types of narratives, fairy tales 
most require of their readers a robust “suspension of disbelief,” or, put more 
positively in Tolkien’s own terms, a generous grant of “literary belief.”8 Both 
in the telling and in the hearing, fairy stories thus appear at polar opposites 
from scientific or philosophic inquiry and education and from the real-world 
polities studied by political science.
Third, one can easily conclude from what has been said that the sole 
benefit fairy stories offer to adult humans is mental and emotional relaxation, 
a temporary escape from the here and now, from the weight of grown-up 
responsibilities and concerns. The causes of fear and unease that we may put 
out of mind through indulging in fairy stories include social and political 
problems and possibilities, the stuff of citizenship and statesmanship as well 
as the matter for social science and theory. Tolkien’s tales may thus benefit 
some students of political science and practitioners of the political art, but 
only instrumentally and indirectly, affording them a mental getaway now 
so that they may study and work more energetically later. Fairy stories still 
seem to have no intrinsic value for more ennobling forms of leisure; they 
appear unhelpful for genuine learning about matters of serious human 
concern, including the social and political.
A fourth and very concrete reason to doubt that Tolkien’s tales could 
assist students of political philosophy is that Tolkien himself often appears 
little interested in politics, and even to think very little of politics, at least 
as we commonly use the word. This impression is conveyed most strongly 
in some of his published letters: “world policies and events” typically tend 
to “trample” rather than support ordinary human life and relationships; 
Tolkien’s own “political opinions” incline increasingly toward “Anarchy” 
or “ ‘unconstitutional’ Monarchy,” that is, to either the absence of formal 
government or the least political of Aristotelian regime types; a character 
named Denethor in The Lord of the Rings evinces the tragic flaw of having 
“become a ‘political’ leader,” “tainted with mere politics”; and Tolkien and 
his friends secretly undertake to “wean” a colleague from involvement in 
“politics (academic).”9
To appreciate Tolkien’s contribution to political philosophy, we need to 
find a response to these objections.10
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CHILDREN, GROWN-UPS, AND FAIRY STORIES
In a 1967 interview with the Sunday Times, Tolkien playfully reveals that 
his decision decades earlier to write and market The Hobbit as a children’s 
book was something of a front. Tolkien had observed that the critics, not 
to mention the children, tend to go much easier on children’s tales than on 
fiction written for adults (“OFS,” 37–38). Tolkien indeed wrote for children, 
including his own children, but not exclusively or even primarily: “That’s 
all sob stuff [about his intent to write exclusively for children or even for 
the private enjoyment of his own children]. No, of course I didn’t. If you’re a 
youngish man and you don’t want to be made fun of, you say you’re writing for 
children. At any rate, children are your immediate audience and you write or 
tell them stories, for which they are mildly grateful: long rambling stories at 
bedtime.”11 Tolkien’s is a more age-inclusive approach to the fairy-story craft.
Why should this be so? In “On Fairy-Stories,” Tolkien reasons that in 
the first place, children do not constitute a strictly separate class of readers, 
much less a “special kind of creature”; they are simply “normal, if immature, 
members of a particular family, and of the human family at large” (“OFS,” 34). 
He reiterates this basic view some three decades later, in his 1967 interview 
with the Sunday Times: “Children aren’t a class. They are merely human be-
ings at different stages of maturity. All of them have a human intelligence 
which even at its lowest is a pretty wonderful thing, and the entire world in 
front of them. It remains to be seen if they rise above that.”12 What normally 
differentiates children from adults is, on the one hand, the longer experience 
and the broader and more advanced understanding generally possessed by 
adults and, on the other hand, the greater humility, innocence, and capacity 
for wonder possessed by most children (“OFS,” 37–38, 42–43). Yet children 
and adult human beings do not have radically diverse tastes and desires.
As a matter of historical record, Tolkien notes that the most revered 
fairy tales, collected and revised by Andrew Lang and others as especially 
appropriate for children, were not originally children’s stories but were myths, 
epics, and tales told by adults for adults, or for an entire, age-inclusive com-
munity. More essentially, Tolkien maintains that fairy stories are one full-
fledged branch of the literary art. Like other forms of art, fairy story flows 
from and reflects certain natural human desires, not merely children’s desires. 
If fairy tales as a literary type are pitched exclusively to young readers, then 
the art form as a whole cannot flourish or reflect its essential humanity, and 
children and adults will share in the loss. “Fairy-stories . . . cut off from a 
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full adult art, would in the end be ruined; indeed insofar as they have been 
[so cut off], they have been ruined.” Conversely, just as the art of painting 
can be adapted for children and taught in simple terms to children but is 
perfected in forms best appreciated by adults who are possessed of wider 
experience and are more sensitive to depth and refinement, so too with the 
telling and hearing of tales:
If fairy-story as a kind is worth reading at all it is worthy to be written 
for and read by adults. They will, of course, put more in and get more 
out than children can. Then, as a branch of a genuine art, children 
may hope to get fairy-stories fit for them to read and yet within their 
measure; as they may hope to get suitable introductions to poetry, 
history, and the sciences. Though it may be better for them to read 
some things, especially fairy-stories, that are beyond their measure 
rather than short of it. Their books like their clothes should allow 
for growth, and their books at any rate should encourage it. (“OFS,” 
43, emphasis added)
One important way at least some adult readers can “put more in,” or 
bring more to the reading of myth or fairy tale, is precisely through their 
greater experience with and interest in social and political matters. They 
may well find that the reading of Tolkien’s tales revives their awareness of 
some puzzles of social and political life and theory, especially in the ethical 
dimensions of those puzzles.
REASON, FANTASY, AND “SUB-CREATIVE” ART
For Tolkien, identifying the proper readership of his literary genre opens 
the way to appreciating its “values and functions” for human life. Tolkien 
proposes that fairy tales offer “in a peculiar degree or mode” these four 
contributions: “Fantasy, Recovery, Escape, Consolation, all things of which 
children have, as a rule, less need than older people” (“OFS,” 43–44). It would 
seem that “fantasy” at least must be in contradistinction or even opposition 
to the rational activities of science and philosophy. Yet Tolkien places fantasy 
among the “rational not . . . irrational activit[ies]” of human beings (“OFS,” 
45n2). Precisely insofar as human beings are rational animals (as Aristotle 
famously argued), “fantasy is a natural human activity.” To flourish, fairy 
stories and their fantasy require sharpness and clarity of reason on the part 
of their authors and readers alike (“OFS,” 51).
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Tolkien’s use of the word fantasy is closely linked with his theory of art as 
“sub-creation.” Both flow from and give expression to our nature as human 
beings, as rational animals. Reason is contemplative and practical, directed 
toward both understanding and acting in accord with the truth of things. 
Practical reason’s scope in turn encompasses both doing and making; it is 
perfected by prudence and by art. In the latter capacity, we act upon and 
express our being “made in the image and likeness of a Maker” (“OFS,” 52), 
a God who freely and not of any necessity chooses to create as a manifesta-
tion of and for the sharing of love. The nature of created reason thus appears 
such that at least some human beings will want to employ it to direct their 
potent faculty of imagination in “combin[ing] nouns and redistribut[ing] 
adjectives” drawn from their perception of and speech about the real or 
“primary” world. In this way they can create, in a derivative, limited, yet 
meaningful sense, new beings and fresh or “secondary” worlds in speech. 
We know “green” and we know “the sun” as separate from one another in 
the natural or primary world. Through our imagination we can combine 
them to “create” in a literary sense, to imagine and to say and communicate 
“a green sun” (“OFS,” 46). We recognize “trees” and “humans”; a literary 
artist working with images and words joins their attributes to produce a 
wondrous world with “ents” or “tree-herds,” rational animals with many 
treelike features, evincing an unusual understanding of and concern for trees.
On Tolkien’s own account, it is important to grasp that this entish literary 
fantasy, to give just one example from the “secondary world” of The Lord of 
the Rings, requires the prior perception of and distinction between trees and 
humans in the primary world. The deeper the author’s understanding of real 
humans and real trees, the more “real” or “true,” consistent or compelling 
will be his portrayal of his novel literary creation. Tolkien thus insists that 
“Fantasy . . . does not destroy or even insult Reason; and it does not either 
blunt the appetite for, nor obscure the perception of, scientific verity. On the 
contrary” (“OFS,” 51). Fantasy’s excellence appears actually to depend upon 
this rational appetite and sharp sense perception. Faerie and political science 
are not natural enemies or absolute strangers; they share some common 
roots and ought at the very least to coexist in peaceful, respectful diversity.
According to Tolkien, the genuine goals of literary subcreation and 
fantasy do not involve delusion or manipulation.13 Instead, subcreative art 
should aim to craft a wonderful, desirable world in speech, intended and 
experienced as a genuine common good. Fantasy “uncorrupted . . . seeks 
shared enrichment, partners in making and delight, not slaves.” Freedom is 
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doubly of the essence of Tolkien’s fairy stories, for fantasy is founded on the 
“recognition” of real-world “fact, but not a slavery to it” (“OFS,” 50–51). And 
this once again applies to both writers and readers who seek citizenship (or 
at least asylum and safe conduct) in faerie. If the author of a tale is a master 
of the fairy-story craft, according to Tolkien an exceedingly difficult one, 
fraught with pitfalls and perhaps least likely of success among literary arts, 
the “secondary world” he or she fashions will possess an “inner consistency” 
that elicits many readers’ freely, even spontaneously given literary assent to 
the tale as “true” to that subcreated world and its laws.
Here some significant parallels emerge between Tolkien’s theory of 
fantasy and elements of especially Aristotelian, Augustinian, and Thomistic 
political thought. Fairy stories, like social and political relations, are by nature 
intended to strive for common or shared goods, facilitating friendships as 
well as just ordering and participation. They are to express and somehow 
protect the freedom that all humans by nature (according to Augustine and 
Aquinas, at least) ought properly to possess. In reading Tolkien’s theoretical 
account of his literary art, the student of political theory is thus invited to 
reflect on some influential accounts of the political science and art, as a spur 
to formulate or refine her or his own views. The roads of faerie and political 
science share common sources in human rationality, sociability, and speech.14 
Their respective aspirations and agents bear close resemblances: both fairy 
stories and politics are profoundly “social or human” activities, arts dealing 
with the sharing of common goods and the prospects of happiness.15
In Tolkien’s literary theory, there is another interesting, precise point 
where the paths of faerie and of political philosophy intersect, namely where 
fantasy (or fairy story or myth) is said to constitute “a human right” (“OFS,” 
52). It is a human right as an activity of human reason, a form of art or mak-
ing with its irreplaceable (and unpredictable) contribution of shapes and 
colors to weave into the grand tapestry of human existence. Some people 
will naturally find themselves inclined to desire, and hence to create and to 
enjoy such literature; and it is by nature right that they be permitted to do 
so, for their personal welfare and for the common good. This right is one 
part or expression, one aim, as Tolkien would have it, of the law instilled in 
the minds and hearts of humans, the primordial or natural law whereby we 
understand that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.”16 The 
law and the right once again bear witness to our being “made” and “mea-
sured” by a “Maker,” the archetypal artist who is also the most provident of 
legislators and a lover of freedom.17
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FAMILIARITY, “ARRESTING STRANGENESS,” AND “RECOVERY”
Tolkien’s definition of fairy story is bound up with “the nature of Faërie: 
the Perilous Realm itself,” home to elves or fairies and to many magical 
creatures—to wondrous “things not found within recorded time,” as he 
puts it in his poem “Mythopoeia.”18 Faerie appears to be for Tolkien either a 
synonym for or a species of the “secondary world” fashioned by subcreative 
art, an “indescribable, though not imperceptible,” and inescapably strange 
land containing some strange inhabitants (“OFS,” 13–15). If a story does 
not “use” or at least in some way “touch upon” faerie, if it fails to convey a 
feel for “the air that blows in that country,” then it cannot appropriately be 
called a fairy tale. Even if fairy story is considered to constitute or reflect a 
human right, there is still much about it that is foreign to our human experi-
ence, much that is for us “other.” I will argue later that even this “arresting 
strangeness” and the otherness of fairy story can contribute to our pursuit 
of political-philosophical wisdom.
Not all in faerie is foreign to us, however, as Tolkien is eager to em-
phasize. In terms of the content of the tale, he suggests that if it is well 
conceived and well told, we should find in its secondary world much that 
is familiar from our own human and natural world. Tolkien’s vision of fairy 
story depends upon faerie, but not on the inclusion of fairies [or elves] as 
characters, and certainly not as protagonists. In some significant passages, 
Tolkien underscores the humanity of fairy tales precisely as tales told by 
human beings to and for human beings. It is therefore generally appropri-
ate that the protagonists of these narratives should themselves be human: 
“Most good ‘fairy-stories’ are about the adventures of men in the Perilous 
Realm or upon its shadowy marches. Naturally so” (“OFS,” 14, emphasis in 
original). “In stories in which no human being is concerned; or in which 
the animals are the heroes and heroines, and the men and women, if they 
appear, are mere adjuncts; and above all those in which the animal form is 
only a mask upon a human face, a device of the satirist or the preacher, in 
these we have beast-fable and not fairy-story” (“OFS,” 19).
Tolkien underscores one “realist” cause for the humanity of well-crafted 
fairy story and its protagonists: we human beings, as both readers and writers, 
generally find our exploits and ourselves especially interesting. By contrast, 
stories actually about “fairies” or “elves” are “in modern English . . . relatively 
rare, and as a rule not very interesting” (“OFS,” 14). Affection is strongest 
when its object is both good and one’s own.19 One could also note that it is 
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proper to human beings to experience and to communicate their lives and 
those of others, factual or fictitious, in the form of narrative. The human 
being is by nature “the story-teller,” and our very mortality sharpens and 
adds urgency to our tales.20 Humans are not tied to the purely historical; we 
yearn for an eternal and transcendent good. Yet our condition as material and 
spiritual creatures imparts to our existence an inherently historical dimen-
sion, which in turn makes us tend to craft and to tell stories in myriad forms.
In this aspect of his vision of the fairy-story art’s foundation, Tolkien 
stresses again and anew its fundamental humanity. Tolkien likewise under-
scores the humanity of genuine politics and hence the necessary subordi-
nation of the narrowly political to the broadly human if politics itself is to 
achieve its telos. Tolkien locates the origins of the humanity of fairy stories 
in their arising from “certain primordial human desires” (“OFS,” 17) and for 
the satisfaction and further “whetting” or “enkindling” of these desires.21 He 
mentions explicitly the “primal desire at the heart of Faërie: the realization, 
independent of the conceiving mind, of imagined wonder,” “the desire to 
survey the depths of space and time,” and “[the desire] to hold communion 
with other living things” (“OFS,” 17, 19). In these desires human beings again 
appear as rational, desiring by nature to know universal truth; as social, 
desiring broader and deeper communication and conversation with others; 
and as artistic or creative, wanting to make beautiful and useful things—all 
within the proper yet ample scope of the finite mind’s “measured measure.”22
Considering the human desire “to survey,” to see and to comprehend, 
in its relevance to his literary art, Tolkien takes issue with Andrew Lang’s 
contention that children evince a special “wish to believe.” In his own ex-
perience, Tolkien has observed them rather as wanting to know.23 Tolkien 
further observes that they are especially desirous to know the truth about 
good and evil, right and wrong. Children are typically far more interested 
in this aspect of the truth of a story, at least in broad strokes (“Was he good? 
Was he wicked?”), than in knowing whether or not it actually happened 
(“OFS,” 38–39 and notes). As human agents are the chief characters in fairy 
stories and also in politics, so too in reading the one and studying the other 
the central questions we wonder about will commonly concern good and 
evil, justice and injustice, benefit and harm, happiness and misery, right 
and wrong.24
Besides the familiarity of these human dimensions, the fairy tale’s 
“secondary world” necessarily contains many natural things and artifacts 
recognizable from our real-world experience. Bread and water, earth and 
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sky, fire and ice, stone and sun, field and hoe, and a host of other familiars 
will normally be found in faerie (“OFS,” 14). The human artist cannot create 
ex nihilo, out of nothing, but rather must borrow generously from what is 
given him or her to perceive and to say. The literary master may then imag-
ine, refashion freely, and recombine properties, nouns, and modifiers, thus 
conceiving and crafting in speech new forms, new kinds, and new individu-
als. At the peak of the art of fairy story, the master craftsman can aspire to 
reveal the nature of the “old” or the given more perfectly through the new 
and imagined (“OFS,” 54–55). Even behind or within the novelty of fantasy 
and subcreation, if Tolkien is right, we can expect to reexperience familiar 
realities that we have already actually seen, heard, touched—and perhaps 
forgotten, or never really contemplated.
At this juncture, where fantasy’s “arresting strangeness” (“OFS,” 45) 
meets primary-world familiarity, we encounter another of the chief func-
tions Tolkien considers fairy tale to fulfill in human life. This task he calls 
“recovery,”25 and with its consideration we round out our inquiry into fairy 
story’s relationship with political philosophy. Long experience with world 
and art, with literature and nature, as well as perhaps with society and poli-
tics, brings with it “a danger of boredom or anxiety to be original,” to take 
for granted what has become too familiar, or to seek violently to refashion 
it, or even, one trembles to think after the tragic social experiments of fas-
cism and communism in the twentieth century, to “liquidate” it in order to 
attempt to make ex nihilo (“OFS,” 52–53). Tolkien affirms:
Before we reach such states we need recovery. We should look at 
green again, and be startled anew (but not blinded) by blue and 
yellow and red. We should meet the centaur and the dragon, and 
then perhaps suddenly behold, like the ancient shepherds, sheep, 
and dogs, and horses—and wolves. This recovery fairy-stories help 
us to make. In that sense only a taste for them may make us, or 
keep us, childish. Recovery (which includes return and renewal of 
health) is a re-gaining—regaining of a clear view. I do not say “see-
ing things as they are” and involve myself with the philosophers, 
though I might venture to say “seeing things as we are (or were) 
meant to see them”—as things apart from ourselves. We need, in 
any case, to clean our windows; so that the things seen clearly may 
be freed from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity—from pos-
sessiveness. (“OFS,” 53)
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If Tolkien is correct in his appraisal of fairy tale’s ability to assist in such 
“recovery,” then this literary genre ought to offer at least three forms of aid to 
students and the study of political philosophy. First and foremost, fantasy’s 
“arresting strangeness” may reawaken us to wonder at foundations and 
aspirations of society and politics that have long been buried under the ac-
cumulation of intellectual and political history, under elaborate institutional 
structures and forms, or hidden behind our daily business and boredom. 
In confronting these familiar realities in the foreign realm of faerie, we may 
experience them in all their pathos and beauty, their oddness, fearsomeness, 
and awesomeness. The human being, human faces and voices, rulers, citizens, 
and subjects, law, judgment, poverty, pity, counsel, exhortation, courage and 
cowardice, war and peace . . . these can be restored to our minds’ contempla-
tion by being more vividly and poignantly experienced through our senses, 
pricked by faerie. As the old adage goes, nihil in intellectus quod nisi prius 
in sensu (there is nothing in intellect that is not first in sense). The artist’s 
appreciative presentation of the particular and its uniqueness and value is a 
powerful prelude to theorizing about general kinds and abstract wholes. We 
cannot know fraternity unless we have experienced brothers or sisters, and 
the subcreative artist can re-present them to us if we have become somehow 
estranged. As Tolkien notes, “fairy-stories deal largely, (or the better ones) 
mainly, with simple or fundamental things, untouched by Fantasy, but these 
simplicities are made all the more luminous by their setting” (“OFS,” 55).
Second, even those readers indisposed to recognize in the fairy-story 
setting the mystery of the familiar may find their wonder aroused precisely 
by those strange, unfamiliar creations of the author’s imagination and speech, 
the “things not found in recorded time” or within the primary world as we 
know it. Over time, or even in an instant, this amazement may spill over 
or branch out to include the familiar. Persons may develop (or receive) a 
deeper and perhaps even habitual capacity for awe at the strange, largely 
unknown denizens of the world around them and thus come to perceive 
even very ordinary things in the primary world with extraordinary freshness 
and clarity (cf. “OFS,” 52–53). This is what Tolkien seems to suggest when 
he writes, “[In fairy-story, we] should meet the centaur and the dragon, and 
then perhaps suddenly behold, like the ancient shepherds, sheep, and dogs, 
and horses—and wolves” (“OFS,” 53, emphasis added). Likewise, through 
even a “taste” for fairy tales, we may find ourselves confronting human be-
ings and citizens, friends and enemies, wrongdoers and those wronged, the 
letter of the law and its spirit, as if for the first time, with a deeper sense of all 
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that we do not know about them and an intimation of why we should care 
about them. Thus the author’s fantastic fairy stories may, even precisely as 
fantastic, assist us in recovering some preconditions for serious social science.
Finally and significantly, Tolkien stresses that recovery entails a renewed 
appreciation for the otherness of persons, beings, and practices. The wonder 
evoked by fairy tale can effect in us a sort of spring cleaning of the senses 
and the mind, helping
to clean our windows; so that the things seen clearly may be freed 
from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity—from possessiveness. 
. . . This triteness is really the penalty of “appropriation”: the things 
[and persons] that are trite, or (in a bad sense) familiar, are the 
things we have appropriated, legally or mentally. We say we know 
them. They have become like things which once attracted us by their 
glitter, or their colour, or their shape, and we laid hands on them, 
and then locked them in our hoard, acquired them, and acquiring 
ceased to look at them. (“OFS,” 53–54)
It would seem that recovering our capacity to perceive others as such can 
help reawaken our sense of justice, as the virtue and the rule of actions 
that properly regard the otherness of persons and the things that are their 
due. If our gaze is fixed on the things and persons around us only insofar 
as they relate to ourselves, insofar as they are (or could be) ours, then we 
put ourselves at risk of glossing over justice or misinterpreting its require-
ments. Moreover, an awareness of “otherness” also properly undergirds our 
friendships: at the very least, it assists us in respecting the freedom of the 
friend, in fending off the excessive possessiveness that stifles relationships 
of justice and friendship alike. Even “another self ” is not rightly reducible 
to myself, is not strictly speaking “mine” or “me.”
The value for social and civic life and thought of this other-regarding 
dimension of literary recovery seems undeniable. Whether “the political 
good is justice” or whether the good of friendship is found to constitute an 
even higher “social and civic” aim,26 the fantasy of faerie and the wonder 
at otherness it evokes can assist us in appreciating and investigating anew a 
key aim of politics. As Wilson Carey McWilliams has written of The Lord 
of the Rings, Tolkien’s tales can assist “those citizens who would recover the 
habit of imagination, of moral clarity, and of political vision.”27 Fairy story 
likewise can help free us from an excessive (if natural) desire to acquire, to 
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appropriate others “legally or mentally” to ourselves and our self-regarding 
passions and ambitions. In this way too Tolkien’s fantasy can aid “humility” 
in representing to us the humanity proper to politics and political science 
(cf. “OFS,” 53–54).
Tolkien’s Hobbit and a Fresh Perception of Justice and Friendship
Such are the aspects of Tolkien’s theory of fairy story that seem most apropos 
of the study of politics. Yet one may well wonder whether Tolkien’s account of 
the “recovery” that fairy story can bring about is not exaggerated. This section 
considers one literary test case for Tolkien’s thesis: the fairy story that first 
put our author on the literary map, The Hobbit, or, There and Back Again.28
Tolkien indicates that The Hobbit presents to its readers an especially 
human and therefore for us a natural vision of the world and of persons, 
relationships, and events; in this it differs from The Silmarillion, where as it 
were divine, angelic, and especially “elvish” perspectives predominate, as well 
as from The Lord of the Rings, where the vantage point is midway between 
the elvish and the human, or rather a “blend[ing]” of the two.29 Tolkien also 
stresses that his hobbits “are . . . really meant to be a branch of the specifically 
human race.”30 Since politics likewise comprises a fundamentally human art 
and science, reflecting and elucidating the ways we humans understand, 
evaluate, and craft our common lives together both in and among our poli-
ties, The Hobbit is especially apropos.
The adventure of that most respectable hobbit, Bilbo Baggins, began 
with “an unexpected party” in his most respectable hobbit-hole. Bilbo was 
an experienced, grown-up hobbit, about fifty years old but with a youthful 
attitude. He was fond of parties and guests, for he was comfortably well off 
and took pleasure in sharing his leisure and his goods with others. In this 
case, however, his hospitality and his provisions seemed unusually, and un-
comfortably, out of his rightful control. Bilbo did not even know the thirteen 
dwarves who invaded his abode one afternoon, and their manners clearly 
did not measure up to Shire standards.31 He did know Gandalf, the wizard 
who, unbeknownst to Bilbo, had invited the dwarves, and who moreover 
had recommended the hobbit to them as their companion on the long and 
dangerous journey they were about to undertake.
The purpose of the expedition was the recovery of stolen treasure and 
the exaction of vengeance on the robber, one Smaug the dragon, who had 
cruelly murdered many among their family and friends or (for the younger 
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among the dwarves) their forebears and kinsmen and who had destroyed 
the dwarves’ great polity, the Kingdom under the Mountain. In the same 
assault, Smaug had devastated the neighboring town of Dale, once a prosper-
ous place inhabited by human beings. In short, the quest was about exacting 
and restoring justice, chiefly through the recovery of property.
Yet from the beginning, Tolkien tells this tale with an ironic and playful 
twist. Through the words and actions of various characters, the meaning 
and value of property, of the concept one’s own and hence also of justice 
strictly speaking, are repeatedly called into question.32 In recruiting Bilbo 
to help regain the dwarves’ lost goods, for instance, Gandalf is rather free 
with Bilbo’s own goods: not only with the hobbit’s food and drink, but 
also with his home. To tip the dwarves off to the location of the correct 
hobbit-hole and to jolt the unwilling Baggins into opening it, the wizard 
first scratches and later dents “Bilbo’s beautiful green front door” (30, 23). 
Gandalf thus seems curiously unconcerned about property, at least about 
what is due to Bilbo as proprietor. The wizard does express an interest in 
profiting the hobbit (19), although strangely enough in a conversation that 
repeatedly underscores the uncomfortably high chances of fatality entailed 
by the quest. Even the dwarves, desirous as they are of their lost treasure, 
tease Bilbo about his solicitousness for his household goods, composing 
this little ditty in his honor:
Clip the glasses and crack the plates!
Blunt the knives and bend the forks!
That’s what Bilbo Baggins hates—
Smash the bottles and burn the corks! (25)
Whereas Bilbo’s heart is especially in his household management, evinc-
ing perhaps the greater naturalness of his way of life, the dwarves’ thoughts 
are focused on the beautiful artifacts their people had made and on the once 
magnificent halls of their former dwelling under the Mountain. Their affec-
tion is given to “the beautiful things made by [mainly their own] hands and 
by cunning and by magic . . . a fierce and jealous love, the desire of the hearts 
of dwarves.” Their chief aim on this “errand” is “to claim our long forgot-
ten gold” (27–28), even before, it seems, avenging their dead—whence the 
double irony that, at Gandalf ’s prodding, they employ the most respectable 
hobbit available on account of his excellent credentials at “burglary”: why, 
when their “errand” is not theft but rather the reclaiming of stolen goods, 
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and when the hobbit they hire has an impeccably clean record? To Bilbo’s 
consternation at his new professional title, one of the dwarves replies: “You 
can say Expert Treasure-hunter instead of Burglar if you like. Some of them 
do. It’s all the same to us. Gandalf told us that there was a man of the sort 
in these parts looking for a Job at once, and he had arranged for a meeting 
here this Wednesday tea-time” (31).
Against both his better judgment and his self-preservation instinct, 
Bilbo meets the dwarves the next morning as they set off, and in so doing 
he seals the contractual agreement whereby “Burglar Bilbo” promises to 
assist “Thorin and Company” (named for the leader of the expedition and 
heir to the former Kingdom under the Mountain) in their peculiar, risky, 
and apparently shifty business venture. If they succeed, one-fourteenth of all 
profits (however defined) will be his; if they fail, all his travel and/or funeral 
expenses will still be covered by the “Company.” As they set off in search 
of the Lonely Mountain where Smaug now reigns from a heap of treasure, 
Bilbo leaves behind the goods and properties to which he is most attached, 
those material comforts his heart most desires and that land most possessed 
of his affections. He hopes of course to return to them, but for now he freely 
detaches himself from their secure enjoyment, albeit painfully and with 
difficulty, for the sake of an intangible adventure that he also, deep down, 
desires. The dwarves, by contrast, are moving ever closer to the properties 
they most wish to (re-)acquire, toward highly valued goods that are by right 
their own but not yet theirs to enjoy. This opposite interior movement along 
one and the same road may help explain the sharp disagreement concern-
ing the right and the good that erupts between Bilbo and Thorin at their 
journey’s end.
In principle at least, a friendship Aristotle would term “useful” has been 
formed between hobbit and dwarves.33 Their common business venture 
involves goods that they desire but could not attain unaided. The Company 
burglar is first called into action as such early on, when the Company is cold 
and famished in a forest and three trolls are found enjoying their stolen fare 
around a fire. Bilbo’s words and deeds in this affair raise further questions 
about what is owed, about justice in speech and in deed (45–53). Is Bilbo 
right to attempt burglary of trolls’ (stolen) gold and provisions, and if so 
on what grounds? Ought he to tell them the truth or (as he later opts) to 
mislead them regarding his companions or purported lack thereof? It seems 
possible at any rate that extraordinary circumstances can sometimes alter 
what one would generally judge to be another’s due, in speech as well as in 
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deed, and that one owes it to one’s friends not to compromise their safety 
unnecessarily. The fledgling friendship between hobbit and dwarves is on 
this occasion (and on many others that follow) tested and forged beyond 
the bounds of contract when, to succor his companions’ needs, Bilbo risks 
his safety to burgle other than the specified stolen dragon-treasure, and 
again when the dwarves on their part nearly perish in an attempt to save 
the captured burglar from the trolls’ cooking pot. Only with their mutual 
friend Gandalf ’s aid do they all (except the trolls) escape alive in the end.
As the “Company” continues its march and advances through dangers, 
the tale of their adventures and perils shows up more difficulties in ascer-
taining and achieving what is just. Some of these challenges again stem from 
the unusual circumstances surrounding the group’s quest and its setting in 
faerie. In one key moment, for instance, Bilbo finds a ring deep beneath a 
mountain, where a gang of goblins has carried him and his companions. 
(This is in fact “the One Ring,” as readers of The Lord of the Rings later 
come to know it.) Bilbo later learns that this ring “belongs” to a small slimy 
creature named Gollum, but since the latter evidently wishes to eat him and 
the ring proves magical and Bilbo’s only hope of escape, he judges it neces-
sary to keep it (but, significantly, not to use it to kill his unarmed would-be 
killer). In the course of their negotiations, the two engage in a high-stakes 
duel of riddles: if Bilbo wins, Gollum will escort him out of the mountain to 
light and safety; if Gollum wins, Bilbo becomes Gollum’s next meal. At one 
point in the game, Bilbo, flustered and afraid, accidentally asks a question 
that is not properly a riddle. Gollum fails to answer it, and Bilbo holds the 
game won; but has he really won, on fair or just terms? Bilbo’s benign intent 
compared with Gollum’s murderous designs does seem to justify altering 
the venerable rules of engagement, especially so since Bilbo did not intend 
to cheat; yet one still senses that Bilbo is not entirely happy with his conduct 
on this occasion. He would much prefer that things be done by the book, 
or rather in accord with the revered rationality embedded in an ancient 
custom; but necessity compels him to accept a less respectable result—and 
to take advantage of it to flee for his life.
Out of the mountain at last, Bilbo is reunited with his friends, who once 
again have escaped with Gandalf ’s help. To attend to other “business” of his 
own, the wizard soon leaves them, on the edge of the dark and perilous for-
est called Mirkwood, which they must cross to reach the Lonely Mountain. 
While they are lost in the forest, the group’s provisions fail. On the brink 
of starvation, they are captured by Wood-elves, all, that is, except Bilbo, 
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whose ring renders him invisible. Bilbo follows them to the elf-king’s forti-
fied palace. Here the dwarves are treated decently by the elves, yet they are 
imprisoned on account of the long mistrust between the two peoples. This 
mistrust, we learn, had its roots in an ancient dispute about property and 
about what was on one occasion due to whom. Elves interpret this event and 
its causes in one way, while the dwarves have an alternative memory and 
account. Neither view is verified in the story, but it seems likely that there is 
something (if not an equal portion) of the truth about right, but not justice 
entire, on each side.34 The narrator does imply that in this instance the elves 
may have been more at fault, because of their king’s somewhat excessive 
desire for gems and precious metal and for the honor a rich treasury would 
bring him, a desire more difficult to fulfill given that the Wood-elves do not 
mine or work metal and show no interest to learn. Moreover, the author 
writes that the Wood-elves tended to suspect or mistrust strangers. As a result 
of this unfriendly stance, the elves now misinterpret the starving “Thorin and 
Company’s” begging for harassment and even “crime” or assault. Knowing 
the elf-king’s liking for beautiful treasure (but not for doing the mining or 
working with metals and gems to make it), Thorin judges it unwise to tell him 
the whole truth about the quest that brought his Company to the forest. The 
dwarves land in prison, where they are at least well fed, while the invisible 
Bilbo is thrust back on a wearisome life of burglaring in the palace to keep 
body and soul together and to prepare to rescue his friends (which in the 
end of course he does). Differing and perhaps necessarily partial perceptions, 
excessive desires to acquire, and long-standing unfriendly mistrust hinder 
what is due from being ascertained and achieved throughout this episode.
The problematizing of property and, with it, of justice reaches its high 
point at the story’s climax. Thorin and Company reach the Lonely Moun-
tain with the aid of Burglar Bilbo. They steal into a secret entrance in the 
mountainside. Bilbo performs his famous function ably, managing first to 
lift a golden cup from under the dragon’s nose and later to engage Smaug in 
clever conversation with the aim of discovering a weak spot in the dragon’s 
armor, which he in fact does. But the immensity of the treasure hoard and 
Smaug’s keen sense of smell quash any hopes of even an invisible hobbit’s 
burglaring back the whole. Their Company does not appear to include any 
“warriors or heroes” capable of dragon-slaying, and Gandalf has not rejoined 
them. Worst of all, during Bilbo’s dialogue with the dragon, he momentarily 
lets his wit and daring go to his head, naming himself (among other more 
heroic epithets) “Barrel-rider” and thus revealing his recent association 
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with Lake-town, a settlement of human beings dwelling near the Lonely 
Mountain. Bilbo soon realizes his blunder and is humble enough to admit 
it to the dwarves. A friendly bird flies off to warn the town’s inhabitants of 
their impending peril and to tell them of the unprotected spot in Smaug’s 
jewel-crusted belly. At Lake-town Smaug meets his match in a warrior named 
Bard, but despite the dragon’s demise, the town is destroyed and one-third 
of its people perish. The rest are left in cold, hunger, and sorrow. The Wood-
elves come to the relief of Lake-town; and together men and elves in arms 
march to the Lonely Mountain, where the dwarves are presumed dead and 
the treasure available to compensate for so much unmerited harm. But 
instead they find Thorin and Company alive and well and reveling in their 
own recovered treasure.
Even before the arrival of Lake-men and Wood-elves announcing the 
dragon’s death, Bilbo was concerned about the dwarves’ covetousness and its 
likely consequences. A first foray into the treasure chamber had mesmerized 
his companions. They “cried out to one another, as they lifted old treasures 
from the mound or from the wall and held them in the light, caressing and 
fingering them. . . . They gathered gems and stuffed their pockets, and let 
what they could not carry fall back through their fingers with a sigh” (228). 
Bilbo also felt moved by the magnificence of it all and had in fact quietly 
pocketed the most precious gem of all, the Arkenstone. Yet the hobbit man-
aged to gather his wits and in the end to escape the treasure’s maddening 
spell. “Long before the dwarves were tired of examining the treasures, he 
became wary of it and sat down on the floor; and he began to wonder ner-
vously what the end of it all would be.” Bilbo reflected then that a warm and 
cheerful draught from a friend’s wooden bowl would really be preferable to 
a whole pile of the hoard’s jeweled goblets (228–29).
Maddened by the Lake-men’s claims on his wealth and infuriated by the 
mere presence of his former jailers, Thorin sticks to his (far-outnumbered) 
guns and especially to his narrow vision of the right. As heir to the Kingdom 
under the Mountain, he still assumes that the treasure comprises only his 
just and rightful inheritance. Never mind that the very hospitality of the 
Lake-men to the dwarves in their need, coupled with the carelessness of 
the dwarves’ contracted burglar, has led to a grievous injustice committed 
against the townspeople. Never mind that the Lake-man Bard has slain the 
dragon and so made the actual repossession of the dwarves’ property pos-
sible. Never mind that the dragon’s plunder under the mountain included 
goods stolen from the former men of Dale, from whose chieftain Bard had 
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descended. Thorin might eventually come to honor the last claim, and he 
would certainly pay his Company’s bills for their food and lodging in Lake-
town, once the elves and armed men had gone away. Yet he remains unmoved 
even by pity at such great human suffering, caused (albeit unintentionally) 
to others by his own quest. His passionate yearning for his own is too ex-
clusive and too powerful to allow him to open his eyes, freshly to perceive 
and so more broadly to understand just what under the circumstances is 
truly due to whom. “[The] lust of [gold] was heavy on him,” and the desire 
for properties “about which were wound old memories of the labours and 
the sorrows of his own race” (250).
So Thorin remains stubborn and a bloody conflict threatens to break 
out. Some of the younger dwarves are grieved, wishing they could “welcome” 
the elves and men “as friends” (248); yet they do not presume to contradict 
Thorin. Only Bilbo is confident that Thorin’s conduct is fundamentally un-
just and unwise, likely to harm also the dwarves themselves in the end; he 
is miserable, yet finally he hatches a plot designed to prevent such unneces-
sary strife and bloodshed. His leverage comes once again from his burglary, 
specifically of the Arkenstone, which belonged to Thorin’s grandfather and 
which the dwarf-king desires above all else. Bilbo initially reasoned, or rather 
rationalized, that his pocketing the gem was justified by Thorin’s promise 
to let him choose his own fourteenth-share of the treasure; but Bilbo’s con-
science still bothered him. He might well have returned it earlier but for fear 
of Thorin’s rage. Now, however, the situation has become so extreme that 
Bilbo’s courage is roused, and he decides to deliver the Arkenstone over to 
the other side for them to barter with. He does this not to betray his friends 
but to save them, King Thorin included, from Midas’s curse and from com-
mitting injustice against others. The exact attribution of property in the 
Arkenstone is no longer of prime importance; at this moment, moreover, it 
is difficult even to determine to whom it really belongs.
Bilbo, not without a shudder, not without a glance of longing, 
handed the marvelous stone to Bard, and he held it in his hand, as 
though dazed.
“But how is it yours to give?” he asked at last with an effort.
“O well!” said the hobbit uncomfortably. “It isn’t exactly; but, 
well, I am willing to let it stand against my claim, don’t you know. 
I may be a burglar—or so they say; personally I never really felt 
like one—but I am an honest one, I hope, more or less. Anyway I 
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am going back now, and the dwarves can do what they like to me. 
I hope you will find it useful. . . . I don’t think I ought to leave my 
friends like this [by remaining safely with the elves and men], after 
all we have gone through together.” (257–58)
Gandalf is in the camp disguised as an old man and overhears all this; 
he warmly approves of Bilbo’s deed. Thorin, however, is enraged and rejects 
Bilbo utterly as a traitor: “Take him, if you wish him to live; and no friend-
ship of mine goes with him” (262). Yet after a surprise assault by a powerful 
common enemy at last unites dwarves, elves, and humans in a common 
cause, Thorin and Bilbo finally do part in friendship and a more just, indeed 
generous distribution of goods is achieved at Thorin’s own behest. Thorin 
has fought bravely in the common defense and been grievously wounded. 
He lies dying under the Lonely Mountain and takes his leave of the reha-
bilitated Company Burglar:
“Farewell, good thief,” [Thorin] said [to Burglar Bilbo]. . . . “I go 
now to the halls of waiting to sit beside my fathers, until the world 
is renewed. Since I leave now all gold and silver, and go to where it 
is of little worth, I wish to part in friendship from you, and I would 
take back my words and deeds at the Gate. . . . There is more in 
you of good than you know. . . . Some courage and some wisdom, 
blended in measure. If more of us valued food and cheer and song 
above hoarded gold, it would be a merrier world. But sad or merry, 
I must leave it now. Farewell!” (272–73)
Bilbo in turn takes his leave of Thorin, thanking him for the undeserved 
privilege of sharing in his perils, for which the hobbit is grateful. Then Bilbo 
weeps long and bitterly for Thorin’s death, confirming what the reader has 
increasingly noticed as the story has progressed: that the hobbit rather easily 
has come to care more for his companions for their own sakes than for the 
adventure they shared with him and that facilitated their friendship, and 
much more than for the reward they had contracted to pay him. Bilbo’s ability 
at the story’s outset to distance himself from his property and to share his 
possessions through hospitality, even with uninvited guests at “an unexpected 
party,” foreshadows both his openness to new insights concerning justice and, 
especially, his affinity to form fuller friendships. Bilbo easily transcends the 
useful, chiefly instrumental friendship their business contract began, and 
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the attitude of deeper friendliness that he cultivates opens for him a fuller 
perspective on justice than mere compact or strict legal due could afford.
Throughout the journey Bilbo has likewise come to realize more and 
more his dependence for a meaningful life on society with particularly close 
friends, even as he matures and becomes more confident of his own abilities. 
Midway through the quest, Bilbo finds himself for the first time lost and 
alone in the forest. He kills an attacking giant spider with his small sword 
and feels “much fiercer and bolder” than ever before. Yet his first thought 
after the victory is for his missing friends and how to find them. He muses, 
“What a mess we are in now! We! I only wish it was we: it is horrible being 
all alone” (154, emphasis in original). Later on, while the dwarves are locked 
in the Wood-elves’ jail cells, Bilbo sometimes uses his invisible ring to slip 
out of the palace gates and explore the forest. But this is risky business, wan-
dering alone in the woods, incapable of hunting and uncertain of finding 
and reentering the hidden palace. So “when [Bilbo] did go out, which was 
not very often, he did no good. He did not wish to desert the dwarves, and 
indeed he did not know where in the world to go without them” (169). And 
when he organizes their escape with the help of his new ring, it is a fully 
common venture: “We must all keep together and not risk getting separated. 
All of us must escape or none” (174).
Gollum, by contrast, the previous owner of the ring as we encounter 
him in The Hobbit, has chosen or at least resigned himself to a solitary life. 
There has long been for him no meaningful “other,” neither a friend with 
whom to converse or share things that are good, nor even simply an indi-
vidual apart from himself to whom to render what is her or his due. Even 
Gollum cannot live completely without conversation, so he objectifies him-
self and converses with that imaginary or pseudo-other, his pseudo-friend, 
“my precious.” Genuine others like Bilbo are reduced to mere curiosities 
or even to foodstuffs. Outside of himself, only a useful, inanimate object 
has value for Gollum: the ring, perceived and desired as a purely private 
good, also personified and referred to as “my precious [present].”35 He is 
anxious to appear friendly to Bilbo for a time, but not to make a friend nor 
even to persevere in external affability longer than suits him.36 Thorin, in 
an analogous though much less extreme manner, has only a reduced group 
of friends, or kinsmen, with whom he is willing to share his treasure; and 
he is for a while so focused on that external good that he cannot properly 
perceive even those select friends as others, as persons existing apart from 
himself and his desire. He thus cannot clearly conceive their good nor 
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determine what is really their due. The pathos comes full circle in that as a 
consequence Thorin cannot judge rightly what is his own, until misfortune 
strikes hard and he at last lets his eyes be opened. Whether the wretched 
and now ringless Gollum can experience a similar conversion facilitated by 
or leading to a fresh vision of persons and things, of friendship and justice, 
remains at The Hobbit’s end an unanswered riddle. It seems highly unlikely, 
but perhaps it is not yet impossible.
The story of The Hobbit ends where it began, in Bilbo’s beloved home 
in the Shire and with Bilbo’s property in jeopardy. After only a year away, 
Bilbo returns to find that he is presumed dead. His house is again full of 
uninvited guests, and this time his belongings are being auctioned off. Many 
people actually seem disappointed to find him alive, reluctant as they are to 
return their fine new acquisitions. Bilbo finally has to buy back some of his 
own furniture. In the end his household goods are mostly recovered, but 
not his formerly good name: his reputation for respectability has gone the 
way of most burglars’. He is held in high esteem among his young nieces and 
nephews on the (also somewhat suspect) Took side of his family, “but even 
they were not encouraged in their friendship by their elders” (285). Bilbo 
seems untroubled by this unjust loss of repute; he takes up poetry writing 
and often returns to visit the elves.
Years later his old friends Gandalf and Balin37 come to visit Bilbo, bring-
ing him encouraging news of peace and prosperity in the lands around the 
Lonely Mountain. Wealth abounds, the land is again green and fertile, gov-
ernment among humans is improved with Bard at its helm, and commerce 
bustles up and down the Running River. Significantly, the narrator stresses 
not that justice entire finally reigns in those lands, but rather that friendly 
relations have been restored and strengthened among their peoples. Such 
is The Hobbit’s formula for a social and civic “happily ever after” (qualified 
by an appropriately realistic disclaimer that “it seemed [things] were going 
very well” there): “and there was friendship in those parts between elves and 
dwarves and men.”38
Tolkienian Recovery in Modern Liberal Democracy
The “imagined wonder” of Tolkien’s Hobbit thus can aid us in recovering 
a fresh awareness of the strangeness of ownership; of the difficulty of dis-
cerning what is strictly right or just, and the need for both knowledge and, 
perhaps especially, friendliness or benevolence if we are even to approximate 
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what is due in more complex situations;39 and of the importance as well as 
the fragility and limitations of friendship in social and civic relationships. 
In these regards, the recovery of a clearer (and, paradoxically, more prob-
lematic) perception prompted by Tolkien’s tale seems especially apropos for 
us denizens of modern liberal democracy. We can tend to view our world 
through a predictable prism of privacy and rights-claims and individualistic 
outlooks, that is, through a glass clouded by anxious desires to acquire and 
to succeed. If we allow this fairy story to open our eyes to a broader view 
of our own humanity and its neediness, foibles, and aspirations, it can, as 
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of classical Greek and Latin literature in the 
modern democratic era, help “prop us up on the side where we lean.”40 And 
by shaking some of our “settled convictions” about the just and the benefi-
cial, this “child’s tale” can help clear the way for adults to engage afresh in 
philosophical and social-scientific inquiry.
Tocqueville considers classical Greek and Latin literature to be essentially 
aristocratic in spirit and thus an excellent counterweight to democratic ten-
dencies in the arts. The former is all attention to detail, beauty, refinement, 
and idealism; the latter seeks ease, excitement, novelty, and naturalism. There 
are virtues in each approach, but if isolated and allowed to follow its natural 
bents, each “literary spirit” has its peculiar pitfalls. The aristocratic ethos 
can end in an esoteric incommunicability of artificial, even petty and sterile 
formalism; the democratic spirit can swing toward the hastily written, the 
reductive, and the bizarre.41 Tocqueville likewise contrasts the tendency of 
aristocratic historians to focus on the roles of individual persons in shaping 
the course of events, on the one hand, with the common bent of democratic 
history to gloss over human agency and responsibility and identify the causes 
of particular events in mass movements, material processes, and sweeping 
social currents, on the other hand. Once again, either of these approaches 
in isolation is likely to obscure the full truth of things.42 In literature at least 
(and one can extend the analogy to history), Tocqueville indicates the pos-
sibility of periods governed by a sort of mixed regime, contested, perhaps 
short-lived, yet flourishing, when “as the literary genus of democratic nations 
meets that of aristocracies, both seem to want to reign in accord over the 
human mind. Those are passing, but very brilliant periods.”43
Tolkien’s tales seem to reflect just such a meeting of aristocratic and 
democratic spirits, as works by a poet and storyteller with a love for the 
particular and a keen sense of history (he at least once described his “sub-
creation” as more properly of an imaginary historical period than of an imagi-
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nary world). Tolkien’s stories are painstakingly crafted by a lover of language 
who has read widely in ancient and medieval texts, including Norse, Latin, 
and Greek, and who has an appreciation for tradition, custom, and literary 
form. Yet at the same time, Tolkien’s theory of art as subcreation leads him 
to provide the novelty and unpredictability, the freedom from established 
forms, that democratic cultures often crave. Tolkien’s view of the quest genre 
as an excellent vehicle for subcreation through story lends itself to adventur-
ous tales full of variety and action, both favorites of democratic audiences.
With regard to the historical dimension, Tolkien’s quests are set in 
specific (if imaginary) periods—in the case of The Hobbit and especially 
The Lord of the Rings, at the close of one era and the birth of another. As 
Tocqueville maintains of the transition from aristocratic to democratic era 
in the primary world, so too in Tolkien’s imaginary epic there are forces 
at work that individual agents cannot control and which they would try 
to master or reverse at their own peril. There is a keen and even sorrow-
ful sense in Tolkien’s tales of all that is slipping away in the sands of time, 
together with a moderate hopefulness toward the future and what might 
yet be achieved. And, perhaps most importantly, there is in “middle-earth” 
a sphere of causality that is properly each character’s own, comprising per-
sonal tasks, decisions, and responsibilities, upon which (under and aided by 
Providence)44 the fate of others also depends. In their subcreated wonder, 
Tolkien’s tales re-present to modern readers the rightful priority of human-
ity over the narrower needs of a particular polity and likewise the priority 
of the personal over the artificial and mechanical. Indeed, his disdain for 
the chauvinism that often underlies moments of purportedly universalist 
expansion, as well as his deep concern for the tendency of mass society and 
technological rationalism to obfuscate the primordial dimension of the 
personal, free, and responsible, underlies Tolkien’s sometimes deprecatory 
comments about “modern” politics, or “mere” politics.45 “If we could get 
back to personal names [in speaking about politics],” writes Tolkien to his 
son Christopher, “it would do a lot of good.”46
Both Tolkien and Tocqueville perceive humanity in terms of its poten-
cies for greatness and for misery; moreover, both share in a fiery passion for 
human greatness.47 What most distinguishes their visions is perhaps this: 
while the social scientist Tocqueville is more level-headedly amenable to 
democratic social states and institutions, the poet Tolkien can love, delight 
in, and marvel at the concrete, ordinary, provincial, and even petty human 
person in a way that Tocqueville apparently cannot. Tolkien’s “hero is a hob-
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bit,”48 which is to say, one of us: small, “unimaginative,” and comfort-loving, 
yet possessed of a “pretty wonderful” intellect (even the dullest of us), and 
capable of surprising courage and heroism in a pinch. “This last great Tale 
[comprising both The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings] is seen mainly 
through the eyes of Hobbits: it thus becomes anthropocentric. But through 
Hobbits, not Men so-called . . . to exemplify a recurring theme: the place in 
‘world-politics’ of the unforeseen and unforeseeable acts of will, and deeds 
of virtue of the apparently small, ungreat, forgotten in the places of the Wise 
and Great (good as well as evil).”49
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“Just give them the interne t”
Social Media and the Promise of Liberal Democracy
Joseph J. Foy
On June 6, 2010, Khaled Mohamed Said was sitting at a table on the second 
floor of a cybercafé in Sidi Gaber, a neighborhood in Alexandria, Egypt. Two 
detectives from the local police station entered the café to arrest Said. After 
binding his hands behind his back, one of the detectives smashed Said’s 
face on the edge of a marble tabletop. The officers then dragged his body 
out of the café and into an entranceway of another establishment across the 
street. There the men beat him, repeatedly striking his head against the iron 
doorway, the walls, and the stairs. They allegedly continued beating him 
long after his body was lifeless.1
When Khaled Said’s family was allowed access to the morgue to view 
his body, his brother discreetly took photos of the beaten, disfigured corpse 
of the nearly unrecognizable twenty-eight-year-old. He then e-mailed the 
photos out, and they soon went viral on the Internet. Among the recipients 
of the gruesome images was Internet activist Wael Ghonim. In response, 
Ghonim and four others created and administered the Facebook page “We 
Are All Khaled Said.” They used the page to post images of Said, condemn 
the brutality of the dictatorial regime of Hosni Mubarak, and organize the 
January 25, 2011, event “The Day of the Revolution against Torture, Poverty, 
Corruption, and Unemployment.” The instructions were for people wishing 
to engage in the protest to wear all black and stand five feet apart (so as to 
comply with Egyptian laws against public demonstrations) while making 
no noise and carrying no signs. More than eighty thousand people clicked 
“yes” to the event, indicating their plan to participate, and eighteen days 
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later, Mubarak, who had assumed control of Egypt in 1981, resigned his 
position as president.2
Internet technology has been rapidly revolutionizing the way informa-
tion is both communicated and consumed and has given rise to what is 
known as “social media”: Web- and mobile-based forms of interactive com-
munication that allow users to generate and share electronic content through 
a variety of applications. Social networking sites such as Facebook, Ning, and 
Google+, as well as microblogging applications such as Twitter and Qiaku, 
allow individuals to connect with other users all over the world. People can 
engage in interactive discourse and information sharing, which leads to the 
creation of alternative communities and an electronic form of civil society.
The popularity of social media has spawned much discussion and specu-
lation as to whether such technologies substantively and meaningfully alter 
the meaning of community and human relationships. In the realm of politics, 
much of the public attention has been directed to the possibility of social 
networking as a means of mass mobilization and as a tool of democracy, with 
analyses of national (2008 American presidential elections), international 
(the revolutionary activities taking place in countries from Iran to Egypt), 
and local (the mobilization of political protests in Madison, Wisconsin) 
events at the forefront of public scrutiny and popular punditry. And while 
such empirical case studies are vital for exploring in greater depth, from a 
theoretical perspective there is an even greater, global transformation that 
is occurring in both democratic and nondemocratic societies. Put simply, 
the Internet and social media are transforming the public sphere in a way 
that fulfills the long-standing promises of liberal democracy.
Liberal Democracy in Form and Practice
A first step toward fully appreciating the role that Internet technologies and 
social media play in helping to secure the full potential of liberal democracy 
is to establish and understand the framework for such a system.
Democracy is an essentially contested concept, with many different un-
derstandings, conceptions, and applications, which lack universal agreement. 
For instance, in the classical, Athenian (508–322 BCE) sense, democracy was 
a system wherein the common people (demos) popularly shared in political 
rule or power (kratos). In that system citizens directly participated in col-
lective deliberation and decision making, selecting governmental positions 
in the city-state through the process of lottery (citizenship was limited to 
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adult males who had completed military training, thus excluding a major-
ity of the population). By contrast, in the Roman tradition (509–527 BCE), 
democracy was defined in a republican sense; citizens were represented by 
elected officials, and political authority was divided in different governmental 
institutions through a defined separation of powers. Both systems, though 
procedurally quite different, are considered democratic because the public 
had a role in making or directly influencing political decisions that were 
binding on the community at large. As Pericles noted in his famous funeral 
oration eulogizing the Athenians, who were among the first to fall in the 
Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), “[Athens’s] administration favors the 
many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy.”3
During the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth century in the West, 
liberal-democratic theorists such as John Locke (1632–1704) conceived of 
democracy as resulting from a system of natural rights that empowers the 
individual by placing limitations on governments, constraining them to the 
“will” of the people, the “consent of the governed.” Baron de Montesquieu 
(1689–1755) later expanded Lockean notions of division of power, so as to 
separate administrative functions of government through the establishment 
of legislative, executive, and judicial bodies and imposing further limitations 
on government. These early forms have become known as systems of “clas-
sical liberalism,” emphasizing the right of the individual to be free from the 
coercive influences of the state. More contemporary political theorists and 
activists have begun incorporating economic rights into their conceptions 
of democracy. The modern liberal thinker John Rawls (1921–2002), for 
example, articulates the necessity of social programs to ensure meaningful 
participation, choice, and quality of life in a democratic society; his is a form 
known as “egalitarian liberalism” or “welfare state liberalism.”
No matter which form a liberal democracy takes, the modern liberal 
consensus is that democracy requires the guarantee of certain rights and 
freedoms in order to sustain it in a meaningful sense. Along these lines, 
democratic theorist Robert Dahl established procedural criteria for what 
he calls “polyarchy,” a modern, working democracy. Dahl states that seven 
features are necessary to qualify a system as democratic: control over gov-
ernmental decisions about policy must be constitutionally vested in elected 
officials; elected officials must be peacefully selected and removed through 
the process of frequent, fair elections; there must be nearly universal adult 
suffrage; most adult citizens should have the right to run for elected office; 
citizens must retain the right of free expression and criticism; there needs to 
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be access to alternative forms of information, such that the flow of informa-
tion is not monopolistically controlled by government or another entity; and 
people must be given the right of association and participation.4 If a system 
falls significantly short on any one of these dimensions, it fails to meet the 
necessary requirements to be considered within the rubric of democracy.5 
Thus, although democracies may take a variety of forms and incorporate 
different procedural and institutional mechanisms for political activities, 
all must provide a framework for citizen participation and public control 
of political authority.
Along with the institutional and procedural requirements for a liberal 
democracy, there is a growing recognition of the importance of democratic 
culture, to produce significant progress toward popular sovereignty. Ronald 
Inglehart, a professor of comparative political development, has famously 
argued that cultural patterns, once they are established, have a significant 
impact on political and economic decision making.6 Recognizing the role of 
institutional liberalization in advancing cultural change, Inglehart does not 
dismiss the interplay institutions have in the shaping of culture through pro-
cesses of socialization. However, central to his argument about substantive 
democracy is the recognition that if democracy is to exist in a meaningful 
sense, there must be a democratization of the mass public and culture, not 
just the liberalization of political institutions.
But what of those societies that have become culturally habituated to 
illiberal, undemocratic activities? Are they doomed to remain suppressed 
by the tyrannical abuses of power because circumstances have not allowed 
for the development of more open political institutions? When and if such 
institutions are liberalized, do the lack of a democratic experience and the 
societies’ underdeveloped democratic culture threaten the consolidation of 
democracy? As American pragmatist philosopher and liberal theorist John 
Dewey once noted, “Full freedom of the human spirit and of individuality 
can be achieved only as there is effective opportunity to share in the cultural 
resources of civilization.”7 It is here that the Internet and the expansion of 
social media play a critical part.
Liberal Democracy’s Fourth Revolution
The history of liberal democracy to date might be summed up in three dis-
tinct movements: the rejection of political centralization, the rejection of 
economic control, and the rejection of social hierarchy. Each of these move-
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ments has attempted to expand the notion of freedom and participation in 
a meaningful sense, thereby democratizing institutions of public authority 
and broadening notions of liberty.
Arguably the first wave of liberal democracy occurred in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries in the struggle against the unchecked power of 
oligarchic rule. England’s Glorious Revolution in 1688 is but one example. 
The overthrow of King James II and the subsequent drafting of the English 
Bill of Rights imposed limits on the previously absolutist power of mon-
archy, establishing the foundations of modern democracy. The first wave, 
therefore, rejected the concentration of political power in the hands of the 
one or the few and formulated a theory of liberty as freedom from tyranni-
cal authority through the development of constitutional limitations on the 
power of the state.
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the second wave of liber-
alization, which corresponded with the economic and social transforma-
tion resulting from the Industrial Revolution. Workers’ movements began 
challenging the authority of the corporation through the formation of trade 
unions and demands for political recognition and the power of collective 
bargaining. New institutional arrangements that worked to advance liberty 
for laboring classes through the regulation of industrial practices and the 
establishment of social welfare expanded the principles of liberalism from 
strictly political to economic matters as well. And as an outgrowth of such 
a rejection of economic control, the third liberal wave arose in the form 
of mass movements that began in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
rejecting principles of social hierarchy. Numerous civil rights movements 
sought to empower gender, racial, and ethnic minorities through the insti-
tutional expansion of the right of suffrage and of franchise.
Each liberal movement in history responded to changing social and 
economic conditions, altering the fundamental understanding of what is 
meant by freedom and equality. However, each of the movements focused 
on institutional reforms concentrated within the traditional realm of the 
public sphere, an arena in which matters of significance are discussed and 
outcomes are determined by the quality of argument. The first wave provided 
limitations on the power of the state, the second wave on the economic power 
of industry, and the third on eugenic principles of social hierarchy. The ex-
panded principles of liberty in each case empowered individuals through 
greater inclusion into public deliberation and participation, democratizing 
institutions to advance evolving notions of liberty.
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What we are now witnessing is a fourth wave of liberal revolution, 
culminating in the rejection of cultural control. In the late twentieth 
century, the rapid rise of Internet technology exploded the canon of 
identity, community, and what counted as the public sphere. This fourth 
wave is, in essence, a democratization of the public. Rather than pushing 
for de jure forms of institutional liberalization and the systemic opening 
of society, social media provide a framework for mass communication 
and interactive media that undercuts the cultural monopolies and levels 
hierarchical models of information distribution. Social media eliminate 
the long-standing barriers between citizen and journalist, private citizen 
and public activist; they offer the possibility for pluralistic contributions 
to public dialogue and debate regardless of a person’s status or position. 
The political rights that give each individual the same input in politi-
cal decisions as the next person regardless of background or status are 
thereby extended to all realms of social and cultural activities. To some, 
the elimination of these commercial, economic, political, intellectual, and 
cultural hierarchies is a source of great dismay and skepticism. However, 
within liberalism there has always been a fundamental tension between 
freedom and equality.
In addition to the transformative effect of Web-based access to infor-
mation and expression and social media applications on institutions of 
culture in liberal societies, these technologies have a profound impact on 
cultural systems within closed societies. In those countries where open 
participation is suppressed and communication and information rigidly 
controlled by the state, there is a lack of opportunity for individuals to 
become acculturated with principles of diversity, tolerance, and collec-
tive action in the advancement of publicly defined goals. The existence 
of Internet technology has allowed for the development of what might 
be considered “parallel societies,” ones in which groups willfully segment 
themselves from the dominant political paradigm in order to carve out 
a space for autonomous (or at least semiautonomous) social, cultural, 
and individual pursuits not otherwise tolerated. Social media provide for 
more pluralistic contributions to public dialogue and debate by not only 
fostering the development of alternative publics but allowing access to, and 
interaction within, those publics in ways not previously possible. For these 
reasons, social media are helping to carve out new frontiers of democratic 
participation and engagement and transforming cultural frameworks by 
democratizing the mass public.
“Just Give Them the Internet” 239
Social Media, Smart Mobs, Side-Stepping Censorship
As opposed to traditional media sources, social media and other Web-based 
applications make it possible for people to interact with information, post-
ing reactions and insights and follow-up commentary. Whereas in earlier 
years, “debate” could occur asynchronously in the opinion columns and 
letters to the editor on the back pages of newspapers or through telephone 
calls to radio talk shows, now, through the use of blogs, user comment 
spaces at the end of news stories, online insta-polls, and more, people can 
instantaneously react to information, and they can continue to interact with 
others who comment on the same source. Although these forums often set 
boundaries in terms of deleting abusive language and threats, they are not 
subjected to the same kinds of editorial controls and screening as other 
forms of media. Likewise, they often allow for easy sharing of information 
through “like,” “recommend,” and “share” buttons that repost links and 
summaries of articles to social networking feeds. This feature not only en-
hances the democratic possibility of public discourse; it helps expand the 
notions of alternative sources of information and free expression, as well as 
of principles of association.
More overtly, social media have become a forum through which political 
activity is conducted, advanced, and reinforced, since it allows for quicker, 
easier dissemination of information as well as coordination of public action. 
Social and media critic Howard Rheingold refers to this power of electronic 
media as the creation of “smart mobs”: technology’s ability to organize and 
facilitate social and political action.8 With a handheld device that is linked to 
a social networking application, a person can remain mobile while keeping 
in contact with a larger group. As Rheingold explains, “These devices will 
help people coordinate actions with others around the world—and, perhaps 
more importantly, with people nearby. Groups of people using these tools 
will gain new forms of social power, new ways to organize their interactions 
just in time and just in place.”9
An example of the smart-mob effect was enacted in February 2011 in 
my home state of Wisconsin. After the passage of a budget bill that called 
for the elimination of collective bargaining rights for public employees 
throughout the state, the largest public protest in the state since the Vietnam 
War descended on the state capitol building in Madison. On Friday, Febru-
ary 11, Governor Scott Walker announced the proposed legislation, and by 
the evening of that day people had already begun protesting. The following 
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Monday, more than 1,000 University of Wisconsin students marched against 
some of the recommended changes announced, and Tuesday, February 15, 
an estimated 3,000 people occupied the capitol rotunda while 10,000 more 
marched outside. The following day, the number of protestors doubled, 
adding 5,000 more on Thursday, and the numbers swelled to more than 
68,000 by the weekend.
Mass public protest of this kind is not unheard of in the United States, 
but the degree of coordination, communication, and facilitation of activi-
ties using social networking technologies altered the way organization and 
mobilization were occurring. Twitter updates from sources like Mother 
Jones, which posted, “Sources in Madison say riot police have been ordered 
to clear protestors from capitol at 2 am,” helped followers who occupied the 
capitol stay current with information from outside the building, and through 
social networks people were able to witness in real time what was happen-
ing throughout the capitol. Facebook pages also began popping up for the 
dissemination of information and the coordination of a public response. 
Almost instantly, sites such as “Facebook Cause Page: Vote No on Walker’s 
Budget Bill,” “Thank You Wisconsin Dem Senators,” “WI Public Employees 
against Walker’s Attack on Workers’ Rights,” “Virtual Wisconsin State Em-
ployees Unions Solidarity Vigil,” and “The Scott Walker Watch” appeared.10 
Supporters of the governor and the proposed legislation initiated responses 
such as the Americans for Prosperity Web page “Stand with Scott Walker” 
and the Republican Governor’s Association’s “Stand with Scott” site, which 
also organized a Twitter feed, “#standwithscott.”11 In this way, protests and 
public debate, dissent, and discourse were occurring not only at the capitol 
but also in the virtual spaces of the Internet.
Additionally, the rapid, often viral dissemination of video and sound 
files, art, music, infographics, books, blogs, and a host of other communica-
tion forms means that argumentation and identity formation is no longer 
hegemonically controlled by elite sources of production and information. 
Online messaging offers a meaningful challenge to cultural monopolies in 
the forms of political and social institutions and news and entertainment 
media; it also expands what counts as political discourse.12
Social media not only level the hierarchy of cultural control but also 
wreak havoc on attempts at censorship. For example, in response to an 
online petition following an open letter issued by 303 Chinese writers, 
lawyers, scholars, peasants, former party officials, and workers calling upon 
the Communist Party of China to relinquish its monopolistic hold of po-
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litical authority, to liberalize the country and open prospects for political 
self-determination for the people, the Chinese government issued a major 
crackdown of speech on the Internet.13
The Cao Ní Ma, or “grass-mud horse,” was a meme (a cultural artifact 
transmitted via repetition) that spread throughout China as a form of dissent 
from the government’s control and censorship of the Internet. The grass-
mud horse, its name derived from words that sound like a profane insult in 
Mandarin dialects but using characters that are harmless so as not to set off 
Chinese censors, is a mythical form of alpaca that received an entry in the 
Baidu Encyclopedia, an online encyclopedia that is edited collaboratively 
in a manner similar to Wikipedia. Dissidents used a variety of sophomoric 
puns, including another dirty pun in reference to the “difficult environment” 
in which the grass-mud horse lives, as a means of skirting antipornography 
laws and resisting increased efforts by the Chinese government to restrict 
open communication. Likewise, dissidents used a variety of Web-based 
technologies and social media applications to spread their message. The 
“Song of the Grass Mud Horse,” which went viral on YouTube, celebrates the 
mythical alpaca for defeating the “River Crabs” (censorship) and protecting 
its grasslands (free speech).
Although risqué puns and dirty song lyrics may seem like a feeble re-
sponse to authoritarian rule, they reveal not only the potential for widespread 
activism in otherwise closed systems and the difficulty Internet technologies 
create for illiberal political systems that seek to censor the free dissemina-
tion of ideas and forums for public activism. Soon after the grass-mud horse 
began galloping across the Internet—with YouTube videos of the original 
song, and others like it, drawing several million viewers over the years—T-
shirts, dolls, toys, posters, and movies featuring the animal became available 
across the world. This phenomenon created an alternative public outside 
of the centralized systemic politics of China, allowing individuals a means 
for engaging in activism, protest, and expressions of solidarity. Such dis-
sent was not institutionally allowed, but the democratizing effects of social 
media and Web technologies on the public created a space parallel to the 
closed institutions.
iPod Liberalism and the Critique of Social Media
Internet technologies and social media are not without their detractors. 
Media analysts and social critics have long expressed a general concern that 
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people use these technologies for mere escapism and self-indulgent enter-
tainment.14 More recently, broadcast and cinematic arts professor Peter B. 
Orlik has warned against the possibility of “unabated absorption” in online 
networks such as “Second Life” and “sci-fi sojourns” (presumably referring 
to multimember online role-playing games such as World of Warcraft and 
Star Wars: The Old Republic) that insulates and distracts individuals from 
participation in traditional public activities.15
Some traditional media sources, and ironically titled blog entries like 
“Real People Don’t Have Time for Social Media,” attempt to respond to the 
concern about the amount of time “wasted” with social media by pointing 
out that dedicating time to amusing ourselves is not by any means unique to 
Web-based technologies.16 Just as the printing press allowed for the escapism 
of the pulp novel, radio for pop music, celluloid the summer blockbuster, 
and television the sitcom, individuals use social media as a means of pleasure 
and entertainment. Orlik explains, “Individual media ‘programs’ do not cre-
ate escapist harm. It is only the unvaried aggregation of such programs that 
can turn gratification to dependency.”17 Besides this uniqueness argument, 
defenders of social media point out the creative and interactive potential 
of social media that does not exist within traditional media. It allows for 
the development of communities and the practice of social behaviors that 
continue even as individuals seek entertainment.
Of course, one problem resulting from the formation of alternative 
publics is the loss of any unifying public sphere that makes the necessary 
coordination, compromise, and cooperation of democracy possible. With 
the rise of more and more “closed publics,” individuals either intentionally 
or unintentionally create an echo chamber in which their worldviews are 
constantly reinforced as the truth and all others are marginalized and dis-
missed. These closed publics shelter individuals from dissent and insulate 
them from information or ideas they find to be uncomfortable.
Once again, these criticisms are not unique to social media. When one 
examines broadly the pluralistic nature of participation in liberal socie-
ties, the tendency of individuals to seek like-minded others to collaborate 
with in an attempt to achieve mutually desired outcomes is endemic to 
democracy. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison argued that all free and 
open societies deal with the formation of “factions,” which he described as 
“a number of citizens . . . who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or 
to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” These groups, 
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which take the contemporary form of interest groups, advocacy networks, 
political parties, unions, and trade associations, among others, segment 
political activities around particular interests. Madison postulates that “the 
latent causes of faction are . . . sown in the nature of man; and we see them 
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the dif-
ferent circumstances of civil society.”18 The factionalization of the public 
into like-minded communities is therefore the by-product of associational 
freedoms allowed within open systems. Rather than being caused by social 
networking, the formation of these groups is an expression of the liberal 
freedoms inherent in the Internet.
Unlike traditional avenues of political engagement that connect almost 
entirely with already in-tune, mobilized groups, social media also help break 
down the barriers of disengagement. Because users can share political and 
nonpolitical content, as well as opening forums for immediate responses 
and feedback from other individuals within their networks, people are more 
commonly exposed to public engagement than they might be through tradi-
tional political activity. One may not attend a political rally or public forum 
in a conventional sense, but engaging in public discourse with a variety of 
family, friends, and followers in social media habituates norms of open com-
munication and exposes people to overt political messages and information 
that they might not seek outside of these electronic communities.
A more direct criticism of social media’s democratic potential comes 
from Evgeny Morozov, a renowned scholar and social critic. Morozov dis-
parages the popular claims that the Internet will usher in a wave of liberal 
democratization. Dismissing what he refers to as “iPod Liberalism,” which 
he labels as the deterministic assumption people have that the spread of 
technology will produce more open societies, Morozov contests that the 
mere existence of technology does not automatically lead to increases in 
liberalization in closed regimes.19 On the contrary, although he sees the 
democratic possibilities inherent within Internet technologies, he criticizes 
the notion that advancements in technology will necessarily yield demo-
cratic outcomes.20 Likewise, he argues that authoritarian regimes often use 
Internet technologies to their advantage, creating new means of surveilling 
dissenters and spreading progovernment propaganda. Morozov sees in the 
Internet a potential for further stifling opposition and suppressing dissent; 
he does not expect it necessarily to exert a democratic and liberalizing 
impact on societies.
Such a perspective is problematic for a number of reasons. First, Morozov 
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acknowledges that the Internet has promoted the flow of information not 
only across open societies but also into and out of more closed, authoritarian 
states. And he grants that new generations of political dissidents are turn-
ing to social media to organize and structure oppositional movements. He 
even goes so far as to claim that “if anything the speed and ease of Internet 
publishing have made many previous modes of samizdat obsolete; the emerg-
ing generation of dissidents may as well choose Facebook and YouTube as 
their headquarters and iTunes and Wikipedia as their classrooms.”21 To that 
extent, Morozov agrees with the democratic prospects of the Internet and 
social media. His concern, however, is for the notion of “technological de-
terminism,” the idea that the Internet will necessarily yield democratization 
in any system in which it is introduced; he notes that these technologies can 
be used as easily by despots as by democrats. This criticism, however, places 
too high a threshold for any form of political activism. By introducing such 
a standard, claims that the printing press helped to advance democracy and 
promote the spread of liberal ideas could be dismissed by the fact that the 
print media did not help topple every closed regime in which they were 
introduced; or that authoritarian regimes have used these traditional forms 
of media to promulgate rigid party or state discipline; or that because art 
was used as a form of propaganda by the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union or the National Socialist Party in Germany, we should reject the 
democratic prospects of artistic expression as being unable to produce a 
meaningful understanding of democracy. Thus, while it is true that social 
media do not necessarily result in immediate regime change across authori-
tarian states, by Morozov’s own admission they can be important tools in 
the oppositional arsenal.
Additionally, Morozov’s critique misunderstands the essence of what 
liberal democracy entails. Democracy does not mean that only “proper or 
agreeable” ideas will be allowed to surface, or that only certain groups ought 
to have the power to utilize tools of expression to further their agenda. 
Democracy requires a commitment to the ideals and procedures that allow 
for mass empowerment and the genuinely free and open participation of 
all. Such a system carries with it the possibility that illiberal voices will be 
heard and supported rather than those calling for greater openness and 
transparency. Democracies around the world have been known, in fact, to 
elect dictators. The problem Morozov has with social media, therefore, is a 
problem he would find with an open society itself. Democracy is a dangerous 
proposition. The radical opening of society by social media is also dangerous, 
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but this is not an argument against its democratic potential. Theoretically 
and empirically, the democratizing potential of social media cannot be 
evaluated in terms of whether or not they are used in ways acceptable to a 
particular vision of a good society.
Finally, Morozov overlooks the fact that social media are not directly 
focused on producing regime change and promoting systemic liberalization. 
Systemic liberalization may be a likely outcome over time (it is important to 
note that in his 2009 article, one regime he cites as having a lot of technologi-
cal advancement without a corresponding movement toward liberalization 
is Egypt), but the true power of Internet technologies is in the democratizing 
effect they have on the mass public, allowing a large number of individuals 
a means to view a diversity of information that is difficult for the state to 
suppress, as well as the opportunity to connect with other individuals and 
express solidarity and a common identity where no viable means previously 
existed. This access not only familiarizes and acculturates individuals to core 
aspects of democratic life—freedom of information, expression, and a form 
of assembly—it enables them to practice those aspects directly in ways that 
in all other forms are being suppressed. The Internet and social media help 
to create a democratic culture through the organization of alternative publics 
that can organize and communicate outside the bounds of traditionally de-
fined political space, giving people an opportunity to experience and practice 
democracy even in situations where democracy is nonexistent in systemic 
politics. This opportunity can be far more critical than the mere creation 
of electoral institutions or what might amount to superficial avenues for 
representation. As Alexis de Tocqueville describes in his study of America, 
democratic societies do not have their roots in institutions but in culture.22 
Lacking a democratic culture, the creation and imposition of democratic 
institutions often fail or become distorted because of a lack of democratic 
experiences, habits, and ways of life.
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and the Blogosphere: 
The “End” of Democracy
Social media and the Internet are reframing our understanding of the 
public sphere and of communities. In doing so, this technology is fulfill-
ing the promise of a liberal democratic politics. Like other revolutionary 
moments in the history of liberal democracy, social media are pushing for 
the opening of traditional institutions and the establishment of a stronger, 
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more expansive framework of democratic participation. Expanding on these 
movements, the social media revolution is not merely targeting external, 
institutional arrangements to bring about a more liberal democratic society, 
but it is part of a liberal revolution that is democratizing the public itself. 
Internet technologies may in fact be ushering in a new, and perhaps final, 
frontier in the creation of a more global civil society in which traditional 
feelings of association with a geographically defined scope of culture give 
way to a transnational sense of common identity. The image of a twenty-
one-year-old Egyptian protestor in Tahrir holding a handmade sign saying, 
“Egypt Supports Wisconsin Workers” and “One World, One Pain,” which 
was reported on by Lila Shapiro of the Huffington Post, and the photo of 
protestors in Madison, Wisconsin, carrying Egyptian flags around the capitol 
building are just two very small examples of the potential for a reconcep-
tion of citizenship, democracy, and the public sphere in an electronic age.23
In specific cases, Web-based technologies and social networking ap-
plications are introducing fledgling forays into democratic activities by in-
dividuals who have otherwise had such freedoms suppressed within closed 
political systems. In the now immortal words of Wael Ghonim, “If you 
want to liberalize a society, just give them the Internet.”24 From a political-
theory perspective, however, this tool for mass communication and public 
interaction may go beyond just advancing a traditional understanding of 
liberal democracy. Instead, social media and other Web-based applications 
and forums represent the fulfillment of liberal democracy. Not only do 
they allow for all individuals to engage in the dissemination of ideas and 
decisions; they break down elite controls over what counts as an important 
issue for social consideration.25 The continued tension between freedom 
and equality within this framework will continue, as well as debate about 
whether too much democracy might not be the utopian conclusion many 
political theorists were hoping for. However, those debates will continue 
to add to the vibrant tradition of democratic theory and political philoso-
phy for years to come, and perhaps represent the ultimate end in the long 
progress of democracy.
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